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VOL XX · APRIL 1968 · No. 3

CONTENTS

Political Discontinuities in the International System — *Oran R. Young* 369

Peru's Postponed Revolution — *David Chaplin* 393

Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam — *Edward J. Mitchell* 421

RESEARCH NOTES

The Oligarchy Muddle — *James L. Payne* 439

Hypotheses on Misperception — *Robert Jervis* 454

REVIEW ARTICLES

International and Comparative Politics: Toward a Synthesis? — *Wolfram F. Hanrieder* 480

Political Development: Time Sequences and Rates of Change — *Eric A. Nordlinger* 494

The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy — *Charles F. Hermann* 521

The Difficult Political Choices of Science — *Eugene B. Skolnikoff* 535

The Contributors ii

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POLITICAL DISCONTINUITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

By ORAN R. YOUNG

THE international political system is currently undergoing changes that are both rapid and extensive. Especially since the early sixties, a number of trends have manifested themselves and become interrelated in such a way that, taken together, they are substantially altering the fundamental postwar patterns of international politics. These indications of change and flux have engendered a substantial debate concerning appropriate concepts for the analysis of the international system. Nevertheless, the resultant debate about the significance of these trends has evolved, for the most part, around the dichotomy between bipolar and multipolar models of the international system.[1] As a result, the debate has been cast in terms of a somewhat narrow conception of essentially structural problems. I submit, however, that the dichotomy between bipolar and multipolar models is clearly inadequate to deal with a number of the principal aspects and axes of change which are becoming increasingly important in international politics in the current period. Nor is the range of mixed types along a spectrum between the poles of bipolarity and multipolarity sufficient for a clear analysis of contemporary shifts.[2] While the notion of a vertically layered system combining elements of bipolarity and multipolarity at the same time, for example, is an interesting one, it too fails to capture much of the essence of the contemporary flux.[3] What are needed instead, therefore, are some new modes of conceptualizing the international political system. It is the thesis of this article that a constructive start in this direction can be made by emphasizing the growing interpenetration of the global or systemwide axes of international politics on the one hand and several newly emerging but widely divergent regional arenas or subsystems on the other hand.

[1] For a clear discussion of the bipolar model, see Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar System," *Daedalus* (Summer 1964), 881-909. A somewhat parallel effort to develop the multipolar model is Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 390-406.

[2] For various conceptions of the range of mixed types, see Arthur Lee Burns, "From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics*, IX (July 1957), 494-529; and Ciro Elliott Zoppo, "Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 579-606.

[3] This notion of a layered system has been developed by Richard Rosecrance in his article "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, X (September 1966), 314-27.

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The Discontinuities Model

The alternative model I propose for the analysis of international politics in the present period is one that encompasses the concurrent influence of global and regional power processes in patterns that are strongly marked by elements of both congruence and discontinuity. In general, the concepts of congruence and discontinuity refer to the extent to which patterns of political interests and relationships of power are similar or dissimilar as between the global arena and various regional arenas and as between the different regional arenas themselves. There are, however, several more specific characteristics of this model of international politics that should be made explicit at the outset.

First, there are some actors and some substantive issues that are relevant throughout the whole international system, or at least throughout most of its subsystems. The superpowers, though their *effective* influence on many issues is declining, clearly fall into this category in the current international system. Similarly, substantive issues such as communism, nationalism, and economic development have systemwide as well as local aspects. Second, relevant actors, substantive interests, patterns of conflict, and specific power balances differ significantly from one subsystem to another. While global actors and issues are of some importance in each subsystem, the individual subsystems also contain a variety of unique features. Asian and African power balances, for example, are quite different from the more classical arrangements in Europe. And Asian communism is considerably more intertwined with the problems of active nationalism than is the case with communism in Europe. Third, the regional subsystems of the international system are therefore significantly discontinuous with one another in a number of respects. The degree of discontinuity between any two subsystems may of course vary, but for the moment it is the existence of discontinuities in general that needs to be stressed. Fourth, in all cases the subsystems are by no means totally discontinuous with one another since each is in fact an amalgam of global and local features. The existence of systemwide actors and issues is not the only source of congruence between the various subsystems. Several other types of links between subsystems are of some importance. To begin with, with regard to issues of reputation there is a spread effect that is important in shaping regional manifestations of systemwide issues. For example, the alliance behavior of a superpower in one subsystem can affect the posture of that power's allies in other subsystems. In addition, there are various demonstration effects that exercise a considerable influence

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on the atmosphere of international politics across subsystems. In other words, there are perceptual links between the subsystems as well as more substantive links. These perceptual links tend to be substantially spread and strengthened through the existence of various universal organizations, such as the United Nations, that serve as channels of communication. The fifth characteristic of the model is that the specific mixture between global and regional elements is apt to differ in a variety of ways from one subsystem to another. In short, levels and patterns of discontinuity are likely to be relatively volatile both horizontally across space and vertically over time.

It is important to clarify the essential differences between the discontinuities model outlined above and the other important models that have appeared in the contemporary discussion of international politics.[4] Bipolar models emphasize the importance of a single, dominant axis of conflict and the tendency for regional actors and issues to be conceptualized in relationship to the underlying bipolar axis of the system. The discontinuities model, on the other hand, stresses the importance of both systemwide and regional factors and emphasizes the complex patterns of their interpenetration, leaving room for shifting weights with regard to the question of which type of factor is dominant. For its part, the multipolar model tends to stress the existence of a multiplicity of axes of conflict and the phenomenon of crosscutting relationships among these axes.[5] The discontinuities model differs in several respects from the multipolar perspective: it deals primarily with subsystems rather than with individual actors; it stresses the differences between systemwide and regional axes of conflict; and it focuses on the complex interpenetrations between universal and regional issues rather than on the much less "lumpy" notion of a number of individual actors dealing with each other on a variety of issues in ways that produce numerous intersecting lines of conflict. Next, the distinctions between the discontinuities model and the model based on the notion of a small number of relatively distinct regional blocs are easily discernible.[6] Above all, the discontinuities model emphasizes both the

[4] Perhaps the single most important statement of abstract models of the international system remains Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957).

[5] In its intellectual origins, the multipolar model of the international system really stems from the conceptions of the American group theorists concerning domestic politics. For the original and in some ways clearest statement of these conceptions, see Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago 1908).

[6] For conceptualizations of models along these lines, see Roger Masters, "A Multi-Bloc Model of the International System," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961), 780-98; and Wolfram Hanrieder, "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, IX (September 1965), 299-308.

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combination of global and regional factors within individual subsystems and the various interconnections between subsystems. Finally, there is a hypothetical model of the international system based on the notion of political fragmentation that would produce a situation somewhat similar to the old conception of atomistic liberalism within individual polities. In this case, the discontinuities model with its repeated stress on interactions and interpenetrations offers a conception of international politics that constitutes one form of direct opposition to the fragmentation model.[7]

One of the most interesting features of the discontinuities model of the international system is the extent to which it contains logical ambiguities that are very much analogous to some of the central problems of international politics in the current era. The sources of these ambiguities fall into several distinct categories. First, the tension between congruence and discontinuity among the various subsystems generates "limited adversary" relationships of a very peculiar nature, especially among the great powers.[8] In short, black-and-white distinctions are impossible in such a situation. The great powers, and especially the superpowers, are increasingly constrained to modify their conflicts in any given subsystem by the fact that they are apt to have important common interests in other subsystems which they do not want to jeopardize. At the same time, these powers are often hampered in the exploitation of common interests both within subsystems and on the global level by the fact that they find themselves engaged in sharp conflicts in other subsystems. There is little doubt, for example, that one important source of change in the postures of the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe is the development of incipient common interests between these powers in the Asian subsystem. Or to take another example, a major barrier to Soviet-American cooperation on the global issues of arms control arises from their conflicting interests in such concrete situations as Germany and Vietnam.

Second, there are important possibilities for manipulation across subsystems which tend to lend further ambiguities to the system, in addition to those emerging directly from the tension between congruence and discontinuity. These possibilities emerge, in essence, from the fact that, while the various subsystems are significantly discontinuous, there are nevertheless important interconnections between them. For this reason, it is sometimes possible to achieve advantages by

[7] Another form of direct opposition to fragmentation would be the development of genuine political integration among the units of the international system.

[8] The concept of "limited adversary" relationships is introduced and developed in Marshall D. Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War* (New Haven 1966).

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utilizing political credit and reputation across subsystems. Victories won in a subsystem that is relatively easy to deal with may serve a country in pursuing its interests in other subsystems. Or again, it is sometimes possible to stir up trouble in one subsystem as a means of sowing confusion and of diverting attention from a country's prime area of interest.[9] There are also in a system of this kind some less tangible manipulatory possibilities arising out of perceptual problems. Especially in a dynamic and fast-changing world, it is sometimes possible to define and conceptualize emerging power balances in terms of perspectives and concepts developed originally for other arenas. Though this effort sometimes leads to dangerous misconceptions and rigidities (more on these problems below), the process can work to the advantage of an actor that can succeed in shaping perceptions about realities and relevant norms in a specific area in ways that work to its own advantage.

Third, the logical ambiguities that can arise from a discontinuities model increase considerably when we begin to move from a world of two important subsystems to one that contains a number of important subsystems. Both the specific issues and the mixture between regional and global concerns will vary from one subsystem to the next. From the point of view of the powers with systemwide interests, the complexities are increased on a straight numerical basis since there are a greater number of combinations of issues and of discontinuities to be dealt with in a situation of multiple subsystems. Moreover, the shift to multiple subsystems raises the possibility of new types of international problems that are not unique to any individual subsystem but that are still not universal problems since they do not arise in all of the subsystems of the overall system. And finally, the number of possibilities for manipulation, mentioned above, rises rapidly as the system shifts from two subsystems to multiple subsystems.

Given the complexities and ambiguities of the system summarized in the discontinuities model, it is hardly surprising that it tends to generate various intellectual problems and confusions that plague the work of analysts and decision-makers alike. In particular, the mixed and interpenetrated nature of the situation seems to go against the grain of very deep-seated psychological needs for clarity and relative simplicity in efforts to conceptualize reality. Perhaps because of these needs, there are two characteristic classes of simplifying devices that tend to crop up repeatedly in efforts to deal with a world of significant

[9] This particular possibility has always been a major source of American concern with regard to East-West problems in the postwar period.

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discontinuities. Though these classes of devices are, in a sense, opposites, both involve substantial distortions of reality which are apt to generate very serious difficulties for sound analysis and decision-making.

The first class of simplifying devices falls under the heading of *segmentation* or *compartmentalization* and is based on a form of cognitive dissonance. The main thrust of these devices is an overemphasis on the uniqueness of individual, regional subsystems and a tendency to deny, at least tacitly, the extent of interpenetration and congruence between them. More specifically, segmentation is the characteristic failing of analysts who operate on the basis of area specialization and of decision-makers and bureaucrats who work through the country or regional-office system. This orientation not infrequently leads to an inability to assess the impact of systemwide actors and issues on regional power processes. Even more serious, however, is the extent to which segmentation of this kind tends to result in a failure to take account of interconnections between subsystems in such areas as reputation, demonstration effects, and the problems of manipulation across subsystems.

The second class of simplifying devices falls under the heading of *fusion* or *universalization* and stems from the search for a few underlying dimensions or concepts in terms of which it is possible to conceptualize all of international politics. This device is perhaps even more common than segmentation, especially among the lay public, because it satisfies the felt need for some sense of "understanding" concerning the basic meaning or significance of the whole of international politics. At the same time, fusion is apt to be even more distorting than segmentation, both because it requires simplification on an even more grandiose scale and because it leads to a polarized conception of the whole world rather than, as with segmentation, to a differentially inadequate conceptualization of particular regional subsystems. Even the most cursory consideration of such polarized conceptions as democracy versus communism, capitalism versus socialism, or the world city versus the countryside is ample to demonstrate the extent of distortion that the device of fusion is likely to produce.

The Emergence of Discontinuities in the International System

The problems arising from multiple power balances and political discontinuities are necessarily relatively modern developments in international politics. The fundamental precondition of reasonably extensive contacts between regional subsystems has been met, for the most part,

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only in the modern era. Within these limitations, however, there are some interesting historical examples of significant discontinuities between several regional subsystems. And some concrete examples of the ways in which such problems have manifested themselves in the past may lend perspective to our subsequent discussion of political discontinuities in the contemporary international system.

In the period between the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War several interesting discontinuities began to unfold more or less simultaneously in the international arena. From the 1880's onward, England and France were engaged in a variety of conflicts concerning the division of territories in Africa, a situation that created important rigidities when the common interests of the two countries on the European continent began to grow stronger, around the turn of the century, in the wake of various changes in Germany's posture. During the same period, England and Russia were in almost constant opposition to each other in the Middle East and in the Far East despite the existence of common interests between them in Europe and despite the growing Franco-Russian friendship on European issues. In fact, before the Anglo-Russian arrangement of 1907 concerning Persia, these two powers represented the principal axis of contention in the Middle East. Then, even during the First World War, England maintained a treaty relationship with Japan despite the fact that Russia and Japan were clear opponents in the Far East. Moreover, all of these divergent axes of contention were further complicated by the participation of all the major European powers except Austria-Hungary and Italy in the process of extracting concessions from China. Throughout this period, the lines of conflict in the Chinese arena, in which Japan and the United States also participated, tended to shift along different lines and at a different pace than the evolving pattern of conflict in Europe itself.

It is also possible to find important examples of discontinuities in international politics during the interwar years, though for the most part the complexities of this period seem somewhat less striking than those that characterized the system immediately prior to the First World War. England and France, in this period, developed sharply disparate views concerning the organization of security in Eastern Europe and, especially, concerning the appropriate role for the Soviet Union in this connection. More generally, the extensive and relatively acrimonious disputes between England and France in the Middle Eastern arena during the twenties and thirties clearly played a role in producing the uncertainty and unhappiness that marked Anglo-French

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efforts to coordinate in response to the resurgence of Germany in Europe. Even into the late thirties, for example, there were no formal alliance commitments or coordination procedures between the two countries. The United States in the interwar period allowed itself to become increasingly involved in the Far East, even while it continued to maintain an insistently isolationist posture with regard to developments in the European arena. Finally, the Second World War itself produced a striking example of political discontinuity in the efforts of the Soviet Union to remain on nonbelligerent terms with Japan long after the opening of the war in the Pacific and the entry of the United States into the European contest had polarized the war on a global basis. The sharpness of this discontinuity is particularly striking in the light of both the clear-cut interdependence of the allied powers in the European arena and the willingness of Britain to join the United States, at least formally, in the war in the Pacific.

Throughout most of the modern history of international politics, however, other types of relationships have tended to be considerably more salient and influential than the patterns of discontinuity under discussion in this article. To a very real extent, in fact, patterns of this kind have emerged on an extensive, worldwide scale and assumed a position of recognized importance only in the present international system. Several significant sets of causal factors underlie this present relevance of a discontinuities model of international politics.

To begin with, the impact of systemwide or global actors and issues is now much more strongly felt than has ever been the case before. The aftermath of the Second World War has seen a sharp acceleration in the rates of development of communications, transportation, and military technologies. As a result, the extent of interdependence of the various components of the overall international system, which has now become a full-fledged world system, has risen dramatically in the contemporary period.[10] Moreover, the period since World War II has witnessed the rise of two superpowers, in contrast to a larger number of great powers, as well as the emergence of several substantive issues that are relevant throughout the international system. Therefore, the contemporary system is not only more interdependent (in the general sense that what happens in any part of it is capable of exercising a very substantial influence on developments in any other part of it), but is also characterized by the existence of several discrete actors and issues

[10] Interdependence refers here to the extent to which actions in one part of the system affect the other parts of the system. It is therefore not a measure of common or overlapping interests. Interdependencies may be either positive or negative.

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of global significance which play very concrete and specific roles in the various regional subsystems.

These developments actually represent the acceleration of a fundamental trend that began in the second half of the nineteenth century. In themselves, however, they are not sufficient to produce an international system such as the one portrayed in the discontinuities model. In the period following World War II, for example, the dominance of the two superpowers became so clear-cut that some version of the bipolar model seemed to be the most accurate representation of reality. During these years, regional subsystems were nonexistent, effectively dominated by the superpowers, or sufficiently peripheral that the conditions of the discontinuities model other than its systemwide features were rarely met. In more recent years, however, a number of important developments in international politics have come together to reduce the salience of the bipolar axis in international politics and to generate a variety of unique features in the power processes of the various subsystems of the international system.

First, a considerable period of time has passed without a large-scale international war to polarize and simplify the patterns of international politics. Because of this, the setting for political discontinuities has been growing increasingly favorable. Second, there has been a gradual diffusion of effective power in the system, despite the superpowers' great superiority in the physical elements of power. Third, the system has witnessed the rise or resurgence of a small number of new power centers that are of major significance even though they are still far less influential than the superpowers. Powers such as France, Germany, China, Japan, and India belong in this category. Fourth, the number of independent states in the system has grown rapidly since 1945, especially in the new regional subsystems of Asia and Africa. Here, the demise of colonialism represented the end of a major simplifying factor of earlier periods of international politics. Fifth, these shifts in the numbers and types of actors in the system have been accompanied by a general rise in levels of political consciousness and by the spread of active nationalism among the "new states." At the present time, even with such an avowedly international movement as communism, it is often difficult to tell whether its specific manifestations in particular states are based more on internationalism or on nationalism. Sixth, as effective influence diffuses in the system and as new lines of conflict emerge, the superpowers themselves are becoming more aware of their own common interests, even while they continue to prosecute a variety of conflicting interests in the various regional subsystems. The

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upshot of all these developments is that the major simplifying assumptions of the bipolar world of the fifties either are no longer valid or are increasingly hedged about by a variety of complicating relationships on a subsidiary level. The regional subsystems, therefore, are now coming more and more into their own as a complement to the global nature of the overall international system.

Asia and Europe

Let me continue this analysis of contemporary international politics by shifting to some more concrete remarks about the positions of the European and Asian subsystems in the overall international system. Increasingly, the relationships between these two subsystems offer illustrations of a number of the principal aspects of the general discontinuities model outlined above. At the same time, the emerging interconnections between Europe and Asia in contemporary international politics, which have become the subject of a number of ambiguities and misunderstandings, can be at least partially unraveled by applying the perspectives of the discontinuities model.

During most of the first half of the twentieth century, the Asian subsystem was essentially subordinate to rather than coordinate with the European subsystem. The degree of European dominance rose and fell in various patterns in the course of this period. Moreover, the various European powers were frequently at odds with one another over particular Asian issues during these years. The fact remains, nevertheless, that a great deal of the tone of Asian politics prior to World War II was set by the participation of various outside, and primarily European, powers in the Asian subsystem. In this perspective, the Second World War constitutes a sharp and decisive break with the previous pattern of relations between Europe and Asia that had, in any case, already begun to deteriorate during the thirties as the influence of Japan expanded.[11] For several reasons, however, the opening of the war did not lead immediately to the development of an independent or fully autonomous pattern of international politics in the Asian subsystem. First, Japan became the dominant political force in Asia during the war years, thereby effectively replacing the European powers in functional terms rather than exerting a significant pressure for the creation of a self-sustaining political system within Asia. Second, the outbreak of the war resulted in a thorough polarization of the patterns of con-

[11] It may be appropriate to take the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 as an important turning point. But the expansion of Japanese influence throughout the Asian subsystem continued on a fairly gradual basis until the actual beginning of the war.

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flict in the overall international system. For the duration of the war, the regional subsystems were effectively merged into a global pattern of dichotomous conflict.

The war itself destroyed the preconditions of the previous pattern of European dominance in Asia, but it did not, in the process, produce the makings of a new and autonomous Asian subsystem. In fact, in the years immediately following the war the Asian subsystem was almost entirely lacking in international relations of an indigenous variety. The individual units of the subsystem were often more deeply involved in bilateral relations with various external powers than in relations with one another. There were several important causes of this absence of local international relations in Asia. On the one hand, the situation was related to the activities of the outside powers. France, Britain, and Holland, for example, attempted to reestablish their former positions of dominance in Indochina, Malaya, and Indonesia, a posture that led to *inter*regional patterns of interaction as well as to a number of sharp conflicts. At the same time, its dominant role in the war in the Pacific and in the final defeat of Japan made the United States a prominent Asian power almost automatically. As a result, the aftermath of the war found the United States deeply involved in a number of Asian problems, a development that also tended to hinder the emergence of an autonomous Asian political system. On the other hand, this lack of genuine international relations within Asia after the war was also caused by a number of local, Asian factors. First, the most important Asian countries, including Japan and China, had been severely shattered by the war. The principal powers of the subsystem were therefore unable to function effectively as international actors. Second, a number of Asian countries were involved to a great degree with civil wars and a variety of other internal preoccupations during this period. China, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, and various parts of Indochina all belong in this category. Third, many of the new states of Asia had not yet fully emerged from the ties of colonialism at this time. Much of the international effort of these states, therefore, was directed toward breaking the remaining bonds of colonial relationships, an interest that in fact complemented the concurrent attitudes of the European states in producing patterns of *inter*regional interactions. Among those states to which this set of problems was relevant were India, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, and the states of Indochina. In summary, then, the aftermath of the war witnessed a sharp break from the previous pattern of unequal relations between Asia and Europe, but it led, in the first instance, only to

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a peculiar ferment characterized by an absence of local international politics rather than to a new and independent format for international politics in Asia.

Starting from this rather chaotic base, the international politics of Asia have begun to change rapidly and extensively in recent years. The European powers ultimately lost their colonial conflicts. A number of new states appeared on the scene within the Asian subsystem. Though civil strife is still important in Asia, the most important civil war, in China, came to an end relatively early in the postwar period, thereby paving the way for the emergence of the People's Republic of China as an important force in Asian politics. At the same time, Japan reemerged very rapidly as a dynamic state and a key factor to be reckoned with in any current analysis of the Asian subsystem. In passing, even though these changes have also, to a very great degree, destroyed the physical bases of the tutelary position of the United States in Asia, American perceptions have often been quite slow in adapting to the consequences of this shift.

The unsettled quality of the Asian subsystem clearly remains in evidence today. But a number of fundamental issues have been either settled decisively or thrown into channels whose ultimate outcome is relatively clear. As a result, for the first time in the twentieth century a unique brand of Asian politics is beginning to take its place alongside the long-standing traditions of international politics within the European subsystem. In the contemporary world, of course, there is a great deal of interpenetration among all the regional subsystems in political relationships. And this interpenetration between the European and Asian subsystems is very evident. To an increasing degree, however, the position of the Asian subsystem is becoming coordinate rather than subordinate.

The global features and components of this emerging Asian subsystem are not difficult to locate. Many specific issues in Asian politics still bear the imprint of the dominance of outside states in earlier years. The last vestiges of colonialism are only now disappearing. Many individual states in Asia are presently in the throes of various postcolonial shakedown processes. And the United States has not yet shown itself willing to draw back from its *de facto* emergence as a preeminent Asian power at the end of World War II. At the same time, Asian politics have been shaped in a number of ways by the global contours of the various ideological problems underlying the so-called cold war. Some form of communism has become a dominant, or at least power-

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ful, force in a number of Asian countries.[12] The Asian states in general have become involved in the competition between the superpowers for the political favor of the nonaligned states of the world. And in Asia especially the ideologically tinged debate about which models of economic development are most appropriate has become virulent.[13] Finally, the global aspects of the Asian subsystem are further emphasized by the fact that the two superpowers have extensive power interests in the area. These interests have manifested themselves both in the extension of alliance systems to Asia and in the efforts of the United States to construct an Asian defense perimeter that is periodically probed and tested by Communist or Communist-influenced forces.[14] The existence of these interests in Asia on the part of both superpowers underlines the interconnection between the Asian subsystem and the overall international system, but it also tends to open up new possibilities for maneuver on the part of various second-order powers in Asia.

The global aspects of the Asian subsystem are therefore quite evident. More interesting perhaps are the unique features of the subsystem which are becoming increasingly evident and influential as Asian politics move away from their formerly subordinate role vis-à-vis the European arena. These unique features are particularly evident when defined in terms of discontinuities between the Asian and European subsystems. First, the Asian subsystem contains a large number of new states that are often lacking in the internal viability that characterizes most of the older and more established states of Europe. As a result, Asian politics are characterized by boundary problems, internal civil strife and shakedown processes, and the dangers of competitive external intervention in internal upheavals. Second, though the dividing lines are not always clear with regard to individual states, the two subsystems operate, for the most part, at very different levels of economic development. While the European states are increasingly interested in the politics of affluence, the states of Asia, by and large, are still struggling to reach the stage of sustained economic growth. Third, the

[12] At the present time, some form of communism is dominant in China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. There are, in addition, Communist movements of some significance in a number of the other Asian states.

[13] The models debated range from the pure forms of a free market economy to the pure forms of socialism. At the present time, many of the developing countries are becoming increasingly interested in various mixed forms.

[14] The most obvious cases of testing include (1) the attack on South Korea in 1950, (2) the probes in the Taiwan Strait in 1954-1955 and in 1958, (3) Laos, at least until the Geneva agreement of 1962, and (4) Vietnam from 1959 until the present.

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brands of communism that have become prominent in Asia are quite different from the mainstream of European communism. In general, as was suggested earlier, Asian communism is more deeply colored by nationalism and agrarianism in the current period, a fact that has produced great variations in the Communist movements even within the Asian subsystem. Fourth, while European politics in the postwar period have been marked by a relatively clear demarcation between the Soviet and Western blocs, the Asian subsystem has always been rather amorphous with regard to these problems of political delineation. To some extent, this quality is related to geopolitical complexities and to the peculiar features of nonalignment and neutralism in Asia. More fundamentally, perhaps, the quality is also related to the fact that the basic East-West dichotomy essentially originated in Europe and spread only subsequently to the peculiar environment of the Asian subsystem. Fifth, though the superpowers are of critical importance in both subsystems, there are major differences between the second-order powers in the two subsystems. This point relates to such European states as Britain, France, and Germany and to such Asian powers as China, Japan, and India. Among other things, the second-order powers of the two subsystems differ on such matters as the nature of their political alignments, the extent and importance of sources of local conflict among the second-order powers, and the degree of revisionism, directed toward the prevailing international system, manifested by these states.

While the European and Asian subsystems are related to one another in a number of important ways, therefore, they also exhibit a variety of very significant discontinuities. And it is essentially the mixed and complex quality of this relationship that accounts for a considerable amount of the confusion currently evident in efforts to understand the unfolding course of international politics. For this reason, let me now turn to an exploration of several sets of problems that emerge with some clarity from the application of the perspectives of the discontinuities model to the connections between the European and Asian subsystems in the current period.

First, despite the fact that the postwar patterns of international politics in Europe are now beginning to change, the Asian subsystem is characterized by a substantially greater fluidity of power relationships. In Europe we are now witnessing a gradual breaking down of the hard lines of conflict that emerged in the late forties and early fifties. Even with the appearance of a distinctive brand of international politics in Asia, on the other hand, no hard-and-fast lines of division and

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conflict have emerged. This fluidity in the Asian subsystem is ultimately related both to the peculiarities of communism in Asia and to the ambiguities created by the lack of internal viability in many of the individual states of the subsystem. Moreover, this political fluidity has manifested itself in a number of specific areas that generate problems for conceptions of international politics that stem primarily from the bipolar-multipolar spectrum.

Though the superpowers have attempted, from time to time, to extend their interbloc conflicts into Asia, this effort has met with increasing obstacles in recent years. On the Western side, the SEATO alliance has never become fully operational as a major factor in Asian politics.[15] And even from a very early stage in its history the Sino-Soviet alliance was more nearly a relationship of ideology, fraught with important ambiguities, than of complementary power positions.[16] As a result, there are no really solid alliance systems in Asia at the present time, a fact that produces considerably greater opportunities for shifts and alterations in power relationships than is presently the case in Europe. In addition, this picture has been further complicated in recent years by the growth of various common interests of a straightforward political nature which cut across the nominal lines of ideological alignments. Among the major powers, the current growth of common interests between the Soviet Union and Japan and between Japan and China is particularly significant. And the emerging pattern of cross-cutting lines of conflict in Asia is further emphasized by the development of a number of very complex local conflicts involving, in the first instance, such states as Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan. The consequences of this pronounced fluidity in the Asian subsystem are to create a political environment in which the simplifying assumptions of the European subsystem are often irrelevant, as well as to produce an expanding range of political opportunities and dangers in international relationships.

Second, we are now entering a period in which the coordinate relationships among the various second-order powers of the European

[15] Even at the outset in 1954, the SEATO alliance was notable for its failure to include many of the significant Asian states. In the intervening years, the alliance has occasionally been an instrument of American foreign policy, but has seldom functioned in any other way.

[16] Even in 1950 there were several aspects of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China that were obvious sources of potential disagreement. At the time, however, the weakness of China served to camouflage these problems. As a direct function of the emergence of China as a power of significance at least in the Asian subsystem, the basic political difficulties in the Sino-Soviet relationship have become increasingly prominent. In this sense, the relationship is essentially reverting to the patterns that predominated in the early years of the twentieth century.

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and Asian subsystems are becoming increasingly interesting and important. This new type of interconnection between the subsystems is related to the gradual diffusion of effective influence in the overall international system as well as to the general development of coordinate rather than subordinate relations between Europe and Asia. As the overall international system begins to shift in these directions, a number of the second-order powers in the European and Asian subsystems are gradually coming to occupy positions in international politics which are somewhat analogous in structural terms. Under these circumstances, these states are becoming more and more interested in developing relationships with each other across the lines of the subsystems, not so much because they have strong common interests of a positive nature but because the analogous nature of their situations gives them common problems and, in some cases, common opponents in the form of the superpowers.

Although these developments are still at an early stage, these new forms of relationships across the subsystems are already manifesting themselves in a number of concrete areas. The French decision to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1964, for example, was the harbinger of a number of new trends in relations between France (and to some extent Germany) and China. At the present time, there are several sets of ideas emerging in France and Germany about the political value of relations with China for purposes of increasing European leverage in dealings with both the United States and the Soviet Union.[17] And the potential utility for China of developing ties with the major powers of Europe is evident. Moreover, these new interconnections between the subsystems are also emphasized by the increasing extent to which second-order powers in one subsystem are becoming independently active with regard to issues originating in the other. France, for example, has recently shown a growing interest in developing an independent and decidedly postcolonial position of influence with regard to the problems of Indochina. And the Japanese, as a result of their rapidly expanding economic power, have begun to participate extensively in several primarily Europe-based activities in the realm of international economics. This is true, for example, of both the programs of the GATT and the growing efforts among the major powers

[17] There are several alternative lines of thinking in this area at the present time. Some of these ideas have been discussed in a particularly interesting way by Richard Löwenthal. See his "China's Impact on the Evolution of the Alliances in Europe," in *Western and Eastern Europe: The Changing Relationship*, Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 33 (London, March 1967), 20-29.

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to coordinate the means of regulating international monetary conditions.

Third, related to the general diffusion of effective influence in the international system and emphasized by developments such as the growth of relationships among the second-order powers in the system is the emerging trend toward the operationalization of common interests between the two superpowers. As is the case with the second-order powers, the superpowers are coming to occupy increasingly similar structural positions in the overall international system. Perhaps the most interesting feature of this trend in the context of this discussion, however, is the fact that the superpowers are finding it generally easier in the current period to activate their common interests in the Asian subsystem than in the European subsystem.[18] There are several reasons why this is so. As we have seen, the Asian subsystem has never been as rigidly structured as the European subsystem in the postwar period. International politics are more fluid in Asia than in Europe, a condition that provides more opportunities for significant change and therefore requires greater attention on a day-to-day basis. The Asian subsystem contains China, which is currently the most threatening of the emergent powers from the point of view of the power positions of the superpowers in the overall system. And finally, the Asian subsystem currently appears to be more actively dangerous than the European subsystem because of the challenges it generates for the stability of the overall international system. Under these circumstances, the superpowers have recently begun to show a noticeable interest in coordinating their activities in the Asian subsystem both generally, in order to maintain at least a minimally stable balance of power in the subsystem, and more specifically, in order to deal with the desires and the geopolitically critical position of China.

These growing interests of the superpowers in coordinating their activities in Asia have manifested themselves in a number of concrete situations.[19] The Indian subcontinent, for example, has in recent years been the focus of several issues that have served as catalysts for at least tacit coordination between the superpowers. Notable cases in point include the Sino-Indian conflict of the fall of 1962,[20] the problems of

[18] This point is especially interesting because of the fact that it is generally true despite the complexities and difficulties of the current struggle over Vietnam.

[19] These concrete efforts at coordination in the Asian subsystem are particularly interesting in contrast to the continuing strength of rigidities impeding the realization of common interests between the superpowers in the European subsystem.

[20] The temporal juxtaposition of this situation with the Cuban missile crisis makes

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creating favorable expectations about the future security of India in the wake of the Chinese nuclear test of October 1964,[21] and the various India-Pakistan clashes, which reached a high point in August and September 1965 and which shifted considerably in the wake of the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966.[22] In addition, the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, is currently beginning to show an interest in supporting the continued development of Japan, at least for the time being, to provide a balancing force that is likely to become increasingly important as a function of the emergence of China as an important actor in the Asian subsystem. Then, to take another example, the two superpowers have demonstrated considerable caution with regard to the disputes in the Maphilindo area in recent years and have tended to agree tacitly to avoid any possibility of being dragged into local disputes in this area. Thus, in 1962 the Soviet Union acquiesced in the American efforts to settle the West Irian issue, and in 1965 and 1966 the two superpowers were able to agree on an essentially "hands off" policy with regard to the internal upheavals in Indonesia. Finally, the current situation in Vietnam is extraordinarily peculiar in this perspective not only because the superpowers are in fact engaged on opposite sides of the principal conflict but also because this posture is at odds with some important common interests between the superpowers in the whole Indochina area. Underneath the current conflict and regardless of the future political status of South Vietnam, there is an important vein of common interests among the United States, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam in the creation of viable political structures in Indochina capable of maintaining a stable balance in the area without succumbing to outside dominance.[23] And despite the current activities of the Soviet Union in aiding North Vietnam, it is undoubtedly a sense

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the efforts at tacit coordination between the superpowers with regard to the Sino-Indian conflict even more significant.

[21] It was during this period that guarantees, and especially a tacit coordination of guarantees by both superpowers, began to become prominent in discussions of Indian security problems.

[22] In this connection, the *de facto*, though publicly denied, coordination of the superpowers in the United Nations Security Council was a prominent feature of the efforts to stop the overt hostilities between India and Pakistan during September 1965. During January 1966, the Soviet Union took the lead in playing the role of intermediary at Tashkent, but the United States operated in the background in a manner that indicated *de facto* approval and support of the Soviet initiative.

[23] The fundamental problem for the Soviet Union and the United States in this area is that there is every reason to suppose that the development of new patterns of outside dominance in Indochina would effectively mean Chinese dominance. The geopolitical features of the area are such that it is much more plausible to foresee a situation in which a Chinese sphere of influence has reemerged than a situation characterized by the predominance of either superpower.

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that the ongoing Vietnamese conflict is counterproductive of a stable balance in Indochina which lies behind both the half-hearted actions of the Soviet Union in this arena and the clear indications of Soviet unhappiness with the current course of events in Vietnam. For its part, the United States is not wholly oblivious to interests along these lines in Indochina. But the American perspectives on these issues at the present time are rather seriously confused by the influence of a set of doctrines which goes under the heading of containment and which raises a number of problems when applied to the politics of the Asian subsystem.

Fourth among the sets of problems under discussion, these American doctrines of containment, whose origins lie in the development of policies for Europe in the forties and fifties,[24] do not stand the strains of transfer to the Asian subsystem very well.[25] Although there has been in the contemporary period a considerable effort to accomplish this transfer, the effort has so far produced one fundamental ambiguity and a number of unanswered problems. The basic ambiguity stems from the fact that it has never become clear whether the focus of containment in the Asian context falls on the objective of containing China as an emerging great power or on the goal of restraining manifestations of communism in all forms throughout the Asian arena. This ambiguity is a crucial one because the two goals are not only not fully congruent in Asian politics, but also tend to require positions that are seriously incompatible on various specific issues. The fact is, as we have noted, that there are many brands of communism within Asia and that there are, in addition, important differences between most of the Asian brands of communism and the predominant European varieties. In containing China on the basis of power considerations, for example, the United States would have a strong positive interest in supporting the development of a strong and essentially nationalistic political system in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, whereas this is clearly not the case if the objective is to restrain all forms of communism. Or again, Soviet-American common interests in Asia are increasingly evident from the perspective of the straightforward political interests of both countries in maintaining a minimally stable balance of power in the Asian subsystem. The growth of these common interests seems far less impressive, though, when filtered

[24] The classic formulation of this doctrine is the famous article by "X" (George Kennan), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, XXV (July 1947), 566-82.

[25] For some interesting additional points in this area see David Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967), 361-77.

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through the vestiges of the Communist versus non-Communist pattern of conflict in the global East-West arena.

In addition to this fundamental ambiguity, moreover, containment also runs into several more specific problems when applied to the Asian subsystem. To begin with, the political fluidity of the Asian arena and the absence of any clear geographical demarcations between Communist and non-Communist areas make it almost impossible to develop meaningful blocs or systematic alignments based on the issue of communism in Asia. In addition, the frequent lack of political viability within individual states in the Asian subsystem makes it extraordinarily messy and costly to attempt to meet all manifestations of communism with forceful means. Whereas containment in Europe was largely a matter of constructing international coalitions and clarifying international boundaries, containment in Asia requires very extensive interventions in the internal politics of individual states. These interventions are generally ambiguously related to the basic goal of dealing with the sources of communism and are almost always politically costly in a variety of secondary effects.[26] It is primarily this lack of political viability in individual states, for example, that has led to a number of costly American interventions in Asian politics aimed at propping up dubious non-Communist regimes or at combating Communist-tinged insurgency movements. Finally, communism is only one of a number of important issues in Asian politics, and it has never acquired the overriding salience that it achieved in the European subsystem during the fifties. For this reason, any set of doctrines that ascribe a dominant role to the issue of communism is apt to produce both serious distortions and political contradictions when applied to the politics of the Asian subsystem.

These ambiguities of the concept of containment are also important in explaining the present American tendency to ascribe to the United States an especially critical balancing role in the Asian subsystem. Here again the key problem is one of conceptual confusion. Insofar as the principal goal is to contain all manifestations of communism in Asia, it is probably true that no country other than the United States will be both able *and* willing to shoulder major burdens in the Asian subsystem in the foreseeable future. This goal, however, is a highly ambiguous one in any case, both because communism in general is not considered as important an issue by most Asians as it is by many

[26] These secondary effects range from the costs of a continuing commitment to support a shaky or unpopular regime to detrimental consequences for the reputation of the intervening state in the other subsystems of the overall international system.

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Americans and because there are so many varieties of communism in the Asian arena that it is exceedingly difficult to generalize about Asian communism, let alone worldwide communism. Insofar as the fundamental goal is to manage power successfully in the Asian subsystem in the face of the emergence of China, it is simply inaccurate to argue that the United States is the only important bulwark of stability. On the contrary, an interesting feature of the current Asian arena is the extent to which the emergence of China is serving as a catalyst in clarifying the common or overlapping interests of a number of powers that have previously been separated by various ideological divergences.

Fifth, the development of a coordinate international subsystem in Asia has produced a number of new types of problems for the management of power in international politics, as well as some new ideas concerning specific regulatory mechanisms. Above all, it is difficult to conceive of any viable procedures for balancing the Asian subsystem in the absence of prominent participation on the part of both superpowers. This is so for a number of reasons including the political fluidity of the Asian arena, the lack of internal viability of many individual participants in the Asian subsystem, the sharpness of specific conflicts arising in this arena, and the extensiveness of the *ad hoc* political interests of both superpowers in the area. From the point of view of managing power, this involvement of the superpowers in Asian politics is currently producing several consequences of interest. On the one hand, it opens up various possibilities for Asian powers to manipulate the interests and the commitments of the superpowers for local purposes. Both Chinas, for example, have successfully played this game in the various confrontations in the Taiwan Strait.[27] And increasingly, both Vietnams in the current struggle in Indochina are acting to lock the two superpowers into the conflict even though it means an actual or potential reduction in their own freedom of action on a number of issues.[28] While this process is sometimes of considerable importance in determining the specific outcomes of local conflicts, it carries with it some important dangers to overall international stability by involving the superpowers in situations of conflict that they are frequently unable to control very precisely.[29] On the other hand, however, this en-

[27] During the 1958 crisis, activities along these lines were particularly evident in relationships between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union on the one hand and between the Nationalists and the United States on the other.

[28] For some interesting points concerning this problem in the Vietnam context, consult John T. McAlister, Jr., "The Possibilities for Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 258-305.

[29] The possibilities of catalytic actions on the part of the local powers are particularly important. These dangers of catalytic actions do not refer, in the first instance, to

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forced coexistence of the superpowers in the Asian subsystem is increasingly leading to the growth of tacit agreements between these powers in the interests of developing rules for the maintenance of at least minimal stability in the Asian arena. Among other things, this limited and *de facto* coordination between the superpowers seems at present to be generating a new willingness to allow long-delayed processes of political shakedown to occur in a number of Asian states without attempting to exploit them very seriously for cold-war purposes.[30] In this sense, the current political environment in Asia may be considerably more conducive to a process of decisively throwing off the last vestiges of colonialism, in a genuine rather than a formal sense, than was the environment of the late forties and fifties, when the virulence of the cold war operated to freeze matters artificially in such a way that the necessary shakedowns were often prevented from being played out.

Perhaps the most characteristic problems of managing power in the contemporary Asian subsystem are those that arise from situations involving simultaneous and competitive interventions on the part of several outside parties in civil upheavals within individual states. The problem of competitive intervention is peculiarly characteristic of Asia, as compared with Europe, in the current period, and it is peculiarly dangerous in the existing international system, given the possibilities of escalation to superpower confrontations and the quality of military technologies available at the strategic level. Though this problem has not yet generated any clear-cut regulatory responses, it has produced some interesting movements in the direction of regulation. As mentioned above, the superpowers are now proceeding with considerable caution, for the most part, in the Asian arena, and they are showing increasing signs of a willingness to coordinate at least tacitly on procedures that will allow for political shakedowns in individual countries without disrupting the stability of the whole subsystem. More specifically, there is at the present time a growing interest in various

nuclear exchanges, but rather to the possibilities of touching off escalatory sequences that are difficult to control.

[30] Many of the Asian states emerged from colonialism with regimes that were highly successful in revolutionary activities but ill-suited to the requirements of creating viable political structures on a long-term basis. Adaptation problems of this kind are, in fact, relatively common in revolutionary situations. And they are an important cause of the continued political ferment that often follows the successful termination of a struggle for independence. In the Asian context, however, independence was gained by a number of states at a time when the bipolar conflict in the overall system placed artificial impediments in the way of this shakedown process. The current political ferment in several Asian states is actually a kind of delayed shakedown process that never occurred in the late forties and early fifties.

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arrangements of a more formal nature, such as neutralization agreements,[31] designed to allow the various outside parties with an interest in specific situations of internal upheaval to coordinate in setting up for the area a regime designed to prevent competitive intervention while still allowing the various internal forces to prosecute their conflicts in a manner that is as free of artificial impediments as possible.[32] In the final analysis, however, the growth of thinking about the regulation of power along these lines in the Asian subsystem is not important so much for the merits of various specific formulations as for the fact that it constitutes evidence of the development of concepts in this area tailored especially for Asian problems rather than borrowed from prior experiences in the European subsystem.

Conclusion

The discontinuities model discussed in this article has no particular status as a set of answers concerning international politics. On the contrary, it is offered more as a set of concepts designed to generate fruitful insights concerning the changing state of the contemporary international system. And in this sense, it seems to me that the discontinuities model opens up a number of interesting lines of thought and problems for analysis which tend to be overlooked by the bipolar and multipolar models underlying most current debate in this area. It leads, for example, to ideas about a variety of types of complex interpenetration among subsystems each of which is sufficiently *sui generis* that it is impossible to assume direct correspondences among them. In this connection, the trade-offs and possibilities for manipulation across subsystems are particularly interesting in the contemporary world. In addition, the discontinuities model offers some useful perspectives on the problems of the actors with systemwide interests. Such perspectives are particularly useful in understanding current developments in international politics. Inconsistencies in Soviet and American behavior, for example, are far easier to explain when it is understood that both of these countries have patterns of interests that diverge substantially and are not infrequently incompatible with one another as between the

[31] For an exploration of the concepts of neutralization see "Neutralization in Southeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington 1966). This study was prepared by Cyril E. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran Young.

[32] Ideas of this kind have already been tried to a certain extent. Laos, for example, was formally neutralized by international agreement under the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1962. And Cambodia is presently a self-neutralized state whose act of neutralization has been received favorably by most of the relevant outside states.

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various subsystems of the overall international system. The contrasts between the European and Asian subsystems, for example, offer illustrations of these problems.

The introduction of concrete material on the European and Asian subsystems also emphasizes some interesting triangular relationships. Here we have two important subsystems that are increasingly coordinate in their influence patterns, even though there are a number of very significant discontinuities between them. At the same time, the global pattern of relations between the superpowers intersects, at a number of points, with the patterns within each of the subsystems as well as with the interconnections between the two subsystems. As a result, an overall pattern of interaction is formed that contains two distinct classes of discontinuities. In addition to the discontinuities between the two subsystems, there are also discontinuities between the conceptually analogous patterns of international politics within the subsystems on the one hand and the global format of international politics focusing on the direct relationships between the superpowers on the other hand. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that a substantive issue influenced simultaneously by several of these divergent patterns of international politics is virtually bound to become extremely complex and ambiguous. For example, a considerable degree of the opaqueness of the problems of Germany and of Southeast Asia at the present time is a result of this phenomenon of several distinct patterns of international politics focusing simultaneously on a given complex of substantive issues.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that the European and Asian problems discussed in this article are, in general terms, illustrative of a broader class of phenomena in contemporary international politics. In short, the relationships between various subsystems as well as between individual subsystems and the global patterns of international politics could be analyzed on a similar basis for such cases as Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. While the particular substantive problems would vary from case to case, the general perspectives of the discontinuities model are equally relevant throughout the international system. Moreover, a shift from a focus on two subsystems to a consideration of a larger number of subsystems would raise additional questions that could be analyzed profitably. In general, a shift along these lines would open up possibilities for increasingly subtle analyses of the basic power processes of the contemporary international system.

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PERU'S POSTPONED REVOLUTION

By DAVID CHAPLIN*

OBSERVERS of Peru since Carleton Beals (1934) have been predicting "fire on the Andes."[1] When Bolivia began its basic social transformation in 1952, a Peruvian conflagration seemed all the more inevitable. Then, in 1962, what appeared to be Peru's version of the Sierra Maestra phase of "the revolution" began in the densely populated mountainous areas of the south. This movement culminated in a series of abortive putschist efforts in the summer of 1965 which were resoundingly crushed by the Peruvian army as it finally rose to the challenge of guerrilla warfare from the lethargy of its traditional ceremonial, riot-control, and border-skirmish functions.

The relative ease with which this uprising was repressed (compared to similar revolts in Venezuela and Colombia) and the long-delayed and still unrealized "revolution" in Peru require special explanation. How is it that a serious student of Peru such as Bourricaud could write in 1966 that "this apocalyptic vision . . . of illiterate masses . . . determined to sacrifice everything to their rage for destruction . . . which in the 30's and 40's engaged [the] oligarchy in fierce resistance to the APRA [the leftist reform party] is far less widespread today. The most current attitude is that with a little luck and a lot of skill the basis of traditional positions can be preserved."[2] Peru is unlike other Latin American countries in a number of respects. This has meant, and may continue to mean, that it need never go through a revolution of the same type that Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba have experienced as a prerequisite to successful industrialization.

The basic factors accounting for Peru's hitherto relatively peaceful past are these:

1. The historical role of the APRA (the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) in insulating Peru's industrial proletariat from Communist influence. Recently this role has been partially taken over by the party of the current president, leaving the APRA

* I am indebted to the following colleagues for their comments, but they are not, of course, responsible for the final draft: Gabriel Escobar, Maurice Zeitlin, Richard F. Hamilton, Richard Patch, Mary Wilkie, William Denevan, Frank Lyons, and Gerrit Huizer.

[1] Beals, *Fire on the Andes* (Philadelphia 1934).

[2] François Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of Peruvian Oligarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, II, No. 2 (1966), 29.

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to a coalition with its former archenemy, the ex-dictator General Odría.

2. Peru's unusually diversified economic structure, which provides a relatively strong and stable currency and employment situation.

3. Peru's geography, which makes guerrilla warfare extremely difficult.

Besides these unique or extreme factors, Peru shares with many Latin American countries other revolution-dampening characteristics:

1. An urban middle class more prone to aping passé elite values and behavior than to seeing itself, together with the lower class, in opposition to "the oligarchy." Latin America's middle class is extremely divided against itself by ambivalent attitudes toward the traditional elite, capitalism, and modern bureaucratic norms, preferring a reliance on powerful patrons and clique favoritism rather than merit in the pursuit of career success.[3]

2. An "unfavorable" openness of class structure on the basis of race. The much-touted tolerance of Latins on the matter of race does function in Peru to facilitate the passage of some Indians to the category of *cholos* (racially Indian, culturally aggressive participants in *local* political affairs).[4] The same primarily behavioral acculturation requirement permits some second-generation *cholos* to become middle-class *mestizos* (who are of mixed blood and culture). Potential leaders of either of these classes or categories are thus subverted, by "too easy" an accession to the next highest level, from what could otherwise have become a racially based opposition to the status quo.

3. Extensive United States military aid since 1945, followed, since 1960, by U.S. assistance in the strengthening and retraining of Latin American armies for the peculiar conditions of antiguerrilla warfare.[5]

[3] Luis Ratinoff, "Las clases medias en América Latina," *Revista paraguaya de sociología*, II (September-December 1965), 5-31; Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Model and Case History," *American Anthropologist*, LXVI (December 1964), 1321-47; and Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Erroneous Theses About Latin America," *New University Thought*, IV (Winter 1966-1967), 32.

[4] Gabriel Escobar, "El mestizaje en la región andina: El caso del Perú," *Revista de Indias* (Madrid), Nos. 95-96 (January-June 1964), 197-220; Aníbal Quijano, "La emergencía del grupo 'cholo' y sus consecuencias en la sociedad peruana," in Asociación Colombiana de Sociología, *Sociología y sociedad en Latino-américa* (Bogotá 1965), 403-47; and José Varallanos, *El cholo y el Perú* (Buenos Aires 1962).

[5] Carey found that in Latin America Peru was second only to Brazil in the amount of U.S. military assistance (not including covert military and CIA assistance) received

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4. The large split within the revolutionary camp, from the Peking-Havana-Moscow division at the top down to local aggravation on the basis of the endemic personalism that infects all Latin American political activity. In a survey of extremist politics in Peru from 1956 to 1961 Payne distinguishes seven separate factions: (1) the Trotskyite party (the old Fourth International faction), (2) the Trotskyite party (the new Pablo faction), (3) the Leninist Committee, (4) the Rebel APRA party, (5) the Communist party, (6) the Progressive Socialist party, and (7) the Socialist party. In addition to dissension, Peru's extremist leadership, especially since 1956, has demonstrated extraordinary incompetence—especially in its dealings with organized labor. Payne points particularly to the Communist-dominated Cuzco Workers' Federation (operating in the area of the 1962 uprising) as an example of bungled opportunities.[6]

In addition to both sets of characteristics listed above, we should also note the erosion and splintering of opposition to organized urban lower-class demands. Peru is no longer run by a united, conservative, and all-powerful coalition of the army, the Church, and the landed aristocracy. Such a weakening of a once-dominant elite is often viewed as a revolution-precipitating factor. However, it should be viewed more broadly as permitting change—either violent or gradual.

We shall now take up these factors under the following headings: (1) the APRA's insulating role, (2) diversified economy, (3) geography, and (4) the weakening of "the oligarchy."

The APRA's Insulating Role

The APRA stands out in Latin American political history as the first significant South American radical reform party on the Left after the Mexican Revolution.[7] It took public positions in the twenties not advocated by comparably organized and widely based populist parties in other Latin American countries (except Mexico) until 1945. It claimed to be anticlerical, socialist, and pro-Indian and, as such, absorbed the left wing of Peruvian intellectuals as well as most of the nascent labor movement. Its strength lay not only in its "populist"

from 1945 to 1960 ($94,000,000). See James C. Carey, *Peru and the United States* (Notre Dame 1964), 144.

[6] James L. Payne, *Labor and Politics in Peru* (New Haven 1965), 109.

[7] Harry Kantor, *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement* (Berkeley 1956); and Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America* (New Brunswick 1957).

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ideology but also in its highly centralized and disciplined party structure. To this day it is the only real political party in Peru.

Until 1945 the party was outlawed and even after that it could not run its own candidate. It did, however, have an opportunity for three years (1945-1948) to attempt to control the country by supporting President Bustamante, a non-Aprista compromise choice, but all interested groups were disappointed in the results. The Apristas were burdened by the difficult postwar readjustments, but this alone does not account for their failures. No significant reform projects were undertaken on behalf of labor or the Indians (except for the very important unionization of the sugar plantation workers), nor was the power of the Church or the army in any way curtailed. Rather, the interests of the urban middle classes seemed to be the major concern of the Apristas as they concentrated on currency exchange controls. It must be admitted, however, that, facing the implacable hatred of the army, they could not have accomplished more at that time.

In 1948 the APRA underwent a severe repression under the otherwise relatively mild dictatorship of General Odría. Again in 1956, it took the opportunity to govern in a *convivencia* ("living together") arrangement with a president who was clearly a member of Peru's urban commercial oligarchy. It was during this latter period (1956-1962) that the APRA began to lose its appeal for the younger generation of radicals since it had greatly compromised its original goals in return for legitimacy and perhaps a degree of respectability.[8] By 1960 it had swung so far to the Right that a Castro-oriented splinter group, the Rebel APRA party (the Movimiento Izquierdista Revolucionario), split off, while the majority of Young Turks of this period became Belaundistas (of the party of the current president) or Christian Democrats. Within the universities the APRA began to lose out to openly Communist student parties. By 1966 it had even lost the University of Trujillo, although the city of Trujillo had long been the APRA's hometown.

Thanks to its moderation, the APRA won the crudely overt support

[8] The following interesting assessment would seem most appropriate to the APRA during these 1956-1962 *convivencia* days, but it was written in 1934: "Unfortunately, the APRA movement has already compromised its program. It has been trying to conciliate the Church; instead of propagandizing against the militarists, it has advocated justice and efficiency for the Army; and it has soft-pedalled its whole anti-imperialistic position, especially with reference to British capital. This opportunism is largely due to Haya de la Torre, now entirely too enmeshed in the intrigues of Lima politics. It is doubtful if this attempt to win the sympathy of the poorer clergy and the Army has brought enough effective support to compensate for the loss of mass faith in the Aprista movement itself" (Beals, 428).

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of the U. S. government (or at least of the U. S. ambassador) during the 1962 election. This "recognition" of a party long stereotyped as "Communist" by many U. S. citizens in Peru came too late to bolster its declining appeal.

At present it is clear that the APRA is no longer deflecting the radical reform element in Peruvian politics from a revolutionary course. It is now extremely anti-Communist in an apparent attempt to achieve a rapprochement with the military as its only (remote) hope of ever achieving full power. (It has, however, won the warm support of the AFL-CIO in the U.S.) At the same time its current drift to the Right should not obscure its historical role, which was especially significant during the height of Communist popularity in the early post–World War II period.

Diversified Economy

Peru has one of the most diversified "portfolios" of export products of any underdeveloped country. It includes significant quantities of copper, silver, lead, sugar, wool, and cotton, as well as fishmeal (of which Peru is the world's leading producer). In addition, Peru is almost self-sufficient in oil. It is extremely unlikely that the prices of all these commodities would fall simultaneously. Thus, although a sizable portion of Peru's rural labor force has been "proletarianized," the workers would rarely all be in the same labor market situation at once.

Therefore, while Peru's manufacturing sector is still very underdeveloped, the country does not have a "banana republic," monocultural economic structure. At least the better-paid urban workers can afford a wider range of imported consumer goods and experience fewer disrupting economic cycles than in most other Latin American countries. The organized blue-collar workers in Lima have enjoyed a relative as well as an absolute rise in income since 1950.[9]

Geography

As the 1962-1965 guerrilla uprisings made clear, the Peruvian Sierra is not the Sierra Maestra—nor the Colombian Selva, in which there are sufficient cover, food, and water to protect and sustain small bands of guerrillas.[10] The Peruvian middle and southern Sierra, where most of the Indians live, ranges from 6,000 to 12,000 feet at the higher altitudes

[9] United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America, *Analyses and Projections of Economic Development: VI. The Industrial Development of Peru* (Mexico City 1959), 11.

[10] German Guzman, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umana Luna, *La violencia en Colombia*, 2nd ed., Vols. I, II (Bogotá 1963).

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at which the guerrillas were fighting and requires a period of acclimatization for normal activity—to say nothing of carrying on a running fight. In addition, on the western slopes facing the coastal region (and the country's urban power centers) these mountains are without water and hence bare of vegetation. Parachute squads and helicopter-borne troops, aided by aerial surveillance, can easily pursue and capture bands of fleeing guerrillas, whose only respite is thus found in Peru's large but politically unimportant jungle.

In fact, even jungle cover is not sufficient to guarantee the guerrillas success in societies dominated by urban power. Even after more than a decade of extreme violence, the government of Colombia has remained amazingly stable in the face of rural anarchy (especially in forested areas) because it has held the cities. In the 1965 Peruvian guerrilla uprising, even those units operating at the edge of the jungle were quickly captured. In an attack on an isolated hacienda, one group of guerrillas and jungle Indians (*campas*), led by Guillermo Lobaton, were all apprehended and killed by troops using a combination of aerial surveillance (assisted by U. S. Protestant missionaries familiar with the area) and local informers. The original assistance of *campas* had been enlisted on behalf of the guerrillas through the efforts of a "renegade" U. S. Protestant missionary, but subsequently many of this tribe turned informer for the army. The peculiar problem with this jungle area is that the presence of strangers is very quickly noticed and communicated. Only total support by all local inhabitants can afford real protection. The feeling of isolation in the jungle is quite illusory.

The guerrillas would have had more luck remaining in the jungle and concentrating on sabotaging the government's efforts at agrarian reform through colonization, since one of the objectives of this program is increased food production. At present, Peru's highly productive irrigated coastal agriculture is not supplying enough of the country's food demand. Already scarce foreign exchange must be diverted from the purchase of manufactured goods to basic food imports. (However, it must also be noted that most major Latin American metropolises are not as dependent on a local hinterland as their size would suggest. They have long purchased many basic commodities from abroad and hence could survive a brief loss of control over much of their rural areas.)

One further geographical factor is unfavorable to rebel activity: Peru's population is divided internally by high mountain ranges and a long, extremely barren, coastal desert. As a result, the military can bottle up major portions of the country with relative ease.

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The Weakening of "The Oligarchy"

THE LANDED ARISTOCRACY

Probably the least instructive stereotype by which one might classify current Peruvian politics would be a simplistic power coalition consisting of a landed aristocracy supported above by the Church and below by the military. Actually, the plutocratic elite whose primary wealth has been in land has been substantially displaced by an urban commercial oligarchy, which in turn is extremely disunited by differing foreign orientations, personal rivalries, and political contacts.[11] There is very little in common between the post-1930 East European Jewish entrepreneurs and the descendants of the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century *Civilista*-era Creole mercantile elite. The significant turning point in this shift from a rural land-based oligarchy to an urban commercial one came during the Leguía dictatorship (1919-1930). Such a displacement was deliberately pursued by Leguía to the extent of exiling some of the old guard and developing a new elite to take their places.

The landed plutocracy itself has been going through drastic changes ever since national independence in 1821. In the early years of the nineteenth century the withdrawal of the somewhat protecting hand of the Church and the Crown meant the further encroachment of private haciendas on the lands of Indian communities. This occurred partly because of private owners' desire to own land *per se*, but as often because of a need to acquire the virtually free labor of Indians who "came with" the land. The biggest landholdings during the first half of the nineteenth century were in the mountainous regions where local labor was available. In addition, the decay of the pre-Columbian irrigation system along the coast meant that there only the land immediately adjacent to the few small streams could be utilized.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the development of the guano fertilizer industry, together with the growth of export markets for Peruvian cotton and sugar, encouraged the development and consolidation of enormous commercial plantations along the coastal desert. From this time on, the interests of the *sierra gamonal* (the large landowner in the mountains) and the coastal agricultural entrepreneur began to diverge. The latter was different not only in his activity but also in his origins: the most successful entrepreneurs were of immigrant rather than Creole origin.

The property of the *sierra gamonal* produced largely subsistence

[11] Bourricaud, 24-25, 30.

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crops for a local or, at the most, a national market (except for wool), while the coastal agricultural entrepreneur was overwhelmingly devoted to export cash crops. The former's main asset was control over a large, cheap, and presumably docile labor supply that yielded as much political power as financial profit. The latter, on the other hand, experienced an unstable labor supply until well into the twentieth century (a situation complicated by the emancipation of Negroes in 1854 and only temporarily relieved by the subsequent importation of Chinese coolies), and hence he relied more on mechanization and efficient business practices to make a fortune. In recent years the cleavage between these groups has been revealed in the government's clear unwillingness to defend the interests of the inefficient *sierra gamonal* as vigorously as it protects those of the modern coastal plantation owner. In particular, the APRA, whose unions control most of the sugar-mill and plantation labor force, has fought successfully for the special exemption of coastal plantations from the agrarian reform law.

It should not be felt, however, that even in the nineteenth century the *sierra gamonal* constituted a stable, traditional, all-powerful, landed aristocracy. In the first place, Indian unrest and resistance against land encroachment never ceased. Life in the Sierra was closer to the U. S. frontier relations with its Indians than is generally supposed. The main point about this Indian resistance is that it was largely sporadic, unorganized, and "conservative." That is, it had no revolutionary goal of remodeling society, but only of protecting or attempting to take back traditional landholdings.[12] Even the recent formation of peasant unions near the old Inca capital of Cuzco had such a conservative orientation (which the 1962-1965 guerrilla leadership failed to recognize). Solid historical evidence on these isolated uprisings before the twentieth century is difficult to obtain. There are reports, however, of "hundreds" of incidents during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and these attacks helped accelerate the development of patterns of absentee land ownership.[13] These patterns of flight arose also from changed definitions of an acceptable elite style of life. The difference between domestic amenities in Lima and those of *la casa grande* (the main house) of a plantation was minor early in the nineteenth century, but with the arrival of paved streets, plumbing, gas, and

[12] Gabriel Escobar, an authority on the social history of the Peruvian Sierra, observes that "if the Indians, as Indians, had ever acquired political power it would have taken the form of a 'nativistic' reconstruction of the Inca empire, as revealed by the Puno rebellions of the 1920's" (personal communication, January 27, 1967).

[13] Escobar, *La estructura política rural del departamento de Puno*, publ. Ph.D. diss., Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abad del Cuzco (Cuzco 1961).

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electricity in Lima around the turn of the century, life in the country became intolerably primitive. Absenteeism, of course, had been an established pattern since colonial days. However, before the present century it meant seasonal visits by the landowner, whereas more recently often only the hired manager visited to collect rents.

Another factor increasing rural instability during the nineteenth century was the abolition of *mayorazgo* (entail). During the colonial period this rule kept large estates in one piece under the control of a single descendant, whereas the republican inheritance laws required the division of property among all children, male and female, legitimate and illegitimate. It was therefore extremely difficult for one "line" to maintain a sociopolitical position in a local area generation after generation. Moreover, the Latin family structure (similar in this respect to the Western family structure in general) is of the bilateral kindred type—that is, the opposite of a unilateral extended corporate clan, such as the Chinese. In the latter, real property could easily be held together and passed down one line (paternal or maternal) of a family, whereas in the Western system, relations among extended kin are not as strong because even first cousins don't share a single family head. In addition, without primogeniture, property disperses with each generation and can be held together or reassembled only if a given set of parents has the "right" number of children of the right sex and makes favorable matches for them. Otherwise the inevitable tendency is a progressive fractionalization of property.

As a result of this inheritance and kinship structure there has been a high level of social mobility within the provincial middle and upper classes. For those facing a declining status as landholders, flight to the city has usually been the best course of action. At the same time, absentee ownership of even large tracts of land does not usually yield an income sufficient to turn a provincial upper-class status into a comparable position in Lima. Urban migration usually means a relative decline to middle-class status. Even this can be tenuous, as Indian unrest and mismanagement or embezzlement by hired managers gradually decrease the liquid income that can be derived from distant landholdings.

THE CHURCH

Like the "landed aristocracy," the Peruvian Catholic church is also still credited with exerting more influence than it in fact enjoys or has probably ever exercised. The best available estimates of its landholding suggest that it probably owns three or four percent of nongovernmental

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land, only slightly more than the Beneficencias Públicas.[14] Moreover, the poor use to which most of its land has been put presumably limits the liquid income it could yield.

It is probably because of these weaknesses that the Peruvian Catholic church still clings to its formal position as the established, state-protected church in Peru. In 1874, after a post-independence period of Church estrangement from republican governments (but not active governmental anticlericalism as in Mexico), the colonial *patronato* system was reestablished, giving the Peruvian president and congress power to name bishops. Even prior to this, in 1854, when General Castilla freed the impoverished Indians from their special burden of tithing for the Church, the government had taken over the payment of clerical salaries. These payments persist today, but are so insignificant that they can be interpreted only as a gesture of polite contempt. They probably function to produce even fewer public contributions than the Church might receive were it independent.

In the area of legislation, virtually all the matters over which the Church enjoyed a monopoly during the colonial era, namely, marriages, burials, schools, and charities, have escaped its exclusive control. The lowest point of Church influence was probably reached in 1957 when President Prado won a Vatican-sanctioned annulment of a thirty-year marriage, which included children, in order to marry the woman who had long been the usual lady-of-honor at state functions. This rather traditional arrangement had been quite acceptable *until* the President's *de facto* "divorce." His actions so outraged Lima's first families that some cabinet officers' wives refused to attend official dinners with the new First Lady now that she was the President's legal wife. Some even took to the streets barefoot to demonstrate in front of the presidential palace, an action ordinarily unthinkable for women of this level.

In general, it can be said that the Peruvian Catholic church today is largely on the defensive, although there are some signs of a reformation. Such foreign assistance as it receives is usually shunted off to isolated Indian provinces, while national priests, whose number is diminishing, are concentrated in Lima. Most of the foreign Catholic clergy in Peru, unlike those of Chile, were, until recently, excluded from positions of responsibility in the national hierarchy. In Chile, a liberal archbishop brought large numbers of European clergy into high positions within the hierarchy as the prerequisite for a rejuvenation of the Chilean

[14] Thomas Ford, *Man and Land in Peru* (Gainesville 1962), 80. The Beneficencias Públicas (Public Welfare Societies) were established in the late 1820's to serve as an alternative to the religious orders for receiving land bequests and directing charities.

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church. The current Peruvian archbishop, Cardinal Landazuri, although one of the youngest in Latin America, apparently feels incapable of any decisive action.

If, on the other hand, one were to include the Christian Democratic party, the "Christian" labor movement, and students at the Catholic University as part of "the Church" (an assumption the people involved would generally not accept), then Catholicism would seem to have risen to the challenge of the times. These groups, according to Frederick Pike, a North American historian at Notre Dame, have taken such extremely "demagogic" and "irresponsible" stands against capitalism that he feels (as a North American Catholic) that he must take them to task for not being more concerned with inculcating "natural virtue among all classes, from aristocracy to proletariat. . . . All too often . . . the long-term, slow approach of helping the poor classes to develop their own spiritual and material resources is shunned in favor of dramatic measures which allegedly make possible overnight solution of social problems without imposing any burdens, obligations and responsibilities of self-improvement on the poor classes. . . . The economic problem of Peru is in part a moral problem involving not just the hard-heartedness of the wealthy but the laziness, irresponsibility and lack of natural virtue of the lower classes." Pike does, however, admit that "the Catholic Church in Peru undertook the modernization process at a late date. The first important joint pastoral letter of the hierarchy attacking social evils . . . was issued only in 1958."[15] (In this respect it was not behind the Catholic church in most of Latin America.)

It is probably the case that there are at least as wide ideological divergencies within "Catholicism" as outside it. On the far Left stands MOSICP (the Movimiento de Sindicatos Cristianos del Perú) and on the far Right a Peruvian branch of Opus Dei. Both are essentially imported organizations, although each has found local support. The operations of Opus Dei are, as usual, clandestine, so an estimation of its importance is impossible at this stage. There is, however, the possibility that Opus Dei might adopt a technocratic developmentalist policy in Peru rather than being antimodern, as some of its religious pronouncements would suggest. MOSICP, on the other hand, has claimed a far larger success than in fact it has achieved. The liberal Archbishop of Cuzco did give this union his official support at its be-

[15] "The Modernized Church in Peru: Two Aspects," *Review of Politics,* XXVI (July 1964), 308, 309, 311, 307.

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ginning in 1963, but by 1965 no traces of it remained in his area.[16] The only place in Peru in which it remains strong is around the town of Ayaviri, a market center on the railroad between Cuzco and Puno. Here it has survived thanks to the charismatic leadership of a French priest, Father Bleher, whose appeal is augmented by his anti-Americanism.

THE MILITARY

The third member of the traditional coalition, the military, has certainly not lost power in recent years. In fact, it would appear that it would be more difficult now than ever before for a rural civilian uprising to succeed if the military had the will to use its full force. (A highly organized general strike in all the major cities would be another matter.)

The 1962 coup d'état (strongly supported by the local U. S. business community, which persists in its hatred of the APRA in spite of the latter's drastic moderation) demonstrated that the army still feels it must intervene in civil affairs. The army's reign suggests, however, a turning point in the balance between a type of professionalism and traditional *caudillismo* (personalistic military dictatorship). There was a point during the 1962-1963 year of military control at which one member of the junta, General Godoy, began to maneuver himself into a position of personal dictatorial power. This move was countered when several other generals exiled him and maintained their collective leadership, awaiting the promised new elections.

The subsequent behavior of the army during the 1965 guerrilla uprising also revealed an untraditional degree of restraint in the face of a situation that in an earlier period would have been interpreted as justifying a military takeover. President Belaunde, however, well knows that he rules by virtue of military support. But this support has not been won by a policy of simply maintaining the status quo (except, of course, for the very considerable and inviolable perquisites and privileges of the military establishment).

Apparently one of the major sources, or reflections, of the ideological change in Peru's military policy has been the CAEM (Centro de Altos Estudios Militares). This "war college" has led the way in establishing lines of communication to critics of the status quo as well as in formulating an independent development program.[17]

[16] Kenneth Grubenhoff, "The Christian Trade Union Movement of Peru," a graduate-student field-research project, University of Wisconsin, 1965, carried out under my supervision.

[17] Lisa North, *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru*, Politics of Mod-

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It should also not be overlooked that Peru's previous twentieth-century military dictatorships have not been as harsh (except in dealing with the APRA) or as conservative as that of Pérez Jiménez, Trujillo, or Batista. Under General Benavides, in the late 1930's, the first significant body of labor and welfare legislation was passed. Later, Odría (1949-1956) decreed far more social legislation than did the Apristas in either of their opportunities (1945-1948 and 1956-1962). Finally, the 1962-1963 year of military control saw the first serious program of land reform.

In all, military regimes since 1933 have a far better record than so-called democratic governments in instituting social-welfare legislation. General Odría's small but significant popular appeal persists because of the amount of worker housing and other public construction built during his regime. (His regime also enjoyed the benefits of the Korean War boom that made possible stable prices in Peru.)

These social-welfare projects, of course, are not distributed throughout Peru, nor are the new laws widely enforced. They are realized, however, wherever organized labor or political groups have been able to exert some pressure on the government. Perhaps the primary factor in the relatively peaceful and moderate evolution of Peru since 1933 has been the military's willingness to give way at all significant pressure points, rather than repressing the labor movement as in Argentina or Brazil. The first contingent of soldiers on the scene of a disturbance may still massacre those apparently immediately responsible, but it now seems that their next step will be to yield to the wage demands, student agitation, or pressure for land reform.

One factor in the growing professionalization of the Peruvian military has been the foreign education of some of its officers. (This professionalization has yet to reach the lower ranks, as evidenced by the abuse of local Indians by military engineering crews sent out as part of the *acción cívica* program to win popular support by constructing roads.) From 1896 to 1939 the major foreign influence was France.[18] The first U. S. military mission arrived in 1924 to develop naval aviation. Even in 1943, a Peruvian "Who's Who" revealed that of the 386 military officers listed, 70 (18.2 percent) had received some foreign military training.[19] Among the different branches of the mili-

ernization Series, No. 2, Institute of International Studies, University of California (Berkeley 1966), 63.

[18] Gen. Juan Mendoza R., "El ejército peruano en el siglo XX," in José Pareja Paz-Soldan, *Visión del Perú en el siglo XX*, Vol. I (Lima 1962), 300.

[19] Raul Garbin, *Diccionario biográfico del Perú* (Lima 1943-1944).

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tary the percentages of officers trained abroad were as follows: army, 16 percent; navy, 33 percent; air force, 59 percent; and Guardia Civil, 2.2 percent. Most of these officers studied in France, the United States, or Italy, with army officers going more to France and air force officers to the U. S. Since 1943 the pattern has shifted, with an even larger percentage of all branches training abroad, primarily in the U.S. or at U.S. bases in Panama and the Caribbean.[20] It is *not* suggested here that a commitment to parliamentary democracy necessarily results from a year at a southern U.S. military base, but perhaps a preference for less military involvement in politics will eventually appear.[21] Such a tendency could, of course, be effectively countered by covert U.S. support for military intervention, notwithstanding a brief period of overt nonrecognition by the United States.

The Case of La Convención Valley and the 1962-1965 Guerrilla Uprising

The example of Castro's revolution found a new generation of students in Peru thoroughly disillusioned with the APRA after its flirtation with the oligarchy from 1956 to 1962. However, from the perspective of 1968, it appears that the major influence that Cuba and other foreign Communist nations have enjoyed is still largely in the universities. The unsuccessful guerrilla actions of 1965, although largely rural in locale, were urban in membership, since they were not able to enlist the support of a significant number of the local population. In fact, the following example of a successful peasant uprising is explicable by its spontaneous local leadership and its basically conservative goals, as well as by the willingness of the Lima-based power elite to attempt to buy peace in the Sierra at the expense of local *gamonales*.

The outstanding example of this type of movement is the Federación

[20] Mendoza, 316.

[21] A 1962 statement of military policy was published shortly before the 1962-1963 junta took over. Although the author states that the army would not intervene in politics because of its "political maturity" (Mendoza, 344-45), and that it should take care not to convert itself into a police instrument of the oligarchy (p. 341), the door is left open for military intervention to prevent electoral fraud (the public justification for the 1962 coup). General Mendoza adds that the military should not "bury itself" in pure technical and professional efficiency, but should be deeply concerned with overall national progress.

Although the 1962 junta members were apparently not foreign-trained, they were all members of the "Nasserist" CAEM and as such had exposed themselves to a leftist intellectual critique of the APRA as well as of the oligarchy. See Richard Patch, *The Peruvian Elections of 1962 and Their Annulment*, American Universities Field Staff Report, West Coast South America Series, Vol. IX, No. 6 (Peru) (New York, June 1962), 16.

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de Sindicatos de Campesinos de la Convención y Lares.[22] The conditions underlying its origin make it rather unusual, and hence one could conclude that more typical Indian communities would not be likely to follow suit. However, its success has now established a pattern that is being emulated by more typical Indian communities that could not have generated such an effort on their own.

The change leading to the establishment of the federation began in a valley some ninety miles north of Cuzco on the edge of the Amazonian jungle. Although this area was settled by Creoles in the sixteenth century, the distaste of the Sierra (Incan) Indians for life in the jungle and the scarcity and intractability of local tribal Indians resulted in a shortage of labor that has never been fully relieved. The major system of labor recruitment relied on was similar to that employed in the Sierra—i.e., a sharecropping "contract" under which the tenant also owed additional amounts of free labor to his landlord. The major differences (matters of degree only) between this area and the Sierra were that here there were hardly any independent peasant communities as holdovers from the *reducciones* (concentrated regroupings of Indians) of the colonial era. In addition, the landlords here enjoyed an extreme degree of geographic isolation that enabled them to resist governmental attempts even to set up taxing units to support provincial capitals.[23]

Contact was finally established with the outside and change commenced with the construction in 1933 of both a railroad and a dirt road to substitute for the traditional mule train. Simultaneously a malaria epidemic depopulated the valley. It was not until the late 1940's that the epidemic was conquered and a new wave of migrants re-

[22] The major sources utilized for this description and analysis, aside from personal observation, are Wesley W. Craig, Jr., "The Peasant Movement of La Convención, Peru: Dynamics of Rural Organization," a paper read at the meeting of the Rural Sociological Association, Miami, August 27, 1966; Hugo Neira, *Cuzco: Tierra y muerte, problemas de hoy* (Lima 1964); Livio Maitan, "The Revolt of the Peruvian Campesinos," *International Socialist Review*, XXVI (Spring 1965), 38-41, the "Hugo Blanco Correspondence," *ibid.*, 41-46; Ministerio de Guerra, *Las guerrillas en el Perú y su represión* (Lima 1966); Luis de la Puente Uceda, "The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives," *Monthly Review,* XVII (November 1965), 23; Aníbal Quijano, "El movimiento campesino del Perú y sus líderes," *América Latina,* VIII (October-December 1965), 43-65; Sebastian Salazar Bondy, "Andes and the Sierra Maestra," in Carlos Fuentes and others, *Whither Latin America?* (New York 1963), esp. 117; Gerrit Huizer, "On Peasant Unrest in Latin America," report to the International Labor Organization and the Comité Interamericana de Desarrollo Agrícola, Pan American Union (Washington, June 1967), 161-75; Ricardo Letts Colmenares, "Breve historia contemporánea de la lucha por la reforma agraria en el Perú," *Economía y agricultura,* I (December 1963-February 1964), 121-30.

[23] Craig, 8.

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cruited. Craig estimates that by 1965 two-thirds of the residents of the valley had come from nearby Sierra provinces.

Previously, production had consisted largely of subsistence crops, since transportation had been inadequate for a cash crop. During the 1950's, however, coffee was introduced, not primarily by the landlords on their own land, but by their tenants on their marginal plots, which, circumstantially, were more appropriate to this crop. At the same time the price of coffee in this region enjoyed a sharp increase from an index of 100 in 1945 to one of 1,221 in 1954.[24] Production apparently increased over four times during the same period. The added income enjoyed by the tenants was used in part to hire more recent migrants (*allegados*) to take care of their labor obligations to the landowners.

Finally the landlords awoke to the opportunities demonstrated from below and began planting their own land in coffee and trying to recover the plots "leased" to their tenants. Both policies gave rise to an immediate reaction, the latter for obvious reasons and the former because the labor obligations created by the landlords' new coffee areas naturally coincided with the tenants' busiest season. The response of the tenants was to form local unions on each hacienda starting at least as early as 1952. By 1958, these unions had combined into a federation. Craig's research reveals that the founders of these unions had the following characteristics: (1) They were local peasants, not organizers from the city. (2) They were largely recent migrants from the Sierra who were relatively more educated, more nearly bilingual, and more acculturated than their followers. (3) A disproportionately high percentage were from the small group of converts to Protestantism in Peru.[25]

Several outside groups were, however, of crucial importance to the federation's development and early success. One group consisted of a number of lawyers in the city of Cuzco, who, although landowners themselves, were willing in this case to side with the Indians against the jungle oligarchs. Escobar offers the following explanation of this phenomenon: "The lawyer-hacendados of Cuzco do not own very large haciendas nor belong to the traditional 'sixty families of Cuzco.' In general, they belong to the provincial aristocracies and are of lower-class (*cholo*) extraction who have come very recently into possession of haciendas by sending their children to study law and get haciendas by litigation. As such they feel some insecurity in their position and are frequently stopped in their social mobility by a series of discriminatory practices. I view their adoption of Communistic ideology not as

[24] *Ibid.*, 11. [25] *Ibid.*, 15-16.

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enlightenment but as part of the traditional mechanics of class struggle in Cuzco, something that already was happening in colonial times and reached its peak during the twenties."[26]

Cuzco had long been the stronghold of Communist unions in Peru, even after years of intermittent Aprista efforts to move in under government protection. A major reason for this is that the University of Cuzco, staffed in many fields largely by local professionals with legal training, had been alienated from Aprismo since the University's reconstruction in the 1920's.[27]

The Communist labor movement in the city of Cuzco was another group of great assistance to the peasant federation in one of the first and still very rare cases of real urban and rural proletariat cooperation. However, this "help" is described by Payne and others as an example of revolutionary bungling.[28] After reaching its high point in April 1958, when it seized complete control of the city, the Communist labor federation had lost strength. The decision of the Trotskyites and Hugo Blanco, the leader of the 1962 sharecroppers' strike in La Convención, to go to the peasants was made from a position of weakness, since they were not even the dominant faction in the city of Cuzco.

During the 1950's the peasant federation's efforts consisted largely of defending itself—by means of legal grievances presented to the Ministry of Labor—against the incursions of the landlords. The Ministry, under Prado, was not effective in meeting their demands, so when Hugo Blanco joined the federation and suggested more forceful measures, he met with considerable success. One strike had already been carried out in 1960 without harsh repression. In fact, a government commission sent to the area in response to the strike recommended that the traditional free labor obligations be abolished, but the Prado regime decided to suppress this report. By 1962, Blanco had built up enough support to win election as secretary-general of the federation. (He was the son-in-law of one of the lawyers in Cuzco who had already represented the peasant union in an appeal to the Ministry of Labor.) However, as a self-confessed Trotskyite, dedicated, in his own words, to "putschist violence," he had already alienated the by now old-guard founders of the peasant federation as well as its "Stalinist" adviser,

[26] A personal communication, January 27, 1967.

[27] In the southern mountainous region around Cuzco (in 1959), "workers' organizations are, . . . considering their [small] size, remarkably vocal. Their outlook is nearly always Marxist, if not Communistic and their affiliations with the professional group . . . especially the scholastic one . . . are traditionally close" (Southern Peru Regional Development Project, Vol. V, *Human Resources in the Department of Puno* [Lima 1959], 17, mimeographed).

[28] Pp. 110-12.

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Huamantico, the long-time head of the Cuzco Workers' Federation.[29] As a result, most of the founding leaders quit after Blanco's electoral victory, taking twenty unions with them. Simultaneously, the police, under the military junta, were ordered to arrest Blanco, which they finally succeeded in doing nine months later (owing partly to the confession of some inept, amateur, Trotskyite bank robbers determined to finance their own revolutionary program). The problems of the police in finding him were due much more to geographical obstacles than to local support, of which Blanco enjoyed relatively little at that point.[30]

Blanco's capture did not, however, prevent the two factions of the peasant federation from cooperating on a labor boycott of all haciendas during 1962. This passive strike was encouraged by a final gesture on the part of the Prado government (a gesture made primarily to embarrass the subsequent regime), which legitimated the strikers' action by abolishing, on April 24, 1962, their labor obligations (*condiciones*). The President still insisted, however, that the peasants make up for this concession by paying rent. The military junta that took over that July reaffirmed this abolition, but provided that payments be made for the purchase, not just rental, of the land. This success for the peasants was bolstered by the subsequent land reform agency's efforts in the less dramatic area of establishing cooperatives and securing titles —efforts accompanied by some repression (an alleged massacre of forty-two peasants in November 1962 and a roundup of local union leaders)[31] and internal dissension. Following this success, however, the radicalism and strength of the federation began to wane.

Subsequently, when Luis de la Puente (one of the leaders of the 1965 wave of guerrilla uprisings) returned to La Convención in 1965, he did not find the local support he had so glibly predicted.[32] The Ministry of War account of these events and their historical background, while overlooking a number of relevant factors,[33] appears to be quite accurate in demonstrating the lack of popular support for the 1965 guerrilla uprisings.

[29] See the "Hugo Blanco correspondence" written from jail in the spring of 1964. In this reappraisal Blanco attempts to defend his strategic failure. He confesses to having had "heavy putschist vapors . . . floating in [his] brain" (p. 46).

[30] *Las guerrillas en el Perú y su represión* (pp. 20-21). The text notes that "it is practically impossible to traverse the road without being seen by lookouts, and therefore the possibility of capturing any refugee from justice is very remote in those areas since he can be alerted and flee hours ahead [of one's arrival]."

[31] Letts, 128.

[32] "The Peruvian Revolution," 23.

[33] Such as the inappropriate diversion of perhaps a third of the Peruvian army to the Ecuadorian border in the spring of 1965 and the considerable assistance rendered the Communists by the two twentieth-century military dictators, Benavides (1936-1939) and Odría (1949-1956).

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In La Convención, then, we have a clear example of so-called revolutionary peasants turned kulaks by a land reform program. There are still intransigent conservatives who view agrarian reform as "Communistic," but it should be clear that it can produce one of the most conservative types of rural proletariat—the petty, but tolerably well-off, peasant.[34] Certainly such a consequence was, or should have been, one of the conscious goals of the bourgeois liberals who have promoted this program against the interests of both the far Left and the far Right.

We can also draw from this case the observation that peasants can be radicalized more easily by the threat of losing acquired gains than by simply raising their aspirations beyond their achievements. At the same time, it must not be overlooked that these peasants were always pursuing their own goals, namely, secure land titles. If they had met an intransigent urban elite determined to defend the isolated landowners, the situation would perhaps have polarized in the fashion De la Puente hoped for. (On the other hand, as he and others have observed, severe repressions can simply numb and depoliticize a whole generation of workers, at least in the context of a culture one of whose traditional themes is still fatalism.)

Land invasions in Peru have not by any means been limited to this region, although the movement here is still the most successful early case to receive such official recognition. Elsewhere in Peru, especially since Belaunde took office in 1963 with military support, more or less successful invasions have been spreading. To date, very little land has been distributed through the official and very conservative agrarian reform law, but many thousands of hectares have been taken over by peasants and given *de facto* recognition by a government no longer willing or able to stem the tide of land invasion in the Sierra. (The government, however, has stopped such invasions among the modern plantations on the coast.)

Revolutionary Strategy

In the light of the foregoing discussion of factors unfavorable to revolution in Peru, it is interesting to look at the public discussion of strategy carried on among Hugo Blanco, Luis de la Puente, the mil-

[34] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (London 1943), 135-37. Marx also observed that the benefits to the peasantry of the division of land had to be transitory—lasting only long enough to buy support and time for one regime—and that subsequently equally great poverty would result. Latin American land reformers should not expect this conservatizing effect to last indefinitely. An increase in fertility from the earlier marriages that such ready land makes possible can alone undermine the benefits of such a reform.

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itary, and other interested parties. The prime issue seems to be the relevance of the Chinese and Cuban examples. This position includes concentrating on the peasantry and relying on terror either to demoralize the military or to tease it into carrying out an indiscriminate massacre of peasants which would inevitably alienate the survivors.[35] (However, to the extent that so-called Fidelistas expose their "Communistic" goals *before* winning power, they are not following Castro's tactic of representing himself—perhaps sincerely as of 1959—as merely a reformer.)

The first issue to be taken up in that series of public discussions was the revolutionary potential of the urban proletariat. It is difficult to challenge De la Puente's assertion that "the city-centered scheme of the October Revolution does not apply to our reality, since the oligarchic power here is too strong."[36] The editors of the *Monthly Review* added that "no considerable section of the [largely urban] bourgeoisie, especially after the experience of the Cuban Revolution, is going to support [the revolution], still less fight. . . . The Latin American bourgeoisie are not interested in any kind of revolution; they prefer to throw in *their* lot with the imperialist defenders of the status quo."[37] The editors added, however, that the Russian urban model might still apply, as in the case of the Dominican Republic, if there were a split in the armed forces. But again the Cuban experience is unfavorable. Castro's elimination of the caste privileges of the military and, in fact, the military's complete replacement by a militia have alienated at least the careerist professionals among military groups.

This deradicalizing effect of urbanization deserves further discussion since it may appear to contradict Western industrial experience. The classic Marxist view of class conflict required that the lower class be proletarianized by factory work, presumably in cities. However, the most extreme cases of labor-management conflict have occurred in isolated mill towns rather than in factories located in large cities.[38] In

[35] On this latter point, *Caretas*, Peru's leading popular illustrated magazine, spoke effectively to the military in an issue published during the summer of 1965. It reminded them of this now classic tactic in an article entitled "No es una simple operación militar" (August 19-30, 1965), 13. The guerrillas could hope to prosper only if supported by the local peasantry. The crucial program to win such support away from the guerrillas would be agrarian reform, to which the military had already committed itself. In addition, the Peruvian army was already committed, if only half-heartedly, to a program of civic action in the Sierra, consisting largely of road-building.

[36] P. 24. Horowitz feels that "the movement of the peasantry from the rural to urban centers in countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Peru has clearly served to reduce the revolutionary discontent of these nations." See Irving Louis Horowitz, "La política urbana en Latinoamérica," *Revista mexicana de sociología*, XXVIII, No. 1 (n.d.), 74.

[37] (November 1965), 11.

[38] Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike—An

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Peru there have been many bitter strikes in the Cerro de Pasco mines, but the isolation of the mines has made such unrest easy for the military to contain. We might predict that once countries like Peru begin to develop a substantial amount of concentrated heavy industry in large cities the urban working class would be radicalized. There are, however, several countervailing factors: (1) Peru has already established a generous set of labor and welfare laws that tend to be applied at least to organized workers. (2) Such industries are likely to be more capital-intensive than their counterparts in Western historical development—thus permitting higher wages and keeping their workers always a small proportion of Peru's total labor force. Peru's tertiary service sector is likely to bulge indefinitely, thus leaving the manufacturing sector a smaller proportion of the economy than it was at comparable stages of Western industrialization.[39]

The public debate then turned to the Marxist view of Indian society. Traditionally (and currently by ideologues seeking to radicalize the Indian masses), Indian society is viewed either as a communal ideal or more realistically as a *Lumpenproletariat* dominated by a "false consciousness" inculcated by the priests hired by their patrons. Martínez de la Torre epitomized this latter view in his attack on the Apristas' success in championing the cause of the Indians in the 1920's: ". . . They . . . foment the vain cretinism of the enslaved feudal latifundist Sierra. . . . This tactic of dissipating in the provinces the exemplary effort demonstrated by the proletariat of the capital . . . is one of the many means by which the spiteful opportunism of the petty bourgeoisie . . . reveals itself. It is dyed with the false reformism and treacherous uneasiness of recently arrived, twisted nationalist demagogues."[40] (It is not easy to idealize the Peruvian *serrano*. He is not a "noble savage" but a demoralized human being showing personality and character evidence of hundreds of years of exploitation. He is in many respects his own worst enemy.)

This view, referring to events of the twenties and thirties, contrasts with that of Hugo Blanco who, even from jail, still preferred peasant unions to the urban-recruited guerrilla bands that replaced them. While Blanco did note a tendency for such unions "to reconcile them-

International Comparison," in Arthur Kornhauser and others, *Industrial Conflict* (New York 1954), chap. 14.

[39] In fact, between 1940 and 1961 the percentage of workers in manufacturing fell from 15.4 to 13.1, in spite of considerable economic development. See David Chaplin, *The Peruvian Industrial Labor Force* (Princeton 1967), 168-73.

[40] Ricardo Martínez de la Torre, *Apuntes para una interpretación marxista de la historia social del Perú*, Vol. I (Lima 1947), 35.

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selves to small . . . victories" because they are "susceptible to local pressures" and "might turn towards syndicalism,"[41] he still felt that "the [campesino] masses understand the necessity of open struggle and [will] create the militia. . . . The campesinos have already agreed to organize defense committees." In letters Blanco wrote from jail in April of 1964 to one Rosendo in Lima (who, in turn, was preparing the ideological groundwork for the 1965 guerrilla warfare), he admitted that one reason the revolutionaries failed is that they were swallowed up by the union movement rather than operating from a base of a centralized disciplined party. He even cited the case of Manco II (named after an Incan hero) "who surrounded Cuzco ready to crush it[!] and was abandoned by his troops because the time for planting or harvesting had come. . . ." However, in an interview with Craig on May 8, 1965, Blanco admitted that "the campesinos of La Convención are too petit bourgeois; any future uprising of Indians will take place in the highlands, not in La Convención."[42] Blanco conceded away his position in these letters, yet ended by restating it.

The next stage of "the revolution" was heralded by the extremely explicit article by De la Puente cited above and written shortly before he took to the mountains for open warfare. He began the article by disavowing bourgeois reform in favor of radical revolution.[43] He credited the Kennedy-Belaunde program of peaceful revolution through representative democracy with having had excellent prospects until Kennedy's death, and he stated that the APRA-Odría coalition was organized to thwart Belaunde's efforts in the Peruvian congress. De la Puente then went on to take issue with "some people who, though calling themselves members of leftist, revolutionary, and Marxist parties, maintain that the objective and subjective conditions for starting an insurrection are not present in Peru. . . . The objective conditions . . . have always been ripe. . . . If such subjective conditions have not attained their necessary ripeness this is partly due to the inability of the leftist parties . . . to foster and cultivate the ground."[44] While sub-

[41] P. 45.

[42] Craig, 33.

[43] In view of De la Puente's guerrilla leadership it is interesting to note his program for agrarian reform published a year after he was killed: *La reforma del agro peruano* (Lima 1966). It was his thesis at the University of Trujillo, presented in 1957 while he was still an Aprista. In it, he took a moderate evolutionary position advocating that, with proper payment and no violence, the feudal latifundas should be transformed into efficient capitalist enterprises, while Indian communities, with their [supposedly] still active cooperative spirit, should be encouraged to develop as peasant cooperatives (pp. 192-93). He warned against "leftist infantilism" or "Marxist intoxication," which would lead to the violent confiscation of all large landholders. He showed himself anxious to avoid "exhausting national energy on sporadic and ephemeral conquests" (p. 191).

[44] "The Peruvian Revolution," 21.

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sequent events proved that the time was still not ripe, De la Puente made a telling criticism of the still largely urban-oriented revolutionaries by asking where they were when, on July 28, 1963, the day of Belaunde's inauguration, a wave of land invasions took place all over the country without Communist support—or that of any outside political party. Belaunde's campaign had promised a land reform program, and so the invaders were, in effect, responding to his campaign propaganda. These invasions soon "got out of hand" by spreading to coastal areas and so were eventually put down by an effective combination of selective repression and concession. The invasion tactic of picking an appropriate occasion had previously worked with great success in Lima. On Christmas Eve in 1954, 10,000 slum dwellers had moved all their belongings and building materials to construct on the eastern edge of the city a shantytown they called Ciudad de Dios—the City of God. The government did not expel them.

De la Puente went on to discuss the urban bourgeoisie and most of the factory workers as puppets of the oligarchy. In his view, the university students remained the revolution's best hope: "It deserves to be stressed that 12 of the 16 universities in the country are totally controlled by the left."[45] On this base, then, De la Puente hoped to prove false "the assertion that the objective and subjective conditions are not ripe in Peru for beginning an insurrection." Such a position, he asserted, was "only a pretense to block the revolution." He still felt obliged to reckon more considerately with some people who "still maintain dogmatically the traditional schemes of the October Revolution with proletarian leadership and the center of operations in the cities. On the other side there are Trotskyists such as the Frente Izquierdista Revolucionaria, formerly led by Hugo Blanco, who uphold the thesis of dual power, with peasant organizations taking over, one by one, the functions of oligarchic power. . . . This movement, following a process of growing radicalization, would undertake the creation of its own armed militia, and would culminate in the seizure of power as an essentially mass phenomenon."[46] De la Puente felt, on the other hand, that the way "to lift the veil of deceit, dread and skepticism" of the peasants was to bring in guerrillas. "Armed action radicalizes the masses and the same applies to the repression which it evokes."[47] (The latter statement is as close as De la Puente would come to admitting the tactic of provoking brutal reprisals by the army in order to stir up the "vain cretinism of the enslaved . . . Sierra," as Martínez de la

[45] *Ibid.*, 22.
[46] *Ibid.*, 23.
[47] *Ibid.*, 25-26.

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Torre put it. Terror was a prime element in the strategy against the Guardia Civil, as well as against *amarillos* [informers] among the Indians.) De la Puente then went on to list the different guerrilla bands and describe the general plan of action that was shortly to be followed. (The military could not have benefited from this article since it was published just after the last of the guerrilla bands was conquered and De la Puente Uceda was killed.)

There are a number of misjudgments in this program (which, since it was carried out, can be taken as more than propaganda). The prime mistake is undoubtedly the failure to realize that, more so than in most areas, political power in Latin America is overwhelmingly urban. Unlike the settlement of North America, Latin American colonialism was always urban-based.[48] Moreover, *la violencia* in Colombia should demonstrate that Latin American governments can lose effective control over much of their countryside for over a decade—losing from 150,000 to 300,000 dead—and still survive.

De la Puente also was so naive as to think that peasant-based armies would not be willing to shoot down peasant land invaders. The fact is that the Peruvian army has long succeeded in converting Indians into soldiers to such an extent that, as the white foreman of a Cerro de Pasco mine once told the author, in the face of rumors of a miners' invasion of the foreman's walled compound, "I'm not worried about the local regiment joining the miners; I'm just worried that that trigger-happy sergeant is going to kill off my best miners. They may be Communists, but they are good skilled workers. It would take me years to replace them." One of the aspects of Peruvian social reality most disillusioning to a foreigner aware of the *Indigenista* (Indigenist) literature is the extent to which those who raise themselves out of the Indian category can so despise their antecedents. The *cholo* is a very different person from the Indian, even if he is actually the same person at an older age. *Cholos* have freed themselves from the brutalized lethargy of Indian existence without compromising the expression of their emotions or interests by having taken on middle-class pretensions. In their climb upward, however, they rarely make common cause with the Indian mass, but rather are as likely to take advantage of Indian ignorance as are the large landowners. If Peru practiced racial segregation as it exists in the United States, then the more acculturated Indians would be forced to improve their situation through leading "their people" in a "Brown Power" movement against such barriers. The

[48] Richard Morse, "Latin American Cities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IV (July 1962), 473-93.

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different political posture of educated Africans in former French as opposed to British colonies is another example of this point. Racial tolerance, however desirable in itself, functions to deprive the submerged group of its own leaders.

We have yet another reappraisal made of the guerrilla movement following its collapse.[49] This analysis, however, does not offer a specific or optimistic plan of action for the next stage. Edme feels that the new urban bourgeoisie in Latin America, epitomized by Belaunde in Peru and Frei in Chile, are pursuing a policy of real economic development and palliative rural reforms sufficient to prevent a Communist revolution. He agrees with De la Puente that the urban proletariat cannot be counted on by the revolutionaries. "These slums, populated by the most enterprising elements from the countryside, who have come there in hope of finding work first, then individual advancement, are difficult areas for revolutionary activity despite their extreme poverty." Moreover, as landless peasants flee to the city, "the guerrillas are losing part of their base." As for rural areas, "for the capitalist in the large cities, the menaced big landowner is no longer a reliable ally whom one can allow to manipulate and dominate the rural masses as in the past. A process of dissociation is going on within the ruling classes at the expense of the feudal sector."[50]

Here we have a French Marxist writer who seems to see the conservative implications of agrarian reform very clearly. He notes that, under pressure from its neighboring Indian communities, the Cerro de Pasco Corporation in Peru's central highlands "is proposing to redistribute lands. . . . Social tension will be reduced. . . . A new stratum of small landowners will be stabilized and it will disrupt the traditional collective cohesion of the rural world. The most intelligent members of this world will be encouraged to improve themselves. In a word, a protective ring of individualistic small proprietors will be encouraged who will have nothing in common with the landless mass and will keep them at bay."[51] This is perhaps an excessively complimentary assessment of the effectiveness of Peru's agrarian reform efforts, but certainly this is their immediate potential. Edme's only "reassuring" observation on rural agitation is that the benefits of agrarian reform, in the face of a high rate of population growth, can be of only temporary utility.

Edme concludes by condemning the Castroite reliance on guerrilla

[49] Henri Edme, "Damping the Fires of Revolution," *Les Temps Modernes* (May 1966), reprinted in translation in *Atlas* (September 1966), 10-15.
[50] *Ibid.*, 14, 13. [51] *Ibid.*, 14.

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warfare. Without the cities ("the world of the cities does not belong to the guerrillas"), without the support of peasant unions, and without a simultaneous effort at all levels, "the revolution in Latin America is not inevitable either from within or without. . . . Imperialism has done a superb job—at least temporarily—of almost completely integrating all social classes whose existence depends on capitalist development in South America."[52]

Speculation

This attempt to understand Peru's failure to have a radical revolution should not be interpreted as suggesting that the revolution could not occur. This article is primarily concerned with explaining a historical fact. However, by turning some of the explanatory factors around, a formula for revolution could be constructed. Up to the present, the Radical Left leadership has been almost as divided as the elite. But *if* Peru's economic position deteriorated by a simultaneous decline in all export prices plus the imposition of quotas (as did happen in 1957-1958 and could recur if and when the Vietnam war ends), and *if* food shortages increased, the sol were devalued, and inflation increased (as occurred in 1967), and *if* a U.S.-backed Brazilian-style military dictatorship took over to quell the inevitable unrest, then a polarization of Right and Left could occur which would favor such a revolution. At that point the competence of rebel leadership could be the deciding factor.

Also, reforms are thought of as preventing revolutions, but they can also accelerate their likelihood if (1) the reforms stem from the government's weakness and if (2) they promise so much more than they deliver that the mass of the population becomes increasingly frustrated. Most of the world's great revolutions were preceded *not* by the worst of historical abuses but by an era of reforms that were later interpreted as being too little, too late.

There are also some structural trends of the economy which have revolutionary implications. Although, as indicated earlier, the organized blue-collar workers in Lima have enjoyed a relative increase in income since 1950, the overall distribution of wealth and income—between classes as well as between the urban and rural areas, especially the Sierra and Lima—is apparently becoming even more unequal than it apparently was a generation before.[53] Moreover, the relatively well-

[52] *Ibid.*, 15, 13.

[53] David Chaplin, "Industrialization and the Distribution of Wealth in Peru," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, III, No. 3 (1968), 55-66.

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off factory workers are enmeshed in such a maze of increasingly costly featherbedding and fixed-tenure controls that a productivity crisis must be faced eventually. Many branches of manufacturing have costs so high (owing as much to managerial practices as to labor demands) that their penetration of the national market has been stalled, leaving perhaps a third of the population outside their range. Up to the present, various governments have been able to buy factory labor peace at the expense of the largely foreign owners of the still small manufacturing sector. A comparable situation is enjoyed by the still small urban middle class, which is estimated to be fifteen percent of Peru's population.[54] Peru's relatively favorable export situation currently suffices to enrich the upper class in the style to which it is accustomed, while leaving enough at least to mollify if not satisfy the middle class. In addition, Peru's current business laws are so favorable to foreign investors that an era of capital inflow (necessarily limited) has been enjoyed. If, as seems probable, this unusually favorable investment climate for foreign private capital is not maintained, then the rate of economic growth will slow down drastically. Also, the inflow of new capital will have to be offset by the repatriation of profits, thus threatening the exchange rate. In addition, over time, growing consumption and public-service demands will begin to cut into funds otherwise available to maintain the current high growth rate of Peru's GNP.[55]

By the middle of 1967 some of these possibilities have begun to be realized. The pacifying effect of the Convención land reform has somewhat played itself out as coffee prices have fallen, resulting in a re-radicalization of the peasantry. The devaluation of the sol and a sharply increased rate of inflation, experiences more common in other Latin countries in recent years than in Peru, have badly eroded popular support for Belaunde with resulting rumors of a coup to quell urban unrest.

From this perspective, Peru is now entering the most critical phase of its development. The most that can be said is that it appears that Peru stands a better chance than do Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and perhaps other Latin American countries of muddling through to sustained economic development without the necessity of a Communist

[54] David Chaplin, "Peruvian Social Mobility: Revolutionary and Developmental Potential," in Celia Heller, ed., *Structured Social Inequality: A Reader in Comparative Social Stratification* (forthcoming).

[55] Glade feels there may well be a parallel between Peru's recent development and the orthodox economic policies of the Porfirian era in Mexico which preceded the revolution. See William P. Glade, "Comments on Peruvian Economic Prospects," a paper presented at a conference on "The Next Decade of Latin American Economic Development," Cornell University, April 1966.

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type of revolution. At present, the more likely alternative pattern to the present unstable regime seems to be a militaristic state with a single monolithic party of the Mexican variety. This could develop in Peru only if the APRA could effect a complete rapprochement with the military. The Apristas' surprising 1966 electoral comeback and their strong support of the military in its antiguerrilla activities suggest that this may be the party's goal. But achieving it still seems an improbable eventuality in view of the outmoded antipathy toward the APRA of the army and the local U.S. business community.

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INEQUALITY AND INSURGENCY

A Statistical Study of South Vietnam

By EDWARD J. MITCHELL*

TOCQUEVILLE referred to the behavior of the French peasantry during the Revolution as a wonder of history. The centers of revolution, he noted, were the very districts in which social reform and progress had been most visible, whereas resistance to revolution sprang up in areas where the old order had been most completely retained. "It might therefore be said that the French found their position insupportable just where it had become better."[1] Yet if we are to judge from the frequency of like historical events, his observation should have come as no surprise.[2] Indeed, it has been suggested that such behavior is more than unexceptional—it is normal and expected: "There is some indication that by the twentieth century one can risk the generalization: the more prosperous the peasants, the more discontented."[3]

Actually, Tocqueville was well aware of the blandness of his finding. His expression of surprise and wonderment was a concession to the prevailing view. It was probably believed in his time, and is certainly widely held now, that economic privation and inequality are principal causes of internal conflict and political instability. Peasants rebel because they have less than others, and the less they have the more likely they are to rebel. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that this assumption forms an important part of the implicit theoretical foundation upon which United States policy toward the underdeveloped world is constructed.[4] There is no doubt, moreover, that this prevailing position has some evidential support. In fact, recent cross-national studies reveal significant positive correlations between measures of internal group violence and political instability, on the one hand, and the inequality of

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime*, trans. M. W. Patterson (Oxford 1947), 185-86.

[2] The pervasiveness of medieval rebellions conducted by better-off peasants is alone sufficient to destroy the novelty of Tocqueville's finding. See G. C. Coulton, *Medieval Village, Manor and Monastery* (New York 1960), esp. chaps. 11, 24, 25.

[3] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York 1965), 60.

[4] An explicit statement of this position is given in Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal, published in the *New York Times*, May 19, 1966.

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land tenure and lack of "modernity" (an index including literacy, urbanization, GNP per capita, and so forth), on the other.[5]

Thus, there would appear to be two contrary theories of rebellion, each with some basis in fact: according to one, peasants revolt when they are poor; according to the other, when they are better off. Determining which of these opposing views is correct or, more properly, under what circumstances each is correct is not within the scope of this article. Instead, we shall concentrate on their application to one particular and vital situation—Vietnam.

That one of these theories is being applied in Vietnam to the exclusion of the other is indisputable. The attention given by the Allies to economic development and reform in the midst of a major war is without precedent. Secretary McNamara's dictum, "Security means development. . . . Without development there can be no security,"[6] seems to be the order of the day. The success of the Vietcong is attributed to their ability to attract the poorer landless peasants, presumably from areas of high tenancy and unequal distribution of land. According to this view, the great appeal of the Vietcong rests on their promise of land to the tiller.[7] If this view is correct, we should expect to find that the Vietcong have been most successful, other things being equal, in provinces where few peasants own their own land, the distribution of landholdings is unequal, and land redistribution has not been carried out.

A statistical analysis of factors affecting government control in South Vietnam reveals, however, that these provinces are precisely the areas of greatest security.[8] The observed relationship is between greater inequality and greater government control—not the reverse. Whether measured in terms of ownership of land, sizes of farms, or lack of redistribution of large estates, inequality of land tenure seems to contribute to greater security.

In terms of human behavior, how is one to explain these findings?

[5] Bruce M. Russett, "Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics," *World Politics,* XVI (April 1964), 442-54; Ivo. K. and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Polities, 1948-1962: A Cross-national Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* X (September 1966), 249-71. The latter study suggests (pp. 256-57), but does not find, that the most traditional and least developed nations may be significantly more stable than the transitional or developing nations.

[6] Cited in fn. 4 above.

[7] This point of view is attributed to Ambassador Lodge by Richard Critchfield in a *Washington Star* article entered approvingly into the *Congressional Record*, February 17, 1966, by Senator Jacob Javits. It is also affirmed by George McT. Kahin in a Memorandum published in the *Congressional Record*, April 13, 1967.

[8] This study is based upon Edward J. Mitchell, *Land Tenure and Rebellion: A Statistical Analysis of Factors Affecting Government Control in South Vietnam*, The RAND Corporation, RM-5181 (abridged) (Santa Monica, June 1967).

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Part of the explanation may lie in the frequently mentioned docility and low aspirations of poorer peasants. Evidence of these characteristics is found throughout history and contemporarily in the underdeveloped world.[9] Another part may lie in the enhanced power of the landlord in "feudal" areas. The relationship between landlord and tenant is not merely economic; it is social and political as well. The landlord can exercise considerable authority over his tenants. In return for favors that he is able to provide, such as security of tenure and assurance of credit, he may obtain service in the government forces, intelligence regarding rebel activities, and so forth. We should also expect to find poor peasants supporting the existing order merely from the habit of obeying their superiors. During the English Civil War a leading Puritan apologist depicted the authoritarian relationship between lord and peasant and the consequent divisions of society: "A very great part of the knights and gentlemen of England . . . adhered to the King. . . . And most of the tenants of these gentlemen, and also most of the poorest of the people, whom the others called the rabble, did follow the gentry and were for the King."[10] And again: "Freeholders and tradesmen are the strength of religion and civility in the land; and gentlemen and beggars and servile tenants are the strength of iniquity."[11]

An interpretation of the Vietnamese experience along these lines does not seem to be implausible or inconsistent with the facts. There are, of course, alternative views, and certainly a careful study on the scene would be required to decide upon the proper interpretation. However, the main thesis of this article is that inequality of land distribution in Vietnam is positively associated with government control.

Method

The degree of security or government control within South Vietnam varies considerably from province to province. The questions we are concerned with are these: How do we account for this variation in control? Why does one province have relatively more secure hamlets than another? To answer these questions we need some kind of model or framework upon which to base a statistical analysis.

[9] Some recent observations on peasants in India may be found in F. G. Bailey, *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959* (Berkeley 1963), 88; and Kusum Nair, *Blossoms in the Dust* (London 1961), 192-93. A more extensive discussion of this matter and others relating to the interpretation of the statistical results can be found in Mitchell, 22-30.

[10] Richard Baxter, *Autobiography*, cited in Christopher Hill, *The English Revolution, 1640* (London 1959), 13.

[11] *Reliquiae Baxterianae*, cited *ibid.*, 13.

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We conceive of the government's control as depending upon a small number of important factors and a large number of minor influences. The latter, since they are of negligible individual importance and are difficult to measure, are considered here collectively and regarded as merely introducing a random error into the relationship between control and the important factors.[12] Formally, we are working with an equation relating a control variable to a number of explanatory variables and a random variable. For simplicity the equation is assumed to be linear; that is, it may be written in the form

$$C = b_o + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + \ldots + b_nX_n + e, \qquad (1)$$

where C, control, depends upon n explanatory variables, X_1 through X_n, and e represents the random error. The effect upon control of any particular variable, say X_1, is measured by its coefficient, in this case b_1. When X_1 changes by one unit, C will change by b_1 units (rising or falling depending on the sign of b_1), if all other variables are held constant. Thus, differences in the value of C among provinces are attributable to differences in the values of the X's among provinces (and, of lesser interest, in the values of e).

Because there is a random error involved in equation (1), inferences about the equation are statistical or probabilistic in nature. The purpose of the statistical analysis that follows is to estimate the true values of the b's and test hypotheses about them for the set of potentially interesting variables. The test of greatest importance is whether a particular coefficient is significantly different from zero, for if it is not, we may assume that it is in fact zero and may remove the corresponding variable from the equation. If a test indicates that a coefficient is unlikely to be zero, we are led to include the corresponding variable in the equation and examine the direction and magnitude of its effect upon control. Efficient statistical methods are available for both estimation and hypothesis-testing—linear multiple regression and the well-known t-test, respectively. Both methods, especially the former, are based upon fairly weak assumptions and are not highly sensitive to deviations from these assumptions.[13]

Several points should be stressed in any application of these methods. First, since estimation and hypothesis-testing with regard to a particular variable depend upon the set of variables included in the equation, the

[12] This is standard practice in econometric work. See, for example, E. Malinvaud, *Statistical Methods of Econometrics* (Chicago 1966), 55-56. Numerous works describe and analyze the model to be presented here, but Malinvaud's treatment is among the most complete.

[13] *Ibid.*, 172-95, 250-73.

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absence of especially important variables can be critical. This may occur if some important variables are measured poorly or cannot be measured at all. Second, if we are to interpret the coefficients as measuring the effect of the X's on C, then the X's must themselves be determined independently of C. When this is the case, the X's are referred to as exogenous or independent variables. Third, we must emphasize again that a coefficient measures the effect of a particular X with all other variables unchanged. Thus, there is a *ceteris paribus* condition built into the analysis. If one wishes to know the effect of changing several variables simultaneously, one has only to add their separate effects. This property is a consequence of the linearity of the model.

Definitions

The total number of variables considered in this article is rather large, and so a detailed discussion can be given only for those variables that, after analysis, turned out to be important. These include measures of control, the inequality of land distribution, changes in this inequality, mobility, and population density. Other variables will be discussed briefly.

Each year since 1963 the *Los Angeles Times* has published detailed maps showing the extent of government and Vietcong control in South Vietnam. These maps are, according to the *Times*, based upon maps obtained from (unspecified) United States government sources. On the basis of the 1965 map[14] each village was classified as government-controlled, Vietcong-controlled, or contested. On the assumption that all hamlets in a village have the same status as the village, the percentage of hamlets under government control was calculated for each province.

This admittedly crude procedure is subject to several types of error. Even if the original U.S. government maps were accurate, our estimates will contain some degree of random error. The original maps were, however, probably subject to a considerable degree of error. To the extent that these errors are also random, their presence merely blurs any existing relationships with other variables. To the extent that there is a systematic overstatement of area under control, there will be no effect on the estimated direction (positive or negative) of the relationship between control and other variables. The only serious bias to be concerned about is the possibility that measurement error is systematic-

[14] *Los Angeles Times*, December 26, 1965, Opinion Section, 1. The *Times* was kind enough to provide the author with copies of the published maps.

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ally related to the exogenous variables. There are, to our knowledge, no strong reasons to believe that such a situation obtains.

Two measures of the inequality of land distribution are the coefficient of variation of the distribution of landholdings by size and the percentage of land that is owner-operated. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation of the distribution divided by the mean. In the case in which all landholdings are of equal size, the measure is zero; that is, there is no inequality. If landholdings exist in very different sizes, the measure is large and is particularly sensitive to very large landholdings.[15] The percentage of owner-operated land reflects the extent to which individual peasants work their own land; it is inversely related to the degree of tenancy. If all peasants worked the land of large landowners, the measure would be zero (assuming that large landowners do not work any land), whereas if each peasant worked only land that he owned, the measure would be 100. Data in the *Report on the Agricultural Census of Vietnam, 1960-61*[16] enable us to calculate such measures for each of twenty-seven provinces. The remaining provinces of Vietnam are primarily in the highlands where there is little privately owned land, the native Montagnards practicing shifting agriculture.

If we are to interpret land tenure as affecting control, rather than vice versa, the land tenure variables must be truly exogenous. This means that control must in no significant way affect the distribution of land *as measured by our statistics*. Changes in the distribution of land after the Agricultural Census of September 1960 present no problems. These changes might be due in part to Vietcong land redistribution in Vietcong-controlled areas. Our concern is with the characteristics of an area not after Vietcong control but before it. The *de facto* distribution of land after 1960 is not relevant for the purposes of the statistical analysis (although it is certainly important from many other points of view).

The appropriate question is, How much of a role did the Vietcong—and earlier, the Vietminh—play in the determination of the data in the 1960 Census? Is the pattern of inequality observed in 1960 due in large part to the pre-1960 operations of these forces? The timing and manner

[15] A landholding is merely a farm—ownership is not necessarily implied. Thus, one variable measures only inequality in ownership, whereas the other also reflects inequality in the sizes of tenant holdings. Alternative measures of inequality were considered, but were found to be less significant statistically and to provide no additional explanation of control.

[16] Agricultural Economics and Statistics, Department of Rural Affairs, Republic of Vietnam (Saigon 1961). Strictly speaking, this was not a census but rather a sample of about ten percent of the hamlets.

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in which the Census was carried out shed some light on these questions. First, the Census was taken in September 1960, a time when Vietcong influence was much less than it is now. Second, about twenty-one percent of the hamlets originally included in the sample were inaccessible because of security conditions.[17] These hamlets were replaced by hamlets from a supplementary list which presumably were accessible. It is thus likely that the data collected reflect conditions in predominantly government-controlled areas. Third, if a situation arose in which a peasant claimed land that had been allocated to him by the Vietcong while at the same time the land was claimed legally by some wealthy landlord, it is doubtful that the census takers (government employees) would have recorded the land as being owned by the peasant. For these reasons it seems improbable that the inequality variables we have computed reflect substantial Vietcong or Vietminh redistribution.

There are some additional data relevant to this question. Gittinger, comparing some 1934 data quoted by Peautonnier with 1957 data collected for the purposes of the Diem land reform program, notes a general tendency toward greater concentration.[18] He cites only two provinces, Cholon and Rach Gia, both of which were characterized by the acquisition by large landholders (owning over one hundred hectares) of an additional ten percent of the total rice land between 1934 and 1957. The Vietminh exercised a fair degree of influence in Rach Gia; Cholon was controlled by the French.

We have also made some casual comparisons of the percentage of land owned by large landowners in 1929 and that given in the 1957 figures. The 1929 Census is summarized in Yves Henry's *Économie agricole de l'Indochine*.[19] Unfortunately, the provinces of 1929 are not the same as those of 1957, nor are the measurements of land owned by large landowners entirely comparable. Nevertheless, a crude comparison reveals no obvious tendency for Vietminh-controlled areas to decline in concentration, or to increase in concentration at a slower rate, than French-controlled areas.[20]

Two additional measures of land tenure arrangements arise in attempting to measure the extent of land redistribution. Unfortunately,

[17] *Ibid.*, 17-18.

[18] J. Price Gittinger, *Studies in Land Tenure in Vietnam*, Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, United States Operations Mission to Vietnam (Saigon, December 1959), 59-60; G. Peautonnier, "Contribution à l'étude des conditions de l'exploitation de la rizière en Cochinchine," *L'Information d'Indochine économique et financière* (December 1946).

[19] (Hanoi 1932).

[20] The areas of Vietminh control were determined from a map facing p. 200 of Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War People's Army* (Washington 1962).

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no data are available on the amount of land actually redistributed in each province under the land reform program (Ordinance 57). It was originally intended that all land in excess of one hundred hectares owned by any individual would be sold to the government, which in turn would sell it to its cultivators on reasonably favorable terms.[21] For each stage in the redistribution process there is a potential set of numbers: first, the total amount of land subject to transfer; second, the part of this land actually expropriated by the government; and third, the part of the expropriated land actually redistributed to the cultivators. We do have data on the amount of land subject to transfer in each province.[22] We also know that little of this land actually escaped expropriation.[23] The first set of numbers should therefore be highly correlated with the second.

The transition from the second to the third set, however, is more difficult. The amount of land actually redistributed is probably between one-third to two-thirds of the amount subject to transfer.[24] It appears, however, that little or no formerly French-owned land was redistributed. It was decided instead that this land was to be converted into state farms.[25] Fortunately, the data on land subject to transfer distinguish between French and Vietnamese land, and we can therefore treat them separately in the analysis. Of the Vietnamese-owned land, at least half was probably redistributed. In Ba Xuyen a minimum of 45.6 percent of land subject to transfer and 51.9 percent of the expropriated land was redistributed.[26] An AID report dated March 1966 suggests that 57.4 percent of the Vietnamese land in all provinces was redistributed.[27] The Vietnamese land subject to transfer is thus composed of two main parts: a component including expropriated but not redistributed land and a component including only redistributed land. The French land subject to transfer consists entirely of expropriated land

[21] The details of this program may be found in many places, among which are Gittinger; Wolf Ladejinsky, "Agrarian Reform in the Republic of Vietnam," in Wesley R. Fishel, ed., *Problems of Freedom: Vietnam Since Independence* (New York 1961); and Robert Scigliano, *South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress* (Boston 1963).

[22] Division of Agriculture and Natural Resources, United States Operations Mission to Vietnam, *Vietnamese Agricultural Statistics* (Saigon, March 1959), 47.

[23] See Ladejinsky. A recent USIS publication, *Land Tenure in South Vietnam*, indicates that in Ba Xuyen, which contained almost thirty percent of all land subject to transfer, about eighty-four percent had been expropriated by 1963.

[24] The two-thirds figure is attributed to Diem by Scigliano (p. 123). The one-third figure appears in Robert Shaplen's *The Lost Revolution* (New York 1963). In personal communications Wolf Ladejinsky has given a one-third, and John Donnell a one-half, estimate.

[25] Ladejinsky, in a personal communication.

[26] USIS, *Land Tenure*.

[27] John L. Cooper, *Land Reform in the Republic of Vietnam*, Agency for International Development (Washington, March 1966), 3, mimeographed.

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that has not been transferred to the peasants. Any difference in the effects of these two variables should therefore be due at least in part to the impact of redistribution.[28]

Each of these four measures of land tenure conditions—the percentage of owner-operated land, the coefficient of variation of the distribution of holdings, and the percentages of both French and Vietnamese land subject to transfer—reflects a certain type of equality or inequality. When most peasants are landless and work the lands of others, the owner-operated land variable reflects this inequality. It is quite possible, however, that each of the landless peasants leases a farm of approximately equal size, and this contributes to equality of the distribution of holdings as reflected by the coefficient of variation. There is nothing improper in this. Each measure takes account of a certain type of inequality, and it is possible within certain limits for land tenure arrangements in a province to be equal in one dimension but not in another. Similarly, the same high degree of tenancy is consistent with a moderate number of fairly large landowners and a small number of very large landowners. In the past the latter case would have been reflected in the presence of large Vietnamese and French estates. Since the expropriation of these estates by the government, the French land subject to transfer now reflects for the most part the presence of a single owner, the government of Vietnam. The Vietnamese land subject to transfer now indicates in part a reduction in inequality through the breakup of large estates. Although there are certain limits to the independence of these measures,[29] a fairly wide variety of conditions is possible. In fact, the various dimensions of inequality are not very highly correlated across the provinces of South Vietnam. Needless to add, the *effect* on control of each type of inequality may also be quite different.

In order to measure the average degree of accessibility within a province, variables were constructed that measured road density, ruggedness of terrain, and degree of cross-country mobility. Road density was measured by the miles of road per square mile of province. Several

[28] There are presumably ways in which these large Vietnamese and French estates differ, other than the degree of redistribution carried out. However, a study of the limited historical literature on their development reveals no other important differences that might have some subsequent effect on control. But this could be due to the paucity of information rather than the absence of important differences. For the earlier history, see D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-east Asia* (New York 1955), 654-56; Joseph Buttinger, *The Smaller Dragon: A Political History of Vietnam* (New York 1958), 431-32; R. W. Lindholm, "An Economic Development Oriented Land Reform Program for Vietnam," in Walter Froelich, ed., *Land Tenure, Industrialization and Social Stability: Experience and Prospects in Asia* (Milwaukee 1961), 183-86; C. Robequain, *The Economic Development of French Indo-China* (London 1944), 83-85, 181-94.

[29] One could not have, for example, a province with seventy percent government-owned land and fifty percent owner-operated land.

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alternative classifications of roads were tried (all-weather, dry-weather, narrow, wide). Ruggedness of terrain was measured by the percentage of area of the province that could be categorized as mountainous, hilly, or flat. Cross-country mobility, the ease with which troops and troop-carrying vehicles can move across land, was measured by the percentage of area of a province not characterized by swamps and marshes, forests, and so forth. Of all these variables only one showed significant explanatory power. This is the measure of cross-country mobility defined by the percentage of land area that is composed of plains and hills without dense forest. This percentage excludes land containing swamps, marshes, paddy fields, dense forests, and mountains. When we refer henceforth to "mobility," it is this measure that we have in mind.

Our final significant variable, population density, is merely population per square kilometer as given in the 1964 *Annual Statistical Bulletin* of the United States Operations Mission to Vietnam.[30] The populations of Saigon, Danang, and Hue were excluded from these statistics.

Among the variables found to be statistically unimportant are rice production per capita and ethnic composition. Data on rice production per capita (1964-1965) and ethnic composition, which refers to the percentage of population who are Montagnards, were obtained from the U.S.O.M. *Statistical Bulletin*.[31]

"Dummy" variables representing the existence of different regions within South Vietnam—the Mekong delta, the central lowlands, and so forth—were also found to be insignificant.

Table I gives the observed values of each significant variable for twenty-six provinces.

Findings

When multiple regression is applied to the variables just defined and insignificant variables[32] are removed, the following regression equation is obtained:

[30] P. 4. [31] Pp. 81, 3.

[32] A variable is called significant here if its coefficient has a t–statistic of 2.1 or larger; otherwise, it is insignificant. The level of significance of a t–statistic is the probability that a value of t so large (in absolute size) could have been obtained by chance when in fact the coefficient of the particular variable is zero. A t–value of 2.1 indicates significance at the 5 percent level; that is, in only one case in twenty would one find a coefficient so large when the true coefficient is zero. Higher t–values imply greater significance. For example, if t is 2.8, the level of significance is 1 percent and when t is 3.9 the level of significance is one-tenth of 1 percent. These statements are of course dependent upon the approximate validity of certain assumptions about the random errors. See Malinvaud, 172-208, 250-63.

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Table I. Government Control, Land Tenure, Mobility, and Population Density Data for Twenty-six Vietnamese Provinces

No.	Province*	Government control, 1965 (in percent)	Owner-operated land (as a percent of all land)	Coefficient of variation of the distribution of land-holdings by size	Vietnamese land subject to transfer (as a percent of all land)	French land subject to transfer (as a percent of all land)	Area of mobility (in percent)	Population density (per square kilometer)
1	An Giang	75	31	1.80	15.6	11.4	0	214
2	An Xuyen	27	54	1.30	18.8	18.0	15	38
3	Ba Xuyen	24	24	1.85	36.6	25.2	45	118
4	Bien Hoa	31	36	1.75	4.9	2.3	0	116
5	Binh Dinh	9	66	1.05	0.0	0.0	10	84
6	Binh Duong	18	63	1.72	0.3	1.1	25	146
7	Binh Thuan	32	54	1.79	2.2	2.9	85	57
8	Dinh Tuong	31	28	1.30	12.6	4.7	60	423
9	Khanh Hoa	43	39	1.62	0.0	0.3	20	46
10	Kien Giang	22	37	1.85	29.7	26.3	0	66
11	Kien Hoa	24	49	1.02	6.8	1.7	10	257
12	Kien Phong	42	36	1.94	20.6	15.0	50	105
13	Kien Tuong	45	52	1.40	13.4	33.9	10	17
14	Long An	32	42	1.31	9.1	1.8	0	274
15	Long Khan	25	6	1.50	0.0	0.0	15	41
16	Ninh Thuan	76	40	2.42	0.0	23.3	0	39
17	Phong Dinh	28	20	1.29	44.8	28.9	0	244
18	Phuoc Tuy	52	44	2.46	1.2	1.2	50	67
19	Phu Yen	13	72	1.29	0.0	1.8	40	62
20	Quang Nam	18	60	.96	0.0	0.0	25	88
21	Quang Ngai	18	77	.90	0.0	0.0	0	88
22	Quang Tri	12	36	.98	0.0	0.0	15	57
23	Tay Ninh	22	58	1.88	4.5	0.4	0	58
24	Thua Thien	33	27	1.49	0.0	0.0	15	91
25	Vinh Binh	19	30	1.25	17.8	4.2	0	183
26	Vinh Long	64	32	1.46	13.4	4.2	0	290

* Gia Dinh, the rather small province that surrounds Saigon, was excluded from the table on the grounds that it is a unique situation, being dominated by the center of government. Provinces included in the table correspond to the 1960 province boundaries and, with the exception of population density, measurements of all variables correspond to these boundaries. The population density figures are based on 1964 figures and correspond to 1964 provinces. It is doubtful, however, that the appropriate figures differ sufficiently from those employed to affect significantly the use of this variable.

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$$C = 6.47 - .36\,OOL + 28.3\,CV - 1.36\,VL + .89\,FL - .37\,M + .09\,PD$$
$$(.46) \quad (-2.35) \quad (4.81) \quad (-4.13) \quad (2.50) \quad (-3.09) \quad (3.38)$$
$$\overline{R}^2 = .68, \qquad (2)$$

where:

- C is the percentage of secure hamlets as calculated from the *Los Angeles Times* map (1965);
- OOL is the percentage of all land that is owner-operated;
- CV is the coefficient of variation of the distribution of land holdings by size;
- VL is the percentage of land subject to transfer that was formerly Vietnamese-owned;
- FL is the percentage of land subject to transfer that was formerly French-owned;
- PD is population density;
- M is the percentage of area of good mobility;
- $\overline{R}^2$ is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom (an estimate of the proportion of the variance of control explained by the independent variables).[33]

The value in parentheses under each coefficient is the corresponding *t*-statistic.

If our interpretations of what the land tenure variables measure are correct, then the information contained in their coefficients can be easily summarized: *greater inequality means greater control.* Moving across provinces and holding other variables constant, we find that as the percentage of owner-operated land rises, control decreases; as the coefficient of variation increases, control increases. An increase in Vietnamese land subject to transfer implies less control, whereas an increase in French land subject to transfer implies more control.[34] If it is primarily redistribution that distinguishes the two types of land, then it is quite possible that redistribution has had a negative impact on control. At the least, the view that redistribution has had a positive effect is sharply contradicted.[35]

[33] The regression also has the property that it has the highest $\overline{R}^2$ of any regression examined. It can be shown that a correctly specified regression has a higher $\overline{R}^2$ on the average than any other regression. Thus the regression equation (2) is more likely to be the "true" relationship than any of the alternatives. See H. Theil, *Economic Forecasts and Policy* (Amsterdam 1961), 211-14.

[34] This finding is supported by a statement in the Cooper report that "a larger proportion of the former French holdings are in the secure areas than Ordinance No. 57 lands [Vietnamese lands subject to transfer] or state-owned lands" (p. 6).

[35] It should be stressed again that the presence of other factors distinguishing French

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To illustrate these results we have presented scatter diagrams illustrating the partial relationship between control and each of the land tenure variables. These diagrams were constructed by assuming that the regression equation (2) was the "true" relationship and then holding all explanatory variables at their mean values, except for the particular explanatory variable under consideration. Thus, Figure 1 shows



FIGURE 1. GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND OWNER-OPERATED LAND (TWENTY-SIX PROVINCES)

the actual values of the percentage of owner-operated land plotted against the values of control that would have been observed if all other explanatory variables had been constant at their mean values.[36]

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and Vietnamese land could imply a reinterpretation of this finding. At this time we are not aware of what these factors might be. Because of this uncertainty, however, our interpretation of the coefficients of the French and Vietnamese land variables should not be held with a high degree of confidence.

[36] That is, in Figure 1 the control variable, C', is given by

$$C' = 6.5 - .36\ OOL + 28.3\ \overline{CV} - 1.36\ \overline{VL} + .89\ \overline{FL} - .36\ \overline{M} + .09\ \overline{PD} + e,$$

where the bars indicate mean values and e is the estimated value of the residual. Figures 2, 3, and 4 were constructed in a similar manner. As pointed out above, there are limits to the extent to which one can choose arbitrary values for the independent

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

FIGURE 2. GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND THE INEQUALITY OF LAND DISTRIBUTION (TWENTY-SIX PROVINCES)

(The numbers adjacent to the points refer to the provinces given in Table I.) The slopes of the lines in these diagrams are equal to the coefficient of the explanatory variables, and the extent to which points cluster around this line is a reflection of the *t*-value.

The large positive deviations of An Giang (1) and Vinh Long (26) may be due at least in part to the influence of religion, a factor that we have been unable to measure in our study. An Giang is a Hoa Hao

variables. One consequence of this is the negative predicted values of control in Figure 3. The values of the independent variables that give rise to this phenomenon could almost never have been observed. They imply too high a value of owner-operated land, given the land occupied by large French and Vietnamese estates. There is also the possibility of large deviations from linearity of the control equation as one approaches extreme values.

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

FIGURE 3. GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND VIETNAMESE LAND SUBJECT TO TRANSFER (TWENTY-SIX PROVINCES)

stronghold, as is the northwestern part of Vinh Long. The Hoa Hao are known to be, at least for the nonce, a militantly anti-Communist sect. To determine whether explicit consideration of religious composition would have seriously affected the statistical results, we ran another regression, excluding most of the provinces with substantial religious minorities (Catholics, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai). The provinces excluded were An Giang, Vinh Long, Tay Ninh, Kien Hoa, Phong Dinh, Vinh Binh, and Kien Giang. We found no important differences between the regression excluding these provinces and the one including them. Although religion may be a factor determining control, it appears unlikely that its exclusion from the analysis distorts the effects of other variables.

The coefficient of population density is positive. It would certainly seem to be easier for a conventional army and police force to protect a

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more compact population, or a population residing near large towns, than one that is dispersed.

The coefficient of the mobility variable is puzzling. It seems to say that good mobility reduces government control. Although other measures of mobility and terrain were not significant, the signs tended to have similar implications. One possible interpretation is that poor mobility reduces external social contacts, preserves the traditional institutions of society, and thus contributes positively to control. Operating against this interpretation is the fact that the cross-country mobility variable does not take into account the possibility of transportation via canals and waterways, which are of great importance in the rice-producing areas of the Mekong Delta. Another interpretation is simply that the guerrillas make better use of terrain. Since these arguments are of somewhat doubtful validity, there are grounds for ignoring this variable and regarding its coefficient as mere chance. When mobility is excluded, however, all other results remain essentially the same.

The six independent variables account for sixty-eight percent of the



FIGURE 4. GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND FRENCH LANDHOLDINGS (TWENTY-SIX PROVINCES)

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variation in control. The average absolute deviation of predicted control from actual control is seven percentage points. Most of this explanation is due to the land tenure variables. The four land tenure variables alone would account for approximately thirty-seven percent of the variation in control. Together, mobility and population density explain nothing. One of the interesting statistical features of this study is that for only one exogenous variable, *CV*, is the simple correlation with control statistically significant. It is only when the variables are employed jointly, and in particular when the land tenure variables are employed jointly, that we are able to account substantially for interprovincial differences in control. It is therefore likely that simple bivariate approaches to the problem would have been relatively unsuccessful.

Concluding Remarks

As we suggested at the outset, these finding are hardly novel. Consider, for example, the salient features of the counterrevolutionary areas in the west of France. In comparing them with the revolutionary areas we find fewer peasants owning their own land, a higher degree of absenteeism among landlords, greater ownership of land by the nobility, poorer accessibility, and greater religiosity.[37] This situation corresponds quite closely to that in Vietnam, especially if we can take the Hoa Hao to be more religious than other groups and if we make allowances for the absence of a nobility in Vietnam.

In this and other historical precedents, the behavioral interpretation is similar. There exists in the areas of unequal distribution a powerful landlord class exercising firm control over a conservative peasantry which has thoroughly rationalized the inevitability of the existing situation. It is not these peasants who revolt, but those who "have gained enough to give them an appetite for more."[38]

To apply this interpretation to Vietnam is to conjecture, to hypothesize that the divisions of Vietnamese society are similar to those of a number of historical cases and that these divisions can be explained in similar terms. The principal conclusion of this article is, however, factual. We have attempted to discover the dominant characteristics of the secure province in South Vietnam, and despite the sparseness and poor quality of the data we feel that this task has to a certain extent been accomplished. From the point of view of government control, the

[37] Charles Tilly, *The Vendée* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), *passim.*
[38] Coulton, 130.

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ideal province in South Vietnam would be one in which few peasants farm their own land, the distribution of landholdings is unequal, no land redistribution has taken place, large French landholdings existed in the past, population density is high, and the terrain is such that accessibility is poor.

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Research Notes

THE OLIGARCHY MUDDLE

By JAMES L. PAYNE*

AN important task of the social scientist is the continual reexamination of his vocabulary. His purpose in such a reexamination should be the achievement of greater precision in meaning—that is, a more explicit statement of the real-world phenomena to which his terms apply. This research note is an attempt to stimulate the critical examination of the term "oligarchy" and related phrases identifying a ruling elite which have been used widely and repeatedly in discussions of Latin American political systems.

As presently used, the term "oligarchy" is highly ambiguous, referring to many different phenomena. Although many writers have been liberal in their allegations of oligarchy in Latin American countries, their claims are of little utility since it is seldom clear what they mean by the word. Even if we discern a vague outline of the meaning of "oligarchy" in some works, we still do not find explicit techniques for translating the concept into empirical form. And we do not find measurements or evidence. Furthermore, if we apply a few common meanings of "oligarchy" to a country where this phenomenon is held to exist, it is not at all clear that an oligarchy does obtain. In this discussion of the methodological problems involved in determining the existence of oligarchies, I shall use Colombia as a point of reference, since I have recently spent some time examining the politics of that country.[1] Colombia serves as a useful illustration because it is one of the Latin American countries to whose political system "oligarchy" is frequently applied by both local and North American writers.[2]

* This research note is a revision of a paper prepared for delivery at the 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

[1] For a more complete discussion of some of the data presented in this research note, the reader may refer to the work based on that research, *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia* (forthcoming 1968).

[2] Two recent North American publications on Colombian politics in which assertions of oligarchy appear are Vernon L. Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions* (Pittsburgh 1957), and John D. Martz, *Colombia* (Chapel Hill 1962). Also see Robert H. Dix, "Colombia: A Two-Party System in Crisis," unpubl. Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1962. Carlos Lleras Restrepo argues, against the tide to be sure, that local usage of "oligarchy" is simply political propaganda: "Here [in Colombia] all those who wish to practice demagoguery classify everyone else as oligarchs" (*Hacia la restauración democrática y el cambio social*, Vol. I [Bogotá 1963], 327).

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In customary usage, "oligarchy" has two components: it refers to (1) a group, which has (2) considerable "power." Each of these components has many possible referents. We might consider the following as oligarchic groups:

A. individuals of greatest prestige (suitably determined);
B. identified families;
C. individuals of greatest wealth (suitably determined);
D. employers (determined by size of firm or by number of workers, and so on);
E. landowners (determined by size of holding or by interest group membership, and so on);
F. the armed forces (or specified parts);
G. the Catholic church (or specified parts);
H. the holders of high political office at a given moment.

Each of these groups or any combination of these groups could constitute an oligarchy. I have given only a suggestive outline of each group's characteristic; an investigator would need to develop specific techniques to identify the particular group(s) making up his proposed oligarchy. He might select organized interest groups (employer organizations to identify employers, for example); he might use an opinion poll to determine the individuals with greatest prestige. "The Church" might be identified as the archbishop alone, or as all the bishops, or as all the clergy. The more specific the investigator makes the identification of his oligarchy, the easier it will be to prove or disprove claims about its power.

Further, an investigator would need to be alert to the matter of size in identifying the proposed oligarchy. He could not select a group that numbered in the hundreds of thousands and then treat it as if it were a clique. For example, a loosely titled oligarchy of "landowners, merchants, and industrialists" in Colombia would, since it would include shopkeepers and small farmers, comprise several hundred thousand individuals. If the families of these people were also included, the investigator would have a proposed oligarchy of over one million: a massive, heterogeneous chunk of society. He could not, therefore, speak of it as a tiny aristocracy nor imply that it was tightly organized, united, self-conscious, or determined.

The investigator should also be sensitive to conditions of organization. Does the proposed oligarchy have a group life of a formal or informal nature? Are collective decisions taken? This matter is particularly important when an alliance of groups is claimed. Perhaps "al-

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liance" means simply that two or more autonomous and independent groups are regularly found on the same side of an issue or series of issues. Perhaps the reference is to overlapping memberships, family ties, or monthly meetings. In any case, an explicit statement of the phenomenon to which "alliance" refers is necessary to avoid ambiguity.

The definition of "oligarchy" includes, in addition to the specified group(s), an attribution of power. For our purposes, we might examine four distinct power attributes that a group might have:

I. power as the extended tenure of political office;
II. power as the ability to prevail against other members of society on selected issues;
III. power as the ability to control opinion so that other members of society do not oppose the group's position;
IV. (an attribute that, as argued below, embodies a fallacy) power as a group's presumed ability to cause any state of affairs from which it benefits.

A complete definition of "oligarchy," then, includes both group(s) and power attribute(s), thus: "Type E-I oligarchy" would refer to the proposition that landowners (group E) occupy top governmental positions over a long period of time. We can easily see that the combinations and permutations of groups and attributes are very large, so that we are justified in saying that, when unqualified, "oligarchy" is a highly ambiguous term.

"Type B-II oligarchy," for example, says that a selected group of families defeats everyone else on selected issues; but this definition is different from that of a CDE-III oligarchy, in which identified groups of the wealthy, employers, and landowners control opinions so well that the rest of society does not oppose their position. And then a definition of G-IV oligarchy sees the Church "holding power" because that group is held to benefit from the existing state of affairs, while a definition of H-I oligarchy says that the same men in high political office have remained in these positions over a long period of time. It should be added, of course, that I have by no means exhausted the possibilities for either groups or power attributes; we deal here with only some of the more common meanings.

Moreover, when an investigator actually sets out to gather evidence for or against the existence of an oligarchy, it becomes clear that the phenomenon will be a matter of degree. It is not appropriate to say "there is" or "there is not" an oligarchy until the investigator has established some rather arbitrary dividing line on this or that index of

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measurement. He can then call cases falling clearly on one side of his line "oligarchy" and those on the other "not oligarchy." For the purposes of this research note, I shall consider conditions approximately similar to those in the United States "nonoligarchic," since those who apply "oligarchy" to Latin America typically suppose that they identify conditions dramatically different from those that prevail in the United States.

The investigator's selection of the type of oligarchy he wishes to examine is just the first step. Testing for each power attribute involves difficult problems of collecting and interpreting evidence.

Type I: Power as the extended tenure of political office. This conception of power has the advantage of being relatively simple to apply. The investigator selects his group and sees if all or some specified proportion of the identified political offices are held by members of this group over a period of time. A proposed H-I oligarchy is the easiest to test, since the group selected consists of the leading office-holders at a particular moment. The investigator need only see how many of these same persons are also in high offices several years thence.[3]

The evidence is strongly against the existence of an H-I oligarchy in Colombia at any time since 1830. Turnover in the various top political offices appears to be surprisingly high. At the presidential level, Rafael Núñez (president from 1880 to 1882 and from 1884 to 1893—the terms broken by the appointment of several designates) is the only man who remained in office more than five years continuously and whose total time in office exceeded seven years. On the congressional level, since 1923 (when the *Anales del Congreso* began keeping records of the members of Congress) about eighty percent of the national representatives and senators have been replaced at each election. In recent times, ministers and governors have usually lasted in office about one year. Inspection of the nineteenth-century pattern reveals approximately the same rate of turnover. This kind of evidence, then, would suggest that, for the offices mentioned, there has not been a Type H-I oligarchy in Colombia.

The Type I attribute may be applied to different groups (A, B, and so on) to form propositions about the social or economic backgrounds of high political officials. For example, the usage "Type AC-I oligarchy" proposes that the groups of the most wealthy and prestigious members

[3] H-I was the meaning given to "oligarchy" in the study of trade-union democracy by Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin A. Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Garden City 1962). The formulation of the "iron law of oligarchy" by Robert Michels in *Political Parties* is confused by the different meanings given to "oligarchy" in different places (Types I, II, and III).

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of society occupy top political positions. As with other variants of Type I, this proposition would resolve itself into questions of degree, that is, the proportion of posts occupied by members of the proposed group. At a minimal level the investigator could define any representation in high office above the group's frequency in the population as a condition for Type I oligarchy. With such a definition then, apparently all countries would have Type I oligarchies of one kind or another. The overrepresentation of higher-status occupations and ethnic groups in American political leadership, for example, has been frequently shown.[4]

Of course, top office-holders, simply because they hold top offices, will automatically have considerable prestige and even wealth. To avoid circularity, the investigator would probably wish to consider the social origins of the office-holders and thus test for a modified AC-I oligarchy (ACm-I). The literature on Colombian politics and history offers sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon the existence of a high degree of ACm-I oligarchy in Colombia. In recent times, such men as Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Gabriel Turbay, and Jorge Leyva, who all reached posts as high as cabinet minister, were men of humble backgrounds. Earlier, Marco Fidel Suárez, president from 1918 to 1921, was the illegitimate son of a laundress.[5] Luis A. Robles, a prominent Liberal leader in the late nineteenth century, was the dark-skinned son of an Indian and a Negro.[6] José María Rojas Garrido, president in 1867, was from a "poor and obscure" background;[7] Manuel Murillo Toro, president from 1864 to 1866 and from 1872 to 1874, was of a "modest family."[8] Juan José Flores, who consummated Ecuador's independence from Colombia and was twice president of Ecuador (1830-1834, 1839-1845), was of unknown parentage; one source reports his mother to have been a laundress,[9] another identifies his childhood as "poor and unprotected,"[10] and a third points out that he was illiterate until he reached manhood.[11]

These cases are, of course, exceptional, but they do indicate, in much

[4] For a summary of these findings see Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill, and Charles R. Wright, *Public Leadership* (San Francisco 1961).

[5] Fernando Guillén Martínez, *Raíz y futuro de la revolución* (Bogotá 1963), 155.

[6] Eduardo Rodríguez Piñeres, *Hechos y comentarios* (Bogotá 1956), 189.

[7] Gustavo Samper Bernal, *Breve historia constitucional y política de Colombia* (Bogotá 1957), 109. Also see Milton Puentes, *Historia del partido liberal colombiano*, 2nd ed. (Bogotá 1961), 249.

[8] Samper Bernal, 107. Also see Eduardo Rodríguez Piñeres, *El olimpo radical* (Bogotá 1950), 171, 195-96.

[9] A. J. Lemos Guzmán, *Obando*, 2nd ed. (Popayán 1959), 182.

[10] Oscar Efren Reyes, *Breve historia general del Ecuador*, Vol. II (Quito 1957), 510.

[11] Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco, *Historia del Ecuador*, Vol. II (Quinto 1958), 14.

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the same fashion as the Abraham Lincoln experience, that channels to high political office are at least open to those from low social backgrounds. A more complete picture of the social backgrounds of Colombian political leaders can be gained from a survey I made in 1965 of 130 political leaders.[12] Examination of the "father's occupation" responses showed that the bulk of the respondents had fathers in the medium-prestige, nonprofessional categories, particularly shopkeepers, small farmers, and white-collar workers. Six of the respondents gave their father's occupation as blue-collar worker. Approximately one-third of the respondents had fathers on the upper-prestige levels: lawyers, doctors, engineers, and large ranchers (see Table I). This evidence suggests that although there is certainly a degree of Am-I oligarchy in Colombia (using an occupational prestige measurement and taking this particular set of political leaders), it is not clear that the overrepresentation of individuals from higher-status backgrounds is greater there than in other countries, including the United States.

In concluding these observations about the Type I oligarchy I should add that when such an oligarchy is demonstrated (to the degree indicated by the investigator), this finding means nothing beyond what has been measured—that is, that the particular group does hold a given proportion of offices. Conclusions about "power" in other senses are unwarranted unless the investigator shows other propositions to be correct. A rich senator will not necessarily defend the rich; a president whose father was a farmer will not necessarily favor farm subsidies.

Type II: Power as the ability to prevail against other members of society on selected issues. This conception of power points toward the phenomenon of winning and losing openly fought political battles. What is meant by "Type II power" is the ability to defeat one's public opponents. This ability is measured by studying the decision-making process and noting the outcomes of the contested areas of policy. Gathering evidence for a Type II oligarchy involves these steps:

1. identification of the proposed oligarchy;
2. selection of the issues to be examined (for this Type II formulation, an "issue" is a publicly expressed conflict);

[12] These leaders were among the members of the departmental party executive committees in seven different departments (Cundinamarca, Tolima, Caldas, Valle, Cauca, Antioquia, and Atlántico) and big-city party executive committees (Bogotá, Ibagué, Pereira, Cali, Medellín, and Barranquilla). These executive committee members were, of course, the most prominent political leaders in the locality. I delivered and collected the questionnaires myself. For further details on the sample and sampling procedure, see Appendix I of my forthcoming *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia.*

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TABLE I. FATHER'S OCCUPATION OF COLOMBIAN UPPER LEADERSHIP SAMPLE

OCCUPATION STATUS RANK*	FATHER'S OCCUPATION	LIBERALS	CONSERVATIVES	TOTAL	PERCENT
2	Ambassador	1		1	1
3	Manufacturer	1		1	1
5	Architect		1	1	1
5	Doctor	2	2	4	3
5	Engineer	1	3	4	3
6	Lawyer	6	13	19	16
7	Rancher	2	1	3	2
7	Cattle-raiser	2	5	7	6
9	Merchant	16	19	35	29
10	Army officer		2	2	2
11	Journalist	1	2	3	2
11	Civil Servant	1	1	2	2
12	Accountant	1		1	1
14	Public employee	3	4	7	6
15	Schoolteacher	1	1	2	2
16	Small farmer	10	12	22	18
17	Carpenter (and other skilled blue-collar)	3	1	4	3
18	Laborer	2		2	2
	Totals, all known	53	67	120	100
	Unknown, no answer	7	3	10	
	Total, entire sample	60	70	130	

* This status rank of occupations was compiled from a survey conducted in 1965 among Bogotá university students from the universities of Los Andes, Externado de Colombia, and La Javeriana ($N = 75$). The students were given a questionnaire listing thirty-one occupations and asked to give a status rank (between 1 and 7) to each one. These scores were averaged and ranked to produce, when occupations that attained virtually similar scores were combined, eighteen status levels.

3. observation that the proposed oligarchy has a unified (near-unified) position on these issues;
4. observation that all (most, many, some) of the other members of society take a position contrary to that of the proposed oligarchy;
5. examination of the actions taken by the proposed oligarchy and of the impact of these actions within the decision-making context;

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6. evaluation of the outcomes as all (most, many) wins for the group.[13]

Parentheses indicate how these steps may be altered to identify different degrees of Type II oligarchy, from a strong conception to a rather mild one. But it does seem important that each of the steps be followed if winners and losers are to be identified. Obviously the investigator must have a certain clarity about the group that is supposed to be the oligarchy (step 1) to be able to determine whether it wins or not. And he must select issues (publicly expressed conflicts) upon which it is supposed to win (step 2). The requirement of group unity (step 3) is necessary because he cannot meaningfully speak of the entire group as winning or losing if the proposed oligarchs are opposing one another. The proposed oligarchy must have opponents (step 4) since there must be losers if there are to be winners. Ideally, the group should stand alone, opposed by everyone else, so that the investigator does not attribute a victory to the proposed oligarchy when in fact other, nonoligarchical participants who took the same position caused the outcome. A certain amount of crossover, as well as degrees of apathy on either the oligarchy or nonoligarchy side, would have to be permitted in most real-world applications.

Further, the investigator must make an examination of the actions taken by the proposed oligarchy and the impact of these actions in the decision-making context (step 5). The understanding of Type II power concerns the causality of decisions; that is, the proposed Type II oligarchy must *do* something to determine the outcome of issues. It is not enough for the investigator to know that a group wanted X and that X resulted. He must show what actions the selected group took and how these actions affected or took advantage of the sanctions and incentives to which decision-makers respond. Finally, of course, he must evaluate outcomes of issues as wins or losses for the proposed oligarchy (step 6). This evaluation requires an estimate of which side got more of what it wanted.

A search for a Type II oligarchy in Colombia would involve extensive research and the presentation of detailed case-study information that is beyond the scope of this research note. However, certain preliminary observations can be made which would dim hopes for finding

[13] In the discussion of Type II power I draw heavily upon Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven 1961); Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), 463-69; and Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven 1963). In my *Labor and Politics in Peru* (New Haven 1965), 272-77, I attempt a preliminary test for a Type D-II oligarchy in that country.

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such an oligarchy in the grosser, more dramatic form. First, my impression is that most of the groups that are likely candidates for a Type II oligarchy—large employers, wealthy people, landowners, prestigious individuals—are, as groups, usually either apathetic or divided on important issues. For example, the major employer organization, ANDI (Asociación Nacional de Industrias), does not take any position on many issues. The Secretary-General of the Barranquilla Chamber of Commerce, which has about 4,000 members, identified a general problem of interest-group activity in politics in this way: "We try to stay out of the political issues. Suppose there's a case of corruption, for example. We can't say anything because that would be to attack the governor, or whoever it was. Then we would be accused of being partisan; and our membership would also divide."

Many likely candidates for the oligarchic groups suggested earlier (A, C, D, E) are active in different political parties or factions. These party groupings are heterogeneous with respect to wealth, prestige, and social background. Consequently, whenever particular factions happen to take different sides of an issue for purely strategic reasons—a very common occurrence—there will be conflict between members of that faction and members of the opposing factions, "membership" in prestige, wealth, or occupational groups notwithstanding.

A preliminary examination of the motivation of politicians casts further doubt upon propositions about high degrees of Type II oligarchy in Colombia. The overwhelming majority of politicians in Colombia are not seeking to defend any particular program, be it for or against upper-strata interests. They generally seek personal rewards, particularly status, and consequently are basically uninterested in governmental programs as such. Since elections are the major avenue to political office—and are meaningful—candidates tend to adopt "popular" positions to increase their opportunities for advancement. Once in office, the politicians apparently examine measures for their strategic content, asking whether it is in their private political interest to favor or oppose them. For example, if an office-holder is a member of an antipresidential faction, then he will tend to oppose measures that might seem beneficial to the president's group. When such strategic considerations are unclear, then the participant is inclined to take the "popular" position (the one benefiting the lower strata) in keeping with his general vote-maximizing perspective.

The popular inclination of Colombian leaders is revealed in their attitudes toward certain programs that are directly or indirectly for the benefit of lower strata. In the survey of 130 leaders mentioned above,

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it was found that, regardless of party, they were overwhelmingly in favor of more government construction of housing; not one felt the government should do "less." They were moderately in favor of more governmental control of private industry and more legal protection of trade unions (see Table II).

TABLE II. RESPONSES OF TOP PARTY LEADERS TO POLICY QUESTIONS

"In housing construction do you believe the government should do . . . ?"

	LIBERALS	CONSERVATIVES
much more	50	54
more	10	12
the same as now	—	3
less	—	—
much less	—	—
no answer	—	1
Total	60	70

"Do you believe the government ought to control private industry . . . ?"

	LIBERALS	CONSERVATIVES
much more	16	20
more	20	21
the same as now	10	5
less	9	17
much less	2	5
no answer	3	2
Total	60	70

"In the legal protection of trade unions do you believe the government ought to do . . . ?"

	LIBERALS	CONSERVATIVES
much more	17	15
more	22	23
the same as now	18	18
less	2	11
much less	—	2
no answer	1	1
Total	60	70

Another indication of the popular orientation of Colombian leaders is the government's tendency toward deficit financing. Politicians are reluctant to approve tax increases, which are unpopular, but are anxious to spend more money on popular items: public employment,

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schools, roads, housing, irrigation, subsidized buses, telephones, and railroads. Consequently the government seldom has a balanced budget and often runs staggering deficits. It is difficult to reconcile this demagogic fiscal policy with the notion that a small group of conservatives opposed to popular demands "controls" the national government.

Given the basic motivation of most politicians—to reach offices of greater prestige—it seems improbable that a small group could regularly and openly prevail against larger groups. Aspirants for office, in seeking to increase their electoral strength, would side with the most numerous group. Consequently, although there are undoubtedly variations in the ability of different groups to win on different issues in Colombia, it does not seem that a Type II oligarchy could exist in dramatic form.

Type III: Power as the ability to control opinion so that other members of society do not oppose the group's position. This power attribute is a highly sophisticated conception of control or domination. It recognizes that a group may act in such a manner as to prevent certain matters from becoming issues in the Type II sense of publicly expressed conflict. The distinction between the Type II and Type III power attributes might be illustrated by considering hypothetical worker-employer relationships in a company town.

Let us suppose that the workers engage regularly in annual strikes that are climaxed by a march to the owner's house and the presentation of a petition for wage increases. The owner rejects the wage demand, hires strikebreakers, and breaks the strike. He wins and the workers lose on the issue of wages. This pattern of worker-employer conflict would point to the possession of Type II power by the owner on the issue of wages.

But suppose that, in a second case, the employer takes action to prevent the public expression of conflict. He may discharge or murder potential leaders before they can organize a strike. He may, by establishing a system of informants, intimidate workers and thus prevent them from even discussing the subject of a strike. He may destroy channels of worker communication, both on and off the job, so that workers may not share and focus their grievances. Finally, through the control of various media—bulletin boards, loudspeakers, company newspaper, radio station—the employer may indoctrinate workers to the effect that strikes are immoral or unpatriotic. The result of these practices is that the workers do not engage in public conflicts with the employer and consequently wages are not an "issue" in the Type II sense. The occasional tourist would pronounce the workers "content."

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The Type III power attribute is this phenomenon of action and influence at the pre-issue stages. It asks, What might a group be doing to prevent a certain subject from even becoming an issue? This question has become particularly relevant in view of modern totalitarian practices of intimidation and indoctrination, but it may be reasonably asked of any political system or subsystem.[14]

The search for a Type III oligarchy is complicated, in the first instance, because it takes as "issues" those questions on which there is little or no public disagreement. This point should be well understood: if there is public disagreement or conflict on an issue, then Type III power is *not* being exercised on that issue. If members of society are debating, proposing, and contesting certain matters—land reform, housing, price control—then we have instances of issue conflict, and the Type II approach must be used. The definition of a Type III oligarchy is precisely that the proposed group controls opinion so well that conflicts do not arise on the selected subject. Therefore, if a significant number of local participants are publicly protesting the position of "the oligarchy," *this alleged oligarchy cannot be of the Type III variety.*

Let us suppose, then, that the investigator does select a subject upon which he feels there should be protest in a society and he finds no such protest. He proposes that perhaps a specified group is responsible for the lack of protest, that this group has done something to prevent the "normal" emergence of conflict. For example, the investigator might decide that Bolívar Square in Bogotá should be torn up and apartment houses built there. He suspects that there should be support for this idea and, finding none, further suspects that the storekeepers on the Square have controlled opinion so thoroughly that the rest of society is indoctrinated to believe that Bolívar Square is a good thing or is perhaps intimidated about saying anything negative. How can he test these suspicions?

In essence, the question seems rather simple. Since a group is proposed as having dominated attitudes and the expression of opinion on the matter, the investigator has to find out what the group has *done* toward this end. He must then estimate whether the group's activity accounts for the lack of protest. It is not enough to show, for example, that a man owns a newspaper to say that he is "dominating" opinion with it. He may be constrained by readership demand and profit con-

[14] The problem of "nonissue" power has been raised in the context of American municipal power studies by Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (December 1962), 947-52. See also Polsby, 95-97.

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siderations from including many of his private views in the content. People may not read the partisan content if it is there, selecting instead the bridge columns and sports pages. He may be so clumsy in including the partisan content that his readers see through the bias and discount his statements. And, of course, the impact of the newspaper must be evaluated in the total communication matrix: radio, television, personal observation, friends, scholarly books, speeches.

One approach to the Type III power phenomenon is an examination of the sanctions and rewards that discourage or encourage the expression of certain opinions. These sanctions, to have significance for the investigation of a particular oligarchic group, must be wielded by this group and not others in society. It is not enough to say that people are punished for expressing an opinion in a certain medium; it must be shown that the proposed oligarchy, either directly or indirectly (through laws, for example), is the group that applies the sanctions. The sanction-reward approach to opinion control might ultimately permit the construction of opinion deviation–sanction charts for different issues in different countries. Such charts might resemble contour maps giving the sanctions (if any) applied by the proposed oligarchy for the different degrees and forms of opinion deviation on the issues selected.

If there is a high degree of Type III oligarchy in Colombia, it is not immediately apparent. There seems to be considerable competition within the mass media (with the exception of television, which is a government monopoly). Communist literature is openly available, much more so than in the United States. Certain aspiring politicians (e.g., Alberto Ruiz Novoa, Alfonso López Michelsen, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla), who do not have the backing of large newspapers, vigorously and openly attack the *gran prensa* (large daily newspapers), and their remarks are broadcast by radio stations, inserted in their own irregular publications, and even reported in the same *gran prensa*.[15]

It seems clear that familiar totalitarian practices of opinion control are not practiced in Colombia; other possible applications of the Type III power conception remain to be defined and researched.

Type IV: Power as a group's presumed ability to cause any state of affairs from which it benefits. Identifying the two types of power just discussed—II and III—involves showing what a proposed oligarchy

[15] One book published and sold in Colombia maintains that freedom of the press does not exist in Colombia. See Marco Tulio Rodríguez, *La gran prensa en Colombia* (Bogotá 1963). Indicative of the quality of this writer's arguments is his contention that freedom of the press does exist in the Soviet Union and Red China. He cites as evidence articles of the Soviet and Chinese constitutions that "guarantee" it (p. 83).

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has done to obtain certain objectives. Such an identification does not purport to explain how or why inequalities or conditions exist except insofar as the specified group has done something to bring about or maintain these conditions. That is, we recognize the possibility that certain groups may be relatively well-off simply as a result of conditions, events, and attitudes beyond their control. There will be, of course, explanations for such states of affairs, but these explanations do not find the privileged group(s) to be the cause.

The Type IV oligarchy perspective implicitly rejects this possibility. It assumes that if a group benefits from a given condition then it must have done something to bring about or maintain the condition. Armed with this assumption, the investigator may immediately attribute "power" to the favored group.

The Type IV conception is unacceptable because the basic assumption—that those who benefit (or are alleged to benefit), cause—is untenable. This assumption is the essence of what are commonly known as "devil theories": e.g., munitions manufacturers, because they are supposed to benefit from war, are held to cause war. Suppose, for example, we notice that it rains in Seattle. We speculate that taxi drivers make more money on rainy days. Therefore we propose that taxi drivers cause it to rain in Seattle. This conclusion will still be defective even if we are energetic in buttressing some empirical points: we can test the theory that taxi drivers do indeed benefit from rain; we can learn if they know they benefit from rain; we can find out if they actually favor rain. But it is still impossible to conclude that they cause rain since we do not show *what they do* to bring about rain and how these actions fit into existing knowledge about the phenomenon.

In addition to the basic fallacy of attributing causality where no causal relationship may exist, the loose usage of the Type IV perspective may generate spurious propositions about who benefits from a state of affairs. Such propositions have been advanced for Latin American countries in just this manner. Various groups—the wealthy, the Church, landowners, the army—have been identified as "oligarchs" on no more than the assumption that they benefit from a state of affairs: poverty, illiteracy, monoculture. Groups may, without meaningful evidence, be accused of benefiting when they do not benefit, of favoring when they oppose, and of causing when they do not cause. I can see little more in the Type IV oligarchy procedure than an irresponsible attempt to blame someone for Latin American backwardness.

In conclusion: (1) "Oligarchy" and related terms such as "elite rule" have many specific meanings. Therefore the investigator must state (or

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show through application) which meaning he gives to such terms if he uses them. (2) Each meaning of "oligarchy" must be cast in operational form so that evidence may be gathered to show the existence or nonexistence of the type(s) of oligarchy held to exist. (3) The appropriate evidence must be collected.

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HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION

By ROBERT JERVIS*

IN determining how he will behave, an actor must try to predict how others will act and how their actions will affect his values. The actor must therefore develop an image of others and of their intentions. This image may, however, turn out to be an inaccurate one; the actor may, for a number of reasons, misperceive both others' actions and their intentions. In this research note I wish to discuss the types of misperceptions of other states' intentions which states tend to make. The concept of intention is complex, but here we can consider it to comprise the ways in which the state feels it will act in a wide range of future contingencies. These ways of acting usually are not specific and well-developed plans. For many reasons a national or individual actor may not know how he will act under given conditions, but this problem cannot be dealt with here.

I. Previous Treatments of Perception in International Relations

Although diplomatic historians have discussed misperception in their treatments of specific events, students of international relations have generally ignored this topic. However, two sets of scholars have applied content analysis to the documents that flowed within and between governments in the six weeks preceding World War I. But the data have been put into quantitative form in a way that does not produce accurate measures of perceptions and intentions and that makes it impossible to gather useful evidence on misperception.[1]

The second group of theorists who have explicitly dealt with general questions of misperception in international relations consists of those, like Charles Osgood, Amitai Etzioni, and, to a lesser extent, Kenneth Boulding and J. David Singer, who have analyzed the cold war in

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[1] See, for example, Ole Holsti, Robert North, and Richard Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1968). For a fuller discussion of the Stanford content analysis studies and the general problems of quantification, see my "The Costs of the Quantitative Study of International Relations," in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (forthcoming).

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terms of a spiral of misperception.[2] This approach grows partly out of the mathematical theories of L. F. Richardson[3] and partly out of findings of social and cognitive psychology, many of which will be discussed in this research note.

These authors state their case in general, if not universal, terms, but do not provide many historical cases that are satisfactorily explained by their theories. Furthermore, they do not deal with any of the numerous instances that contradict their notion of the self-defeating aspects of the use of power. They ignore the fact that states are not individuals and that the findings of psychology can be applied to organizations only with great care. Most important, their theoretical analysis is for the most part of reduced value because it seems largely to be a product of their assumption that the Soviet Union is a basically status-quo power whose apparently aggressive behavior is a product of fear of the West. Yet they supply little or no evidence to support this view. Indeed, the explanation for the differences of opinion between the spiral theorists and the proponents of deterrence lies not in differing general views of international relations, differing values and morality,[4] or differing methods of analysis,[5] but in differing perceptions of Soviet intentions.

II. Theories—Necessary and Dangerous

Despite the limitations of their approach, these writers have touched on a vital problem that has not been given systematic treatment by theorists of international relations. The evidence from both psychology and history overwhelmingly supports the view (which may be labeled Hypothesis 1) that decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. Indeed, their theories and images play a large part in determining what they notice. In other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect. Furthermore (Hypothesis 1a), a theory will have greater impact on an actor's interpretation of data (a) the greater the ambiguity of the data and (b) the

[2] See, for example, Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender* (Urbana 1962); Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace* (New York 1962); Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (June 1959), 120-31; and Singer, *Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament* (Columbus 1962).

[3] *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Pittsburgh 1960) and *Arms and Insecurity* (Chicago 1960). For nonmathematicians a fine summary of Richardson's work is Anatol Rapoport's "L. F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, I (September 1957), 249-99.

[4] See Philip Green, *Deadly Logic* (Columbus 1966); Green, "Method and Substance in the Arms Debate," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 642-67; and Robert A. Levine, "Fact and Morals in the Arms Debate," *World Politics*, XIV (January 1962), 239-58.

[5] See Anatol Rapoport, *Strategy and Conscience* (New York 1964).

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higher the degree of confidence with which the actor holds the theory.[6]

For many purposes we can use the concept of differing levels of perceptual thresholds to deal with the fact that it takes more, and more unambiguous, information for an actor to recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one. An experiment by Bruner and Postman determined "that the recognition threshold for . . . incongruous playing cards (those with suits and color reversed) is significantly higher than the threshold for normal cards."[7] Not only are people able to identify normal (and therefore expected) cards more quickly and easily than incongruous (and therefore unexpected) ones, but also they may at first take incongruous cards for normal ones.

However, we should not assume, as the spiral theorists often do, that it is necessarily irrational for actors to adjust incoming information to fit more closely their existing beliefs and images. ("Irrational" here describes acting under pressures that the actor would not admit as legitimate if he were conscious of them.) Abelson and Rosenberg label as "psycho-logic" the pressure to create a "balanced" cognitive structure—i.e., one in which "all relations among 'good elements' [in one's attitude structure] are positive (or null), all relations among 'bad elements' are positive (or null), and all relations between good and bad elements are negative (or null)." They correctly show that the "reasoning [this involves] would mortify a logician."[8] But those who have tried to apply this and similar cognitive theories to international relations have usually overlooked the fact that in many cases there are important logical links between the elements and the processes they describe which cannot be called "psycho-logic." (I am here using the term "logical" not in the narrow sense of drawing only those conclusions that follow necessarily from the premises, but rather in the sense of conforming to generally agreed-upon rules for the treating of evidence.) For example, Osgood claims that psycho-logic is displayed when the Soviets praise a man or a proposal and people in the West react by distrusting the object of this praise.[9] But if a person believes that the Russians are aggressive, it is logical for him to be suspicious of their moves. When we say that a decision-maker "dislikes" another

[6] Floyd Allport, *Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure* (New York 1955), 382; Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," in David Finlay, Ole Holsti, and Richard Fagen, *Enemies in Politics* (Chicago 1967), 70.

[7] Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman, "On the Perceptions of Incongruity: A Paradigm," in Jerome Bruner and David Krech, eds., *Perception and Personality* (Durham, N.C., 1949), 210.

[8] Robert Abelson and Milton Rosenberg, "Symbolic Psycho-logic," *Behavioral Science*, III (January 1958), 4-5.

[9] P. 27.

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state this usually means that he believes that that other state has policies conflicting with those of his nation. Reasoning and experience indicate to the decision-maker that the "disliked" state is apt to harm his state's interests. Thus in these cases there is no need to invoke "psychologic," and it cannot be claimed that the cases demonstrate the substitution of "emotional consistency for rational consistency."[10]

The question of the relations among particular beliefs and cognitions can often be seen as part of the general topic of the relation of incoming bits of information to the receivers' already established images. The need to fit data into a wider framework of beliefs, even if doing so does not seem to do justice to individual facts, is not, or at least is not only, a psychological drive that decreases the accuracy of our perceptions of the world, but is "essential to the logic of inquiry."[11] Facts can be interpreted, and indeed identified, only with the aid of hypotheses and theories. Pure empiricism is impossible, and it would be unwise to revise theories in the light of every bit of information that does not easily conform to them.[12] No hypothesis can be expected to account for all the evidence, and if a prevailing view is supported by many theories and by a large pool of findings it should not be quickly altered. Too little rigidity can be as bad as too much.[13]

This is as true in the building of social and physical science as it is

[10] *Ibid.*, 26.

[11] I have borrowed this phrase from Abraham Kaplan, who uses it in a different but related context in *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco 1964), 86.

[12] The spiral theorists are not the only ones to ignore the limits of empiricism. Roger Hilsman found that most consumers and producers of intelligence felt that intelligence should not deal with hypotheses, but should only provide the policy-makers with "all the facts" (*Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* [Glencoe 1956], 46). The close interdependence between hypotheses and facts is overlooked partly because of the tendency to identify "hypotheses" with "policy preferences."

[13] Karl Deutsch interestingly discusses a related question when he argues, "Autonomy . . . requires both intake from the present and recall from memory, and selfhood can be seen in just this continuous balancing of a limited present and a limited past. . . . No further self-determination is possible if either openness or memory is lost. . . . To the extent that [systems cease to be able to take in new information], they approach the behavior of a bullet or torpedo: their future action becomes almost completely determined by their past. On the other hand, a person without memory, an organization without values or policy . . . —all these no longer steer, but drift: their behavior depends little on their past and almost wholly on their present. Driftwood and the bullet are thus each the epitome of another kind of loss of self-control . . ." (*Nationalism and Social Communication* [Cambridge, Mass., 1954], 167-68). Also see Deutsch's *The Nerves of Government* (New York 1963), 98-109, 200-256. A physicist makes a similar argument: "It is clear that if one is too attached to one's preconceived model, one will miss all radical discoveries. It is amazing to what degree one may fail to register mentally an observation which does not fit the initial image. . . . On the other hand, if one is too open-minded and pursues every hitherto unknown phenomenon, one is almost certain to lose oneself in trivia" (Martin Deutsch, "Evidence and Inference in Nuclear Research," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *Evidence and Inference* [Glencoe 1958], 102).

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in policy-making.[14] While it is terribly difficult to know when a finding throws serious doubt on accepted theories and should be followed up and when instead it was caused by experimental mistakes or minor errors in the theory, it is clear that scientists would make no progress if they followed Thomas Huxley's injunction to "sit down before fact as a mere child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever nature leads, or you will learn nothing."[15]

As Michael Polanyi explains, "It is true enough that the scientist must be prepared to submit at any moment to the adverse verdict of observational evidence. But not blindly. . . . There is always the possibility that, as in [the cases of the periodic system of elements and the quantum theory of light], a deviation may not affect the essential correctness of a proposition. . . . The process of explaining away deviations is in fact quite indispensable to the daily routine of research," even though this may lead to the missing of a great discovery.[16] For example, in 1795, the astronomer Lalande did not follow up observations that contradicted the prevailing hypotheses and could have led him to discover the planet Neptune.[17]

Yet we should not be too quick to condemn such behavior. As Thomas Kuhn has noted, "There is no such thing as research without counter-instances."[18] If a set of basic theories—what Kuhn calls a paradigm—has been able to account for a mass of data, it should not be lightly trifled with. As Kuhn puts it: "Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have committed them to an older tradition of normal science [i.e., science within the accepted paradigm], is not a violation of scientific standards but an index to the nature of scientific research itself. The source of resistance is the assurance that the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature

[14] Raymond Bauer, "Problems of Perception and the Relations Between the U.S. and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, v (September 1961), 223-29.

[15] Quoted in W. I. B. Beveridge, *The Art of Scientific Investigation*, 3rd ed. (London 1957), 50.

[16] *Science, Faith, and Society* (Chicago 1964), 31. For a further discussion of this problem, see *ibid.*, 16, 26-41, 90-94; Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge* (London 1958), 8-15, 30, 143-68, 269-98, 310-11; Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago 1964); Kuhn, "The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research," in A. C. Crombie, ed., *Scientific Change* (New York 1963), 344-69; the comments on Kuhn's paper by Hall, Polanyi, and Toulmin, and Kuhn's reply, *ibid.*, 370-95. For a related discussion of these points from a different perspective, see Norman Storer, *The Social System of Science* (New York 1960), 116-22.

[17] "He found that the position of one star relative to others . . . had shifted. Lalande was a good astronomer and knew that such a shift was unreasonable. He crossed out his first observation, put a question mark next to the second observation, and let the matter go" (Jerome Bruner, Jacqueline Goodnow, and George Austin, *A Study of Thinking* [New York 1962], 105).

[18] *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, 79.

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can be shoved into the box the paradigm provides. Inevitably, at times of revolution, that assurance seems stubborn and pig-headed as indeed it sometimes becomes. But it is also something more. That same assurance is what makes normal science or puzzle-solving science possible."[19]

Thus it is important to see that the dilemma of how "open" to be to new information is one that inevitably plagues any attempt at understanding in any field. Instances in which evidence seems to be ignored or twisted to fit the existing theory can often be explained by this dilemma instead of by illogical or nonlogical psychological pressures toward consistency. This is especially true of decision-makers' attempts to estimate the intentions of other states, since they must constantly take account of the danger that the other state is trying to deceive them.

The theoretical framework discussed thus far, together with an examination of many cases, suggests Hypothesis 2: scholars and decision-makers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories.[20] Another way of making this point is to argue that actors tend to establish their theories and expectations prematurely. In politics, of course, this is often necessary because of the need for action. But experimental evidence indicates that the same tendency also occurs on the unconscious level. Bruner and Postman found that "perhaps the greatest single barrier to the recognition of incongruous stimuli is the tendency for perceptual hypotheses to fixate after receiving a minimum of confirmation. . . . Once there had occurred in these cases a partial confirmation of the hypothesis . . . it seemed that nothing could change the subject's report."[21]

[19] *Ibid.*, 150-51.

[20] Requirements of effective political leadership may lead decision-makers to voice fewer doubts than they have about existing policies and images, but this constraint can only partially explain this phenomenon. Similar calculations of political strategy may contribute to several of the hypotheses discussed below.

[21] P. 221. Similarly, in experiments dealing with his subjects' perception of other people, Charles Dailey found that "premature judgment appears to make new data harder to assimilate than when the observer withholds judgment until all data are seen. It seems probable . . . that the observer mistakes his own inferences for facts" ("The Effects of Premature Conclusion Upon the Acquisition of Understanding of a Person," *Journal of Psychology*, XXX [January 1952], 149-50). For other theory and evidence on this point, see Bruner, "On Perceptual Readiness," *Psychological Review*, LXIV (March 1957), 123-52; Gerald Davidson, "The Negative Effects of Early Exposure to Suboptimal Visual Stimuli," *Journal of Personality*, XXXII (June 1964), 278-95; Albert Myers, "An Experimental Analysis of a Tactical Blunder," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LXIX (November 1964), 493-98; and Dale Wyatt and Donald Campbell, "On the Liability of Stereotype or Hypothesis," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLIV (October 1950), 496-500. It should be noted that this tendency makes "incremental" decision-making more likely (David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* [New York 1963]), but the results of this process may lead the actor further from his goals.

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However, when we apply these and other findings to politics and discuss kinds of misperception, we should not quickly apply the label of cognitive distortion. We should proceed cautiously for two related reasons. The first is that the evidence available to decision-makers almost always permits several interpretations. It should be noted that there are cases of visual perception in which different stimuli can produce exactly the same pattern on an observer's retina. Thus, for an observer using one eye the same pattern would be produced by a sphere the size of a golf ball which was quite close to the observer, by a baseball-sized sphere that was further away, or by a basketball-sized sphere still further away. Without other clues, the observer cannot possibly determine which of these stimuli he is presented with, and we would not want to call his incorrect perceptions examples of distortion. Such cases, relatively rare in visual perception, are frequent in international relations. The evidence available to decision-makers is almost always very ambiguous since accurate clues to others' intentions are surrounded by noise[22] and deception. In most cases, no matter how long, deeply, and "objectively" the evidence is analyzed, people can differ in their interpretations, and there are no general rules to indicate who is correct.

The second reason to avoid the label of cognitive distortion is that the distinction between perception and judgment, obscure enough in individual psychology, is almost absent in the making of inferences in international politics. Decision-makers who reject information that contradicts their views—or who develop complex interpretations of it—often do so consciously and explicitly. Since the evidence available contains contradictory information, to make any inferences requires that much information be ignored or given interpretations that will seem tortuous to those who hold a different position.

Indeed, if we consider only the evidence available to a decision-maker at the time of decision, the view later proved incorrect may be supported by as much evidence as the correct one—or even by more. Scholars have often been too unsympathetic with the people who were proved wrong. On closer examination, it is frequently difficult to point to differences between those who were right and those who were wrong with respect to their openness to new information and willingness to modify their views. Winston Churchill, for example, did not open-mindedly view each Nazi action to see if the explanations provided by the appeasers accounted for the data better than his own beliefs. Instead,

[22] For a use of this concept in political communication, see Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor* (Stanford 1962).

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like Chamberlain, he fitted each bit of ambiguous information into his own hypotheses. That he was correct should not lead us to overlook the fact that his methods of analysis and use of theory to produce cognitive consistency did not basically differ from those of the appeasers.[23]

A consideration of the importance of expectations in influencing perception also indicates that the widespread belief in the prevalence of "wishful thinking" may be incorrect, or at least may be based on inadequate data. The psychological literature on the interaction between affect and perception is immense and cannot be treated here, but it should be noted that phenomena that at first were considered strong evidence for the impact of affect on perception often can be better treated as demonstrating the influence of expectations.[24] Thus, in international relations, cases like the United States' misestimation of the political climate in Cuba in April 1961, which may seem at first glance to have been instances of wishful thinking, may instead be more adequately explained by the theories held by the decision-makers (e.g., Communist governments are unpopular). Of course, desires may have an impact on perception by influencing expectations, but since so many other factors affect expectations, the net influence of desires may not be great.

There is evidence from both psychology[25] and international relations that when expectations and desires clash, expectations seem to be more important. The United States would like to believe that North Vietnam is about to negotiate or that the USSR is ready to give up what the United States believes is its goal of world domination, but ambiguous

[23] Similarly, Robert Coulondre, the French ambassador to Berlin in 1939, was one of the few diplomats to appreciate the Nazi threat. Partly because of his earlier service in the USSR, "he was painfully sensitive to the threat of a Berlin-Moscow agreement. He noted with foreboding that Hitler had not attacked Russia in his *Reichstag* address of April 28. . . . So it went all spring and summer, the ambassador relaying each new evidence of the impending diplomatic revolution and adding to his admonitions his pleas for decisive counteraction" (Franklin Ford and Carl Schorske, "The Voice in the Wilderness: Robert Coulondre," in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats*, Vol. III [New York 1963] 573-74). His hypotheses were correct, but it is difficult to detect differences between the way he and those ambassadors who were incorrect, like Neville Henderson, selectively noted and interpreted information. However, to the extent that the fear of war influenced the appeasers' perceptions of Hitler's intentions, the appeasers' views did have an element of psycho-logic that was not present in their opponents' position.

[24] See, for example, Donald Campbell, "Systematic Error on the Part of Human Links in Communications Systems," *Information and Control*, I (1958), 346-50; and Leo Postman, "The Experimental Analysis of Motivational Factors in Perception," in Judson S. Brown, ed., *Current Theory and Research in Motivation* (Lincoln, Neb., 1953), 59-108.

[25] Dale Wyatt and Donald Campbell, "A Study of Interviewer Bias as Related to Interviewer's Expectations and Own Opinions," *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, IV (Spring 1950), 77-83.

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evidence is seen to confirm the opposite conclusion, which conforms to the United States' expectations. Actors are apt to be especially sensitive to evidence of grave danger if they think they can take action to protect themselves against the menace once it has been detected.

III. Safeguards

Can anything then be said to scholars and decision-makers other than "Avoid being either too open or too closed, but be especially aware of the latter danger"? Although decision-makers will always be faced with ambiguous and confusing evidence and will be forced to make inferences about others which will often be inaccurate, a number of safeguards may be suggested which could enable them to minimize their errors. First, and most obvious, decision-makers should be aware that they do not make "unbiased" interpretations of each new bit of incoming information, but rather are inevitably heavily influenced by the theories they expect to be verified. They should know that what may appear to them as a self-evident and unambiguous inference often seems so only because of their preexisting beliefs. To someone with a different theory the same data may appear to be unimportant or to support another explanation. Thus many events provide less independent support for the decision-makers' images than they may at first realize. Knowledge of this should lead decision-makers to examine more closely evidence that others believe contradicts their views.

Second, decision-makers should see if their attitudes contain consistent or supporting beliefs that are not logically linked. These may be examples of true psycho-logic. While it is not logically surprising nor is it evidence of psychological pressures to find that people who believe that Russia is aggressive are very suspicious of any Soviet move, other kinds of consistency are more suspect. For example, most people who feel that it is important for the United States to win the war in Vietnam also feel that a meaningful victory is possible. And most people who feel defeat would neither endanger U.S. national security nor be costly in terms of other values also feel that we cannot win. Although there are important logical linkages between the two parts of each of these views (especially through theories of guerrilla warfare), they do not seem strong enough to explain the degree to which the opinions are correlated. Similarly, in Finland in the winter of 1939, those who felt that grave consequences would follow Finnish agreement to give Russia a military base also believed that the Soviets would withdraw their demand if Finland stood firm. And those who felt that concessions would not lead to loss of major values also believed that Russia would

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fight if need be.[26] In this country, those who favored a nuclear test ban tended to argue that fallout was very harmful, that only limited improvements in technology would flow from further testing, and that a test ban would increase the chances for peace and security. Those who opposed the test ban were apt to disagree on all three points. This does not mean, of course, that the people holding such sets of supporting views were necessarily wrong in any one element. The Finns who wanted to make concessions to the USSR were probably correct in both parts of their argument. But decision-makers should be suspicious if they hold a position in which elements that are not logically connected support the same conclusion. This condition is psychologically comfortable and makes decisions easier to reach (since competing values do not have to be balanced off against each other). The chances are thus considerable that at least part of the reason why a person holds some of these views is related to psychology and not to the substance of the evidence.

Decision-makers should also be aware that actors who suddenly find themselves having an important shared interest with other actors have a tendency to overestimate the degree of common interest involved. This tendency is especially strong for those actors (e.g., the United States, at least before 1950) whose beliefs about international relations and morality imply that they can cooperate only with "good" states and that with those states there will be no major conflicts. On the other hand, states that have either a tradition of limited cooperation with others (e.g., Britain) or a strongly held theory that differentiates occasional from permanent allies[27] (e.g., the Soviet Union) find it easier to resist this tendency and need not devote special efforts to combating its danger.

A third safeguard for decision-makers would be to make their assumptions, beliefs, and the predictions that follow from them as explicit as possible. An actor should try to determine, before events occur, what evidence would count for and against his theories. By knowing what to expect he would know what to be surprised by, and surprise could indicate to that actor that his beliefs needed reevaluation.[28]

A fourth safeguard is more complex. The decision-maker should try

[26] Max Jacobson, *The Diplomacy of the Winter War* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 136-39.

[27] Raymond Aron, *Peace and War* (Garden City 1966), 29.

[28] Cf. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, 65. A fairly high degree of knowledge is needed before one can state precise expectations. One indication of the lack of international relations theory is that most of us are not sure what "naturally" flows from our theories and what constitutes either "puzzles" to be further explored with the paradigm or "anomalies" that cast doubt on the basic theories.

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to prevent individuals and organizations from letting their main task, political future, and identity become tied to specific theories and images of other actors.[29] If this occurs, subgoals originally sought for their contribution to higher ends will take on value of their own, and information indicating possible alternative routes to the original goals will not be carefully considered. For example, the U.S. Forest Service was unable to carry out its original purpose as effectively when it began to see its distinctive competence not in promoting the best use of lands and forests but rather in preventing all types of forest fires.[30]

Organizations that claim to be unbiased may not realize the extent to which their definition of their role has become involved with certain beliefs about the world. Allen Dulles is a victim of this lack of understanding when he says, "I grant that we are all creatures of prejudice, including CIA officials, but by entrusting intelligence coordination to our central intelligence service, which is excluded from policy-making and is married to no particular military hardware, we can avoid, to the greatest possible extent, the bending of facts obtained through intelligence to suit a particular occupational viewpoint."[31] This statement overlooks the fact that the CIA has developed a certain view of international relations and of the cold war which maximizes the importance of its information-gathering, espionage, and subversive activities. Since the CIA would lose its unique place in the government if it were decided that the "back alleys" of world politics were no longer vital to U.S. security, it is not surprising that the organization interprets information in a way that stresses the continued need for its techniques.

Fifth, decision-makers should realize the validity and implications of Roberta Wohlstetter's argument that "a willingness to play with material from different angles and in the context of unpopular as well as popular hypotheses is an essential ingredient of a good detective, whether the end is the solution of a crime or an intelligence estimate."[32] However, it is often difficult, psychologically and politically, for any one person to do this. Since a decision-maker usually cannot get "unbiased" treatments of data, he should instead seek to structure conflicting biases into the decision-making process. The decision-maker, in other words, should have devil's advocates around. Just as, as Neustadt points out,[33] the decision-maker will want to create conflicts among his

[29] See Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston 1957).

[30] Ashley Schiff, *Fire and Water: Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). Despite its title, this book is a fascinating and valuable study.

[31] *The Craft of Intelligence* (New York 1963), 53.

[32] P. 302. See Beveridge, 93, for a discussion of the idea that the scientist should keep in mind as many hypotheses as possible when conducting and analyzing experiments.

[33] *Presidential Power* (New York 1960).

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subordinates in order to make appropriate choices, so he will also want to ensure that incoming information is examined from many different perspectives with many different hypotheses in mind. To some extent this kind of examination will be done automatically through the divergence of goals, training, experience, and information that exists in any large organization. But in many cases this divergence will not be sufficient. The views of those analyzing the data will still be too homogeneous, and the decision-maker will have to go out of his way not only to cultivate but to create differing viewpoints.

While all that would be needed would be to have some people examining the data trying to validate unpopular hypotheses, it would probably be more effective if they actually believed and had a stake in the views they were trying to support. If in 1941 someone had had the task of proving the view that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor, the government might have been less surprised by the attack. And only a person who was out to show that Russia would take objectively great risks would have been apt to note that several ships with especially large hatches going to Cuba were riding high in the water, indicating the presence of a bulky but light cargo that was not likely to be anything other than strategic missiles. And many people who doubt the wisdom of the administration's Vietnam policy would be somewhat reassured if there were people in the government who searched the statements and actions of both sides in an effort to prove that North Vietnam was willing to negotiate and that the official interpretation of such moves as the Communist activities during the Têt truce of 1967 was incorrect.

Of course all these safeguards involve costs. They would divert resources from other tasks and would increase internal dissension. Determining whether these costs would be worth the gains would depend on a detailed analysis of how the suggested safeguards might be implemented. Even if they were adopted by a government, of course, they would not eliminate the chance of misperception. However, the safeguards would make it more likely that national decision-makers would make conscious choices about the way data were interpreted rather than merely assuming that they can be seen in only one way and can mean only one thing. Statesmen would thus be reminded of alternative images of others just as they are constantly reminded of alternative policies.

These safeguards are partly based on Hypothesis 3: actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actor information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and

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considered bit by bit than if it comes all at once. In the former case, each piece of discrepant data can be coped with as it arrives and each of the conflicts with the prevailing view will be small enough to go unnoticed, to be dismissed as unimportant, or to necessitate at most a slight modification of the image (e.g., addition of exceptions to the rule). When the information arrives in a block, the contradiction between it and the prevailing view is apt to be much clearer and the probability of major cognitive reorganization will be higher.

IV. Sources of Concepts

An actor's perceptual thresholds—and thus the images that ambiguous information is apt to produce—are influenced by what he has experienced and learned about.[34] If one actor is to perceive that another fits in a given category he must first have, or develop, a concept for that category. We can usefully distinguish three levels at which a concept can be present or absent. First, the concept can be completely missing. The actor's cognitive structure may not include anything corresponding to the phenomenon he is encountering. This situation can occur not only in science fiction, but also in a world of rapid change or in the meeting of two dissimilar systems. Thus China's image of the Western world was extremely inaccurate in the mid-nineteenth century, her learning was very slow, and her responses were woefully inadequate. The West was spared a similar struggle only because it had the power to reshape the system it encountered. Once the actor clearly sees one instance of the new phenomenon, he is apt to recognize it much more quickly in the future.[35] Second, the actor can know about a concept but not believe that it reflects an actual phenomenon. Thus Communist and Western decision-makers are each aware of the other's explanation of how his system functions, but do not think that the concept cor-

[34] Most psychologists argue that this influence also holds for perception of shapes. For data showing that people in different societies differ in respect to their predisposition to experience certain optical illusions and for a convincing argument that this difference can be explained by the societies' different physical environments, which have led their people to develop different patterns of drawing inferences from ambiguous visual cues, see Marshall Segall, Donald Campbell, and Melville Herskovits, *The Influence of Culture on Visual Perceptions* (Indianapolis 1966).

[35] Thus when Bruner and Postman's subjects first were presented with incongruous playing cards (i.e., cards in which symbols and colors of the suits were not matching, producing red spades or black diamonds), long exposure times were necessary for correct identification. But once a subject correctly perceived the card and added this type of card to his repertoire of categories, he was able to identify other incongruous cards much more quickly. For an analogous example—in this case, changes in the analysis of aerial reconnaissance photographs of an enemy's secret weapons-testing facilities produced by the belief that a previously unknown object may be present—see David Irving, *The Mare's Nest* (Boston 1964), 66-67, 274-75.

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responds to reality. Communist elites, furthermore, deny that anything *could* correspond to the democracies' description of themselves. Third, the actor may hold a concept, but not believe that another actor fills it at the present moment. Thus the British and French statesmen of the 1930's held a concept of states with unlimited ambitions. They realized that Napoleons were possible, but they did not think Hitler belonged in that category. Hypothesis 4 distinguishes these three cases: misperception is most difficult to correct in the case of a missing concept and least difficult to correct in the case of a recognized but presumably unfilled concept. All other things being equal (e.g., the degree to which the concept is central to the actor's cognitive structure), the first case requires more cognitive reorganization than does the second, and the second requires more reorganization than the third.

However, this hypothesis does not mean that learning will necessarily be slowest in the first case, for if the phenomena are totally new the actor may make such grossly inappropriate responses that he will quickly acquire information clearly indicating that he is faced with something he does not understand. And the sooner the actor realizes that things are not—or may not be—what they seem, the sooner he is apt to correct his image.[36]

Three main sources contribute to decision-makers' concepts of international relations and of other states and influence the level of their perceptual thresholds for various phenomena. First, an actor's beliefs about his own domestic political system are apt to be important. In some cases, like that of the USSR, the decision-makers' concepts are tied to an ideology that explicitly provides a frame of reference for viewing foreign affairs. Even where this is not the case, experience with his own system will partly determine what the actor is familiar with and what he is apt to perceive in others. Louis Hartz claims, "It is the absence of the experience of social revolution which is at the heart of the whole American dilemma. . . . In a whole series of specific ways it enters into our difficulty of communication with the rest of the world. We find it difficult to understand Europe's 'social question'. . . . We are not familiar with the deeper social struggles of Asia and hence tend to interpret even reactionary regimes as 'democratic.' "[37] Similarly, George Kennan argues that in World War I the Allied powers, and especially America, could not understand the bitterness and violence of others' internal conflicts: ". . . The inability of the Allied statesmen to picture to themselves the passions of the Russian civil war [was partly caused

[36] Bruner and Postman, 220.
[37] *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York 1955), 306.

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by the fact that] we represent . . . a society in which the manifestations of evil have been carefully buried and sublimated in the social behavior of people, as in their very consciousness. For this reason, probably, despite our widely traveled and outwardly cosmopolitan lives, the mainsprings of political behavior in such a country as Russia tend to remain concealed from our vision."[38]

Second, concepts will be supplied by the actor's previous experiences. An experiment from another field illustrates this. Dearborn and Simon presented business executives from various divisions (e.g., sales, accounting, production) with the same hypothetical data and asked them for an analysis and recommendations from the standpoint of what would be best for the company as a whole. The executives' views heavily reflected their departmental perspectives.[39] William W. Kaufmann shows how the perceptions of Ambassador Joseph Kennedy were affected by his past: "As befitted a former chairman of the Securities Exchange and Maritime Commissions, his primary interest lay in economic matters. . . . The revolutionary character of the Nazi regime was not a phenomenon that he could easily grasp. . . . It was far simpler, and more in accord with his own premises, to explain German aggressiveness in economic terms. The Third Reich was dissatisfied, authoritarian, and expansive largely because her economy was unsound."[40] Similarly it has been argued that Chamberlain was slow to recognize Hitler's intentions partly because of the limiting nature of his personal background and business experiences.[41] The impact of training and ex-

[38] *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (New York 1962), 142-43.

[39] DeWitt Dearborn and Herbert Simon, "Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identification of Executives," *Sociometry*, XXI (June 1958), 140-44.

[40] "Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy," in Craig and Gilbert, 358-59.

[41] Hugh Trevor-Roper puts this point well: "Brought up as a business man, successful in municipal politics, [Chamberlain's] outlook was entirely parochial. Educated Conservative aristocrats like Churchill, Eden, and Cranborne, whose families had long been used to political responsibility, had seen revolution and revolutionary leaders before, in their own history, and understood them correctly; but the Chamberlains, who had run from radical imperialism to timid conservatism in a generation of life in Birmingham, had no such understanding of history or the world: to them the scope of human politics was limited by their own parochial horizons, and Neville Chamberlain could not believe that Hitler was fundamentally different from himself. If Chamberlain wanted peace, so must Hitler" ("Munich—Its Lessons Ten Years Later," in Francis Loewenheim, ed., *Peace or Appeasement?* [Boston 1965], 152-53). For a similar view see A. L. Rowse, *Appeasement* (New York 1963), 117.

But Donald Lammers points out that the views of many prominent British public figures in the 1930's do not fit this generalization (*Explaining Munich* [Stanford 1966], 13-140). Furthermore, arguments that stress the importance of the experiences and views of the actors' ancestors do not explain the links by which these influence the actors themselves. Presumably Churchill and Chamberlain read the same history books in school and had the same basic information about Britain's past role in the world. Thus what has to be demonstrated is that in their homes aristocrats like Churchill learned different things about politics and human nature than did middle-class people

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perience seems to be demonstrated when the background of the appeasers is compared to that of their opponents. One difference stands out: "A substantially higher percentage of the anti-appeasers (irrespective of class origins) had the kind of knowledge which comes from close acquaintance, mainly professional, with foreign affairs."[42] Since members of the diplomatic corps are responsible for meeting threats to the nation's security before these grow to major proportions and since they have learned about cases in which aggressive states were not recognized as such until very late, they may be prone to interpret ambiguous data as showing that others are aggressive. It should be stressed that we cannot say that the professionals of the 1930's were more apt to make accurate judgments of other states. Rather, they may have been more sensitive to the chance that others were aggressive. They would then rarely take an aggressor for a status-quo power, but would more often make the opposite error.[43] Thus in the years before World War I the permanent officials in the British Foreign Office overestimated German aggressiveness.[44]

A parallel demonstration in psychology of the impact of training on perception is presented by an experiment in which ambiguous pictures were shown to both advanced and beginning police-administration students. The advanced group perceived more violence in the pictures than did the beginners. The probable explanation is that "the law enforcer may come to accept crime as a familiar personal experience, one which he himself is not surprised to encounter. The acceptance of crime as a familiar experience in turn increases the ability or readiness to perceive violence where clues to it are potentially available."[45] This

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like Chamberlain and that these experiences had a significant impact. Alternatively, it could be argued that the patterns of child-rearing prevalent among the aristocracy influenced the children's personalities in a way that made them more likely to see others as aggressive.

[42] *Ibid.*, 15.

[43] During a debate on appeasement in the House of Commons, Harold Nicolson declared, "I know that those of us who believe in the traditions of our policy, . . . who believe that one great function of this country is to maintain moral standards in Europe, to maintain a settled pattern of international relations, not to make friends with people who are demonstrably evil . . . —I know that those who hold such beliefs are accused of possessing the Foreign Office mind. I thank God that I possess the Foreign Office mind" (quoted in Martin Gilbert, *The Roots of Appeasement* [New York 1966], 187). But the qualities Nicolson mentions and applauds may be related to a more basic attribute of "the Foreign Office mind"—suspiciousness.

[44] George Monger, *The End of Isolation* (London 1963). I am also indebted to Frederick Collignon for his unpublished manuscript and several conversations on this point.

[45] Hans Toch and Richard Schulte, "Readiness to Perceive Violence as a Result of Police Training," *British Journal of Psychology*, LII (November 1961), 392 (original italics omitted). It should be stressed that one cannot say whether or not the advanced police students perceived the pictures "accurately." The point is that their training pre-

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experiment lends weight to the view that the British diplomats' sensitivity to aggressive states was not totally a product of personnel selection procedures.

A third source of concepts, which frequently will be the most directly relevant to a decision-maker's perception of international relations, is international history. As Henry Kissinger points out, one reason why statesmen were so slow to recognize the threat posed by Napoleon was that previous events had accustomed them only to actors who wanted to modify the existing system, not overthrow it.[46] The other side of the coin is even more striking: historical traumas can heavily influence future perceptions. They can either establish a state's image of the other state involved or can be used as analogies. An example of the former case is provided by the fact that for at least ten years after the Franco-Prussian War most of Europe's statesmen felt that Bismarck had aggressive plans when in fact his main goal was to protect the status quo. Of course the evidence was ambiguous. The post-1871 Bismarckian maneuvers, which were designed to keep peace, looked not unlike the pre-1871 maneuvers designed to set the stage for war. But that the post-1871 maneuvers were seen as indicating aggressive plans is largely attributable to the impact of Bismarck's earlier actions on the statesmen's image of him.

A state's previous unfortunate experience with a type of danger can sensitize it to other examples of that danger. While this sensitivity may lead the state to avoid the mistake it committed in the past, it may also lead it mistakenly to believe that the present situation is like the past one. Santayana's maxim could be turned around: "Those who remember the past are condemned to make the opposite mistakes." As Paul Kecskemeti shows, both defenders and critics of the unconditional surrender plan of the Second World War thought in terms of the conditions of World War I.[47] Annette Baker Fox found that the Scandinavian countries' neutrality policies in World War II were strongly influenced by their experiences in the previous war, even though vital aspects of the two situations were different. Thus "Norway's success [during the First World War] in remaining non-belligerent though

disposed them to see violence in ambiguous situations. Whether on balance they would make fewer perceptual errors and better decisions is very hard to determine. For an experiment showing that training can lead people to "recognize" an expected stimulus even when that stimulus is in fact not shown, see Israel Goldiamond and William F. Hawkins, "Vexierversuch: The Log Relationship Between Word-Frequency and Recognition Obtained in the Absence of Stimulus Words," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, LVI (December 1958), 457-63.

[46] *A World Restored* (New York 1964), 2-3.

[47] *Strategic Surrender* (New York 1964), 215-41.

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pro-Allied gave the Norwegians confidence that their country could again stay out of war."[48] And the lesson drawn from the unfortunate results of this policy was an important factor in Norway's decision to join NATO.

The application of the Munich analogy to various contemporary events has been much commented on, and I do not wish to argue the substantive points at stake. But it seems clear that the probabilities that any state is facing an aggressor who has to be met by force are not altered by the career of Hitler and the history of the 1930's. Similarly the probability of an aggressor's announcing his plans is not increased (if anything, it is decreased) by the fact that Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf*. Yet decision-makers are more sensitive to these possibilities, and thus more apt to perceive ambiguous evidence as indicating they apply to a given case, than they would have been had there been no Nazi Germany.

Historical analogies often precede, rather than follow, a careful analysis of a situation (e.g., Truman's initial reaction to the news of the invasion of South Korea was to think of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria). Noting this precedence, however, does not show us which of many analogies will come to a decision-maker's mind. Truman could have thought of nineteenth-century European wars that were of no interest to the United States. Several factors having nothing to do with the event under consideration influence what analogies a decision-maker is apt to make. One factor is the number of cases similar to the analogy with which the decision-maker is familiar. Another is the importance of the past event to the political system of which the decision-maker is a part. The more times such an event occurred and the greater its consequences were, the more a decision-maker will be sensitive to the particular danger involved and the more he will be apt to see ambiguous stimuli as indicating another instance of this kind of event. A third factor is the degree of the decision-maker's personal involvement in the past case—in time, energy, ego, and position. The last-mentioned variable will affect not only the event's impact on the decision-maker's cognitive structure, but also the way he perceives the event and the lesson he draws. Someone who was involved in getting troops into South Korea after the attack will remember the Korean War differently from someone who was involved in considering the possible use of nuclear weapons or in deciding what messages should be sent to the Chinese. Greater personal involvement will usually give the event greater impact, especially if the decision-maker's own views

[48] *The Power of Small States* (Chicago 1959), 81.

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were validated by the event. One need not accept a total application of learning theory to nations to believe that "nothing fails like success."[49] It also seems likely that if many critics argued at the time that the decision-maker was wrong, he will be even more apt to see other situations in terms of the original event. For example, because Anthony Eden left the government on account of his views and was later shown to have been correct, he probably was more apt to see as Hitlers other leaders with whom he had conflicts (e.g., Nasser). A fourth factor is the degree to which the analogy is compatible with the rest of his belief system. A fifth is the absence of alternative concepts and analogies. Individuals and states vary in the amount of direct or indirect political experience they have had which can provide different ways of interpreting data. Decision-makers who are aware of multiple possibilities of states' intentions may be less likely to seize on an analogy prematurely. The perception of citizens of nations like the United States which have relatively little history of international politics may be more apt to be heavily influenced by the few major international events that have been important to their country.

The first three factors indicate that an event is more apt to shape present perceptions if it occurred in the recent rather than the remote past. If it occurred recently, the statesman will then know about it at first hand even if he was not involved in the making of policy at the time. Thus if generals are prepared to fight the last war, diplomats may be prepared to avoid the last war. Part of the Anglo-French reaction to Hitler can be explained by the prevailing beliefs that the First World War was to a large extent caused by misunderstandings and could have been avoided by farsighted and nonbelligerent diplomacy. And part of the Western perception of Russia and China can be explained by the view that appeasement was an inappropriate response to Hitler.[50]

V. The Evoked Set

The way people perceive data is influenced not only by their cognitive structure and theories about other actors but also by what they are concerned with at the time they receive the information. Information

[49] William Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, First Series (London 1923), 88.

[50] Of course, analogies themselves are not "unmoved movers." The interpretation of past events is not automatic and is informed by general views of international relations and complex judgments. And just as beliefs about the past influence the present, views about the present influence interpretations of history. It is difficult to determine the degree to which the United States' interpretation of the reasons it went to war in 1917 influenced American foreign policy in the 1920's and 1930's and how much the isolationism of that period influenced the histories of the war.

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is evaluated in light of the small part of the person's memory that is presently active—the "evoked set." My perceptions of the dark streets I pass walking home from the movies will be different if the film I saw had dealt with spies than if it had been a comedy. If I am working on aiding a country's education system and I hear someone talk about the need for economic development in that state, I am apt to think he is concerned with education, whereas if I had been working on, say, trying to achieve political stability in that country, I would have placed his remarks in that framework.[51]

Thus Hypothesis 5 states that when messages are sent from a different background of concerns and information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is likely. Person A and person B will read the same message quite differently if A has seen several related messages that B does not know about. This difference will be compounded if, as is frequently the case, A and B each assume that the other has the same background he does. This means that misperception can occur even when deception is neither intended nor expected. Thus Roberta Wohlstetter found not only that different parts of the United States government had different perceptions of data about Japan's intentions and messages partly because they saw the incoming information in very different contexts, but also that officers in the field misunderstood warnings from Washington: "Washington advised General Short [in Pearl Harbor] on November 27 to expect 'hostile action' at any moment, by which it meant 'attack on American possessions from without,' but General Short understood this phrase to mean 'sabotage.'"[52] Washington did not realize the extent to which Pearl Harbor considered the danger of sabotage to be primary, and furthermore it incorrectly believed that General Short had received the intercepts of the secret Japanese diplomatic messages available in Washington which indicated that surprise attack was a distinct possibility. Another implication of this hypothesis is that if important information is known to only part of the government of state A and part of the government of state B, international messages may be misunderstood by those parts of

[51] For some psychological experiments on this subject, see Jerome Bruner and A. Leigh Minturn, "Perceptual Identification and Perceptual Organization" *Journal of General Psychology*, LIII (July 1955), 22-28; Seymour Feshbach and Robert Singer, "The Effects of Fear Arousal and Suppression of Fear Upon Social Perception," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LV (November 1957), 283-88; and Elsa Sippoal, "A Group Study of Some Effects of Preparatory Sets," *Psychology Monographs*, XLVI, No. 210 (1935), 27-28. For a general discussion of the importance of the perceiver's evoked set, see Postman, 87.

[52] Pp. 73-74.

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the receiver's government that do not match, in the information they have, the part of the sender's government that dispatched the message.[53]

Two additional hypotheses can be drawn from the problems of those sending messages. Hypothesis 6 states that when people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver.[54] Since they are aware of what is to them the important pattern in their actions, they often feel that the pattern will be equally obvious to others, and they overlook the degree to which the message is apparent to them only because they know what to look for. Those who have not participated in the endless meetings may not understand what information the sender is trying to convey. George Quester has shown how the German and, to a lesser extent, the British desire to maintain target limits on bombing in the first eighteen months of World War II was undermined partly by the fact that each side knew the limits it was seeking and its own reasons for any apparent "exceptions" (e.g., the German attack on Rotterdam) and incorrectly felt that these limits and reasons were equally clear to the other side.[55]

Hypothesis 7 holds that actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned. Thus even without appreciable impact of different cognitive structures and backgrounds, an action may convey an unwanted message. For example, a country's representatives may not follow instructions and so may give others impressions contrary to those the home government wished to convey. The efforts of Washington and Berlin to settle their dispute over Samoa in the late 1880's were complicated by the provocative behavior of their agents on the spot. These agents not only increased the intensity of the local conflict, but led the decision-makers to become more suspicious of the other state because they tended to assume that their agents were obeying instructions and that the actions of the other side represented official policy. In such cases both sides will believe that the other is reading hostility into a policy of theirs which is friendly. Similarly,

[53] For example, Roger Hilsman points out, "Those who knew of the peripheral reconnaissance flights that probed Soviet air defenses during the Eisenhower administration and the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union itself . . . were better able to understand some of the things the Soviets were saying and doing than people who did not know of these activities" (*To Move a Nation* [Garden City 1967], 66). But it is also possible that those who knew about the U-2 flights at times misinterpreted Soviet messages by incorrectly believing that the sender was influenced by, or at least knew of, these flights.

[54] I am grateful to Thomas Schelling for discussion on this point.

[55] *Deterrence Before Hiroshima* (New York 1966), 105-22.

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Quester's study shows that the attempt to limit bombing referred to above failed partly because neither side was able to bomb as accurately as it thought it could and thus did not realize the physical effects of its actions.[56]

VI. Further Hypotheses From the Perspective of the Perceiver

From the perspective of the perceiver several other hypotheses seem to hold. Hypothesis 8 is that there is an overall tendency for decision-makers to see other states as more hostile than they are.[57] There seem to be more cases of statesmen incorrectly believing others are planning major acts against their interest than of statesmen being lulled by a potential aggressor. There are many reasons for this which are too complex to be treated here (e.g., some parts of the bureaucracy feel it is their responsibility to be suspicious of all other states; decision-makers often feel they are "playing it safe" to believe and act as though the other state were hostile in questionable cases; and often, when people do not feel they are a threat to others, they find it difficult to believe that others may see them as a threat). It should be noted, however, that decision-makers whose perceptions are described by this hypothesis would not necessarily further their own values by trying to correct for this tendency. The values of possible outcomes as well as their probabilities must be considered, and it may be that the probability of an unnecessary arms-tension cycle arising out of misperceptions, multiplied by the costs of such a cycle, may seem less to decision-makers than the probability of incorrectly believing another state is friendly, multiplied by the costs of this eventuality.

Hypothesis 9 states that actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is. This hypothesis holds true in related ways. Frequently, too many complex events are squeezed into a perceived pattern. Actors are hesitant to admit or even see that particular incidents cannot be explained by their theories.[58] Those events not caused by factors that are important parts of the perceiver's image are often seen as though they were. Further, actors see others as more internally united than they in fact are and generally overestimate the degree to which others are following a coherent policy. The degree to which the other side's policies are the product of internal

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] For a slightly different formulation of this view, see Holsti, 27.

[58] The Soviets consciously hold an extreme version of this view and seem to believe that nothing is accidental. See the discussion in Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe 1953), 67-73.

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bargaining,[59] internal misunderstandings, or subordinates' not following instructions is underestimated. This is the case partly because actors tend to be unfamiliar with the details of another state's policy-making processes. Seeing only the finished product, they find it simpler to try to construct a rational explanation for the policies, even though they know that such an analysis could not explain their own policies.[60]

Familiarity also accounts for Hypothesis 10: because a state gets most of its information about the other state's policies from the other's foreign office, it tends to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the other government as a whole. In many cases this perception will be an accurate one, but when the other government is divided or when the other foreign office is acting without specific authorization, misperception may result. For example, part of the reason why in 1918 Allied governments incorrectly thought "that the Japanese were preparing to take action [in Siberia], if need be, with agreement with the British and French alone, disregarding the absence of American consent,"[61] was that Allied ambassadors had talked mostly with Foreign Minister Motono, who was among the minority of the Japanese favoring this policy. Similarly, America's NATO allies may have gained an inaccurate picture of the degree to which the American government was committed to the MLF because they had greatest contact with parts of the government that strongly favored the MLF. And states that tried to get information about Nazi foreign policy from German diplomats were often misled because these officials were generally ignorant of or out of sympathy with Hitler's plans. The Germans and the Japanese sometimes purposely misinformed their own ambassadors in order to deceive their enemies more effectively.

Hypothesis 11 states that actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they themselves do when the others behave in accordance with the actor's desires; but when the behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces. If the *effect* of another's action is to injure or threaten

[59] A. W. Marshall criticizes Western explanations of Soviet military posture for failing to take this into account. See his "Problems of Estimating Military Power," a paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 16.

[60] It has also been noted that in labor-management disputes both sides may be apt to believe incorrectly that the other is controlled from above, either from the international union office or from the company's central headquarters (Robert Blake, Herbert Shepard, and Jane Mouton, *Managing Intergroup Conflict in Industry* [Houston 1964], 182). It has been further noted that both Democratic and Republican members of the House tend to see the other party as the one that is more disciplined and united (Charles Clapp, *The Congressman* [Washington 1963], 17-19).

[61] George Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (New York 1967), 484.

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the first side, the first side is apt to believe that such was the other's *purpose*. An example of the first part of the hypothesis is provided by Kennan's account of the activities of official and unofficial American representatives who protested to the new Bolshevik government against several of its actions. When the Soviets changed their position, these representatives felt it was largely because of their influence.[62] This sort of interpretation can be explained not only by the fact that it is gratifying to the individual making it, but also, taking the other side of the coin mentioned in Hypothesis 9, by the fact that the actor is most familiar with his own input into the other's decision and has less knowledge of other influences. The second part of Hypothesis 11 is illustrated by the tendency of actors to believe that the hostile behavior of others is to be explained by the other side's motives and not by its reaction to the first side. Thus Chamberlain did not see that Hitler's behavior was related in part to his belief that the British were weak. More common is the failure to see that the other side is reacting out of fear of the first side, which can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and spirals of misperception and hostility.

This difficulty is often compounded by an implication of Hypothesis 12: when actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive these intentions. Only rarely do they believe that others may be reacting to a much less favorable image of themselves than they think they are projecting.[63]

For state A to understand how state B perceives A's policy is often difficult because such understanding may involve a conflict with A's image of itself. Raymond Sontag argues that Anglo-German relations before World War I deteriorated partly because "the British did not like to think of themselves as selfish, or unwilling to tolerate 'legitimate' German expansion. The Germans did not like to think of themselves as aggressive, or unwilling to recognize 'legitimate' British vested interest."[64]

[62] *Ibid.*, 404, 408, 500.

[63] Herbert Butterfield notes that these assumptions can contribute to the spiral of "Hobbesian fear. . . . You yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party, but you cannot enter into the other man's counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous. For you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have" (*History and Human Conflict* [London 1951], 20).

[64] *European Diplomatic History 1871-1932* (New York 1933), 125. It takes great mental effort to realize that actions which seem only the natural consequence of defending your vital interests can look to others as though you are refusing them any

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Hypothesis 13 suggests that if it is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace, it is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to others. While he may know that another actor is on an opposing team, it may be more difficult for him to realize that the other is playing an entirely different game. This is especially true when the game he is playing seems vital to him.[65]

The final hypothesis, Hypothesis 14, is as follows: actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views. When choosing between two theories we have to pay attention only to data that cannot be accounted for by one of the theories. But it is common to find people claiming as proof of their theories data that could also support alternative views. This phenomenon is related to the point made earlier that any single bit of information can be interpreted only within a framework of hypotheses and theories. And while it is true that "we may without a vicious circularity accept some datum as a fact because it conforms to the very law for which it counts as another confirming instance, and reject an allegation of fact because it is already excluded by law,"[66] we should be careful lest we forget that a piece of information seems in many cases to confirm a certain hypothesis only because we already believe that hypothesis to be correct and that the information can with as much validity support a different hypothesis. For example, one of the reasons why the German attack on Norway took both that country and England by surprise, even though they had detected German ships moving toward Norway, was that they expected not an attack but an attempt by the Germans to break through the British blockade and reach the

chance of increasing their influence. In rebutting the famous Crowe "balance of power" memorandum of 1907, which justified a policy of "containing" Germany on the grounds that she was a threat to British national security, Sanderson, a former permanent undersecretary in the Foreign Office, wrote, "It has sometimes seemed to me that to a foreigner reading our press the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant sprawling all over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream" (quoted in Monger, 315). But few other Englishmen could be convinced that others might see them this way.

[65] George Kennan makes clear that in 1918 this kind of difficulty was partly responsible for the inability of either the Allies or the new Bolshevik government to understand the motivations of the other side: "There is . . . nothing in nature more egocentrical than the embattled democracy. . . . It . . . tends to attach to its own cause an absolute value which distorts its own vision of everything else. . . . It will readily be seen that people who have got themselves into this frame of mind have little understanding for the issues of any contest other than the one in which they are involved. The idea of people wasting time and substance on any *other* issue seems to them preposterous" (*Russia and the West*, 11-12).

[66] Kaplan, 89.

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Atlantic. The initial course of the ships was consistent with either plan, but the British and Norwegians took this course to mean that their predictions were being borne out.[67] This is not to imply that the interpretation made was foolish, but only that the decision-makers should have been aware that the evidence was also consistent with an invasion and should have had a bit less confidence in their views.

The longer the ships would have to travel the same route whether they were going to one or another of two destinations, the more information would be needed to determine their plans. Taken as a metaphor, this incident applies generally to the treatment of evidence. Thus as long as Hitler made demands for control only of ethnically German areas, his actions could be explained either by the hypothesis that he had unlimited ambitions or by the hypothesis that he wanted to unite all the Germans. But actions against non-Germans (e.g., the takeover of Czechoslovakia in March 1938) could not be accounted for by the latter hypothesis. And it was this action that convinced the appeasers that Hitler had to be stopped. It is interesting to speculate on what the British reaction would have been had Hitler left Czechoslovakia alone for a while and instead made demands on Poland similar to those he eventually made in the summer of 1939. The two paths would then still not have diverged, and further misperception could have occurred.

[67] Johan Jorgen Holst, "Surprise, Signals, and Reaction: The Attack on Norway," *Cooperation and Conflict*, No. 1 (1966), 34. The Germans made a similar mistake in November 1942 when they interpreted the presence of an Allied convoy in the Mediterranean as confirming their belief that Malta would be resupplied. They thus were taken by surprise when landings took place in North Africa (William Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble* [New York 1966], 365).

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Review Articles

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Toward a Synthesis?

By WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER

R. Barry Farrell, editor, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1966, 368 pp. $9.95 (cloth), $3.95 (paper).

K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1967, 505 pp. $7.50.

THE traditional distinction between domestic and foreign politics, made by both decision-makers and analysts, is increasingly called into question by contemporary historical developments. The cold-war conflict and the attending mobilization of military, socioeconomic, and psychological resources by the superpowers and their allies; ventures of regional economic integration; the changing nature of the nation-state; the close connection between the conditions prevailing in the international system and the attempts made by the new states to modernize and to coalesce into viable societies—these are just a few examples of how foreign and domestic policy projects have become overlapping and perhaps entirely inseparable.

It is for compelling reasons, then, that political analysts have devoted considerable attention to this development in recent years. If the decision-maker finds that historical processes make it difficult for him to separate external and internal aspects of national policy, the analyst similarly is called upon to refashion his analytical tools and adjust his conceptual framework: important changes in concrete historical circumstances sooner or later impel revision (in both senses of the word) of analytical perspectives. Such revisions—in this case, efforts to attune analytical frameworks to an apparent blending of external and internal political processes—implicitly or explicitly challenge long-accepted conceptual principles and their underlying assumptions about historical reality. In doing that, they inevitably raise searching questions about traditional divisions of labor in the discipline and about the most effective pedagogical method of portraying the international system.

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In short, these analytical reappraisals touch upon fundamental questions of methodology and data collection, the relationship between the study of international politics and that of comparative politics, and the teaching of international relations.

I

The relationship between domestic and foreign politics—the "central mystery," as one writer has called it—has always held a special fascination for the analyst, in part because reflections on this nexus raise some of the largest questions about the nature of political processes. These questions not only deal with how a political unit seeks survival and accommodation in a frequently predatory environment; they also touch upon internal dimensions such as sources of aspirations, prevailing value systems and their institutional manifestations, the perception of restrictions and opportunities in the environment, the role of groups and individual decision-makers, and so forth—in other words, all the converging factors that determine how a political unit conceives, articulates, and advances its demands on the environment. Hardly any important topic of inquiry, empirical or normative, is not somehow connected with the constant ebb and flow of interactions between a political actor and the scenario of the environment. To talk about the connection between internal and external politics means to talk about all the major elements that form the patterns of power and purpose in the domestic as well as the international system.

As already noted, organizing questions around the distinction between internal and external aspects of state affairs presupposes a corresponding underlying separability in historical reality. This is true whether the political unit in question is an individual, a family, a tribe, a nation-state, or an international organization. But it is only natural that the sociopolitical entity we call the nation-state should have become particularly susceptible to having its political processes dichotomously categorized as foreign and domestic, as external and internal. All the traditional attributes of the nation-state—territorial exclusiveness, sovereignty and equality under international law, large-scale social mobilization, successful secularization and "nationalization" of value systems, the ability to command the supreme loyalty of its subjects, the capacity to control communications and traffic of persons, goods, and services across borders—have imposed sharply defined boundaries between the nation-state and the international environment.

Two theoretical consequences of these boundary-maintaining quali-

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ties are of particular importance. First, most political analysts have accepted what must have appeared as a "natural," or at least a historically and analytically justifiable, distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. Second, they have used this distinction as the basis for an increasingly elaborate but fundamentally two-fold division of labor: between the study of international and (comparative) domestic politics, and between two significantly different approaches to the analysis of international relations.

Although their connection rarely has been denied, the distinction between international and domestic politics has become deeply embedded conceptually, pedagogically, and institutionally. Decision-makers and analysts have long suspected that domestic structures and operational "styles" of national governments may significantly affect external relations and that, conversely, the international environment may produce important "situational impacts" on domestic political processes. Nor is there a lack of classical studies that have specifically focused on such relationships—for example, the writings of Plato and Aristotle, Alexis de Tocqueville, and James Bryce, as well as the whole Rankean school of historiography that stressed concepts such as the primacy of foreign policy. More recently, the rise of totalitarian systems and, after World War II, the emergence of formerly colonial developing systems have spurred a large number of studies that have attempted to correlate internal "structural-functional" requisites with external conduct. Yet many analysts in recent years have expressed their increasing dissatisfaction with the apparent lack of progress in this field of inquiry. Blame is often placed on the lack of purposeful communication between specialists in international politics and specialists in comparative politics. In truth, many of us have imprisoned ourselves in conceptual jails of our own making where we remain incommunicado and deaf to the voices from next door. But the uneasiness, I think, goes deeper than this aspect of the prisoners' dilemma.

In the first place, the historical events that have made it extremely problematic to distinguish between international and domestic politics have overtaken analytical endeavors that are still based on the assumption of their separability: we have not as yet solved analytical problems that are already obsolescent. For example, the conceptual issues that evolve from the overlap of international and domestic politics are not confined to the old question of whether external or internal considerations are predominant in the policy agenda of the nation-state. In fact, the many analytical tasks generated by the concept of the primacy of foreign policy or by the inverse formulation—important as these tasks

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may be—take as their starting point the presupposition that these two dimensions are separable and generically distinct. Since this assumption has become difficult to sustain, the analytical challenges based on it are obsolescent even though they have not as yet been successfully met. It is understandable that such a state of affairs should cause uneasiness in a discipline with scientific ambitions: one cannot skip Maxwell on the way from Newton to Einstein.

Another reason for concern is methodologically much more complex. It stems from a fundamental epistemological difficulty in relating the processes of one social system to the processes of another of which it is a part. The problem applies to the relationship between international politics and domestic politics as well as to that between some diverging approaches to the study of international politics. It is a generally accepted assumption of the comparative method that the phenomena to be compared are characterized by both similarities and dissimilarities. Since the essence of theorizing is to discover regularities of behavior, a theory should be able to account for recurrent patterns of both similar and dissimilar behavior. What is regarded as "similar" or "dissimilar" depends on the frame of reference and on what parameters the analyst "brackets out" by holding them constant. Generally, there has been a tendency in comparative politics to hold the international environment constant and a corresponding inclination in the study of international politics to hold the domestic environment constant. As a consequence, regularities of behavior discovered in studies of comparative politics are examined within a frame of reference that is only sporadically connected to the international environment. Conversely, perceived behavior patterns in international politics are often attributed to inherent qualities of the international system (for example, its decentralized structure), with only intermittent discussion of how the members' internal characteristics may affect relational patterns of the system. The matter is further complicated by "Galton's problem" of idiographic versus nomothetic generalization—that is, the problem of analyzing a particular situation on the one hand and discovering general laws on the other hand. (Scientific explanation is concerned with both, and most analysts aspire to be both fox and hedgehog: they not only want to know many things but they want to know one big thing as well.) All of these considerations raise troublesome methodological issues when two distinct frames of reference (each holding constant central variables of the other) are applied to subject matters, such as international and comparative politics, that are perceived to be overlapping: it becomes difficult to discover whether idiographic findings within one

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frame may not be nomothetic within the other, and the other way around.

This problem is well illustrated by two significantly different approaches to the study of international relations. The first of these approaches views international politics primarily from a global vantage point and highlights the power configurations of the international system and the way they affect the behavior of the system's members. This "systemic" level of analysis tends to view nation-states as essentially monolithic units whose value systems and internal processes are of secondary importance for understanding their external conduct. To use the terms that Denis Donoghue has applied to Nabokov, followers of this approach are essentially analysts of "ossature rather than intestine," concerned primarily with "surfaces and structures." This perspective leads to a neglect of subnational groups and to a peculiar version of state reification: "By eschewing any empirical concern with the domestic and internal variations within the separate nations, the system-oriented approach tends to produce a sort of 'black box' or 'billiard ball' concept of the national actors."[1] This outlook is frequently encountered in the "classical" analyses of balance-of-power relationships as well as in more recent approaches that stress systemic environmental factors.

The second approach emphasizes domestic predispositions and the complex internal political processes that go into the making of foreign policy. Understandably, analysts of this persuasion have little trouble in detecting and highlighting dissimilarities among the actors' behavior on the international scene. In focusing on the personal idiosyncracies of key decision-makers and on the "structural-functional" characteristics that distinguish various national systems, this approach tends to relegate external events to the secondary analytical role of serving as "inputs" from the international system into the domestic system. (Clearly, this approach is close to the traditional subject matter of comparative politics, even though it is primarily concerned with foreign policy processes.)

The choice of one approach rather than the other—although influenced by the analyst's interest, temperament, and training—is essentially determined by the kind of questions that are being raised. The analyst who is primarily interested in the outcome of foreign policy will necessarily focus on the operational setting of the international system whose patterns of power and purpose make for either

[1] J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, XIV (October 1961), 81.

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success or failure; the analyst who is preoccupied with motivational, institutional, and decision-making aspects of foreign policy will necessarily turn his attention to internal political processes. The two approaches are obviously complementary but, as in any intellectual endeavor, the epistemological bias of the question slants the analytical content of the answer and may skew the accumulation of empirical evidence. This poses serious methodological problems when it comes to combining propositions from these two levels of analysis within a unified conceptual framework. Propositions that can be culled either from the international-systemic level of analysis or from the national-subsystemic level of analysis are frequently regarded as noncumulative because they emerge from significantly different analytical contexts. Such propositions, "representing different levels of analysis and couched in different frames of reference . . . would defy theoretical integration; one may well be a corollary of the other, but they are not immediately combinable. A prior translation from one level to another must take place."[2] Attempts to "translate" such propositions are in effect a search for a conceptual synthesis among various levels of analysis. While this quest for a "new dialectic" has not been accompanied by the fanfare of the "great debates" of realism versus idealism and traditionalism versus scientism, it is related to both and is probably equally important in the long run.

II

Both volumes under review are concerned with this general problem-area. The collection edited by R. Barry Farrell is largely based on papers originally prepared for a conference sponsored by the Comparative Politics Program of the Political Science Department of Northwestern University in April 1964. Its discussion

> . . . begins on a level of generalization which encompasses a broad range of variables and theoretical concerns in the interrelationships between national and international politics. The second and third parts each deal with one of the two clusters of problems of internal politics which seem of major relevance for international politics. Thus Part Two discusses relationships between types of political society resulting from different levels of economic development and international political behavior. Part Three is concerned with the relationship between the political organization of open and closed politics and international politics.

[2] *Ibid.*, 91.

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> A single case, that of the Soviet Union, is presented in Part Four, with interest in its uniqueness and its generalizability in surveying in very concrete and specific terms the interaction between various internal and external factors. Part Five directs the reader to several major research concerns and challenges which the several contributors believe open the road toward future development of useful research and analysis (p. vii).

Space limitations do not permit a discussion of all contributions in this volume. Moreover, the methodological diversity of these essays makes this collection a happy exception among such ventures, and I hesitate to single out some of the contributors for particular praise or criticism.[3] Some essays, however, have a more direct bearing on the theoretical issues raised above and deserve closer attention here for that reason.[4]

The essay by Karl W. Deutsch deals primarily with external influences on the internal behavior of nations. He discusses methods that can reduce, increase, or otherwise manipulate outside impacts, and he identifies those external and internal factors that are particularly appropriate for this function. His conceptual framework is designed to locate such "sensitive spots" and to make "semi-quantitative statements about balances, about flows which are strong or less strong, messages which are more or less likely to be accepted or rejected" (p. 16). Deutsch avoids a rigid and confining distinction between "external" and "internal" dimensions by defining them in terms of boundaries that are "marked discontinuities in the frequency of transactions and marked discontinuities in the frequency of responses—particularly, therefore, discontinuities in the degree of covariance" (p. 5). This central idea is then applied in defining the concepts of country, general or natural political community, and autonomy and sovereignty. Although he has addressed himself to similar issues elsewhere, it would have been highly pertinent for the purpose of this collection if Deutsch had specifically discussed the importance of the concepts of transaction

[3] The editor notes in the Preface that "both 'behavioral' and 'traditional' approaches are represented, in addition to other approaches by scholars who regard this dichotomy as uninteresting or unreal" (p. vii). Some of my critical remarks in the following pages may create the impression that, on the whole, I find less fault with the "traditional" approaches. This impression would be erroneous, and I should like to say at the outset that although I find the "behavioral-traditional" distinction neither uninteresting nor unreal, I consider it unfortunate and unnecessary.

[4] This criterion for focusing attention seems justified by the general theoretical intent of the collection. By other standards, Vernon V. Aspaturian's essentially nontheoretical essay "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet Union" is perhaps the finest in the collection.

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frequency and response frequency for the international-comparative politics distinction. It is implied, of course, that this distinction evaporates, since what matters is the frequency and intensity of transmitted and received messages, rather than their source and target. But since the medium is at least part of the message in this framework, it would seem relevant to discuss what media are assumed to be political, especially because the sender may intend the message to be political whereas the receiver may regard it as, say, economic. In other words, intended, perceived, and actual functional content of transactions, in addition to their frequency and intensity, should be specifically identified in talking about the relationships between a political system and its environment.[5]

James N. Rosenau's essay "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" is perhaps the most interesting in this collection—in part because of its strengths and in part because of serious flaws that make it symptomatic of what ails much of contemporary theorizing. Rosenau's essay is an ambitious attempt to lay the groundwork for a general theory of foreign policy. This is to be done in two steps: The first is the development and explication of "pre-theories" of foreign policy which would channel empirical data through "preliminary processing" to render them similar and hence comparable. Rosenau proposes five molds for this purpose—idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables—and then proceeds to rate the "relative potencies" of these variables in different types of societies (large-small, open-closed, economically developed-underdeveloped, penetrated-nonpenetrated). For the second step, the researcher needs, in addition to similarly processed materials, "appropriate concepts for compiling them into meaningful patterns," because then "an almost unlimited number [of theories] can be fashioned out of similarly processed data so long as the initial organization of the data is consistent with the subject the theories are designed to elucidate" (p. 52). Rosenau proposes two central concepts: the *penetrated system*, to accommodate conceptually the fusion of national and international systems; and the organization of data around *issue-areas* (for example, the status area, the nonhuman resource area, and many others), which is necessary since "the functioning of political systems can vary significantly from one type of issue to another" (p. 53). Rosenau then elaborates these concepts and illustrates their interrelationships in a table ranking the relative potency of the five variables underlying the external behavior of sixteen types

[5] Cf. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York 1963), esp. 124.

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of societies in three types of issue-areas. The number of possible combinational patterns is potentially much larger than 240, however, since the number of possible issue-areas is considerably larger than three. (In fact, in the table one of the three issue-area categories is labeled "others.") The "if-then" propositions that Rosenau expects the researcher to extract from this framework for verification are based on relations among variables that can easily run into thousands.

From the researcher's point of view, the major problem with this all-encompassing framework is that it is undiscriminating and provides no guidelines for relevancy or priorities. It is a catchall. Rosenau seeks to turn this shortcoming into a virtue by insisting that his framework leaves open all possible options for theory construction: "While these concepts greatly complicate the task of theory building, they do not dictate or limit the kind of theory that can be constructed. As emphasized throughout, all we have done in this paper is to identify and amplify the materials out of which any theory of foreign policy *must be fashioned*. A wide range of theories can be built out of these materials, and nothing inherent in the latter determines the design, elegance, and utility of the former" (pp. 81-92, emphasis added).

This assumption points up a serious and basic methodological misconception. Rosenau disregards the fact that his five initial variables—around which empirical data are to be organized—already impose directions and limits on the kind of theoretical framework that will result. He maintains that the raw materials, which pre-theory is to render "comparable and ready for theorizing," may "serve as the basis for all kinds of theories—abstract or empirical, single- or multi-country, pure or applied—but until they have been similarly processed, theorizing is not likely to occur, or, if it does, the results are not likely to be very useful" (p. 40). Rosenau claims that his framework has not delimited choices for theory-building; yet he specifies not only the raw materials out of which "any theory of foreign policy must be fashioned," but also how to process them! On the other hand, Rosenau acknowledges that "the preliminary processing to which foreign policy materials must be subjected is of a much more basic order [than the use of quantified materials and operationalized concepts]. It involves the need to develop an explicit conception of where causation is located in international affairs" (p. 41). Indeed. But this means that causal speculations *precede* the choosing of pre-theory variables and that this choice unavoidably limits the kinds of theories that can subsequently be constructed. The rub of the matter is relegated to a footnote: "Briefly, by pre-theory is meant both an early step toward explanation of specific

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empirical events and a general orientation toward all events, a point of view or philosophy about the way the world is. Ideally pre-theories would be limited to the former meaning, but this requires that a field be in general agreement about the 'proper' orientation toward its subject matter, a situation which the field of foreign policy research is far from even approximating" (p. 41, n. 41).

The assumption that such "pre-theories" can or should be sterilized epistemologically by making them atomistic-inductive leads to basic methodological errors. In Rosenau's case, the consequences for his argument are difficult to gauge since his concepts are not operationalized and since, as he says, his pre-theory "is not much more than an orientation and is not at present subject to verification" (p. 47). Throughout, there is confusion about the meaning of pre-theory. When Rosenau chooses to regard it as "not much more than an orientation" and not verifiable, it cannot yield the testable "if-then" propositions that are presumably the payoff for the entire exercise; moreover, as an "orientation," the pre-theory implicitly reflects Rosenau's conception of where "causation is located in international affairs" and hence is individualistic. When Rosenau chooses to regard pre-theory as "an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events," its component parts are presented as epistemologically neutral and capable of being shaped into whatever kind of theoretical construct an analyst thinks appropriate. We are invited to eat the cake and have it too.[6]

The essay by Carl Friedrich focuses on intranational politics and foreign policy in developed Western systems. Professor Friedrich, whose younger colleagues occasionally qualify their deep admiration for him by referring to his "traditionalist" orientation, here puts forth arguments that are profoundly and delightfully radical in their implications. He is one of the few contributors to this collection who, when speaking of the "seamless web" of foreign and domestic policy and the difficulty of even defining foreign policy, is willing to follow this recognition to some of its logical conclusions—for example, the question of whether the study of international relations should be an "autonomous" discipline as proposed by Raymond Aron and many others. Friedrich suggests that the difference between foreign and

[6] To the extent that Rosenau at least recognizes this problem (even though he dismisses it), he belongs to a group of notably sophisticated behavioral analysts who make their epistemological assumptions explicit and try to anticipate the resulting methodological consequences. Unfortunately, too many others cling to the innocent belief that empirical "facts" can be perceived and analyzed without a prior epistemological commitment. Despite their claims to scientific avant-garde status in the social sciences, such analysts are methodological Victorians with assumptions that have long been debunked in the natural sciences.

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domestic policy may be likened to that between agricultural and fiscal policy, "calling for a distinct organization and a separate set of specialists, but certainly not calling for a separate kind of political theory. It is the more curious that just such a theory has been demanded in recent years by very able writers in the field of international relations" (p. 98). It is not quite clear from the context precisely what a "distinct organization" would involve, nor should one assume that the study of foreign policies is automatically coextensive with the study of international politics.[7] But Friedrich leaves no room for doubt that he believes that the entire issue could profit from illumination by philosophically informed approaches to the political process. He also incidentally points to a glaring omission in this collection when he proposes that a "functional approach to policy processes will . . . understand foreign affairs not only as the external aspect of self-contained systems but also as the internal aspect of supranational (regional and worldwide) systems of policy formation and control" (p. 112). It is unfortunate that a discussion of such an important functional area as regional economic integration was not included in this volume. What better example could there be of the empirical and conceptual overlap of domestic and international politics?

Friedrich's call for a unified political theory is taken up by Chadwick F. Alger in his essay on the comparison of intranational and international politics. I have elsewhere critically commented on this article and the analytical trend it exemplifies,[8] and I wish to limit myself here to just one observation. In essence, Alger applies to the international system a modified version of the structural-functional categories formulated for developing societies by Almond and Coleman. The premise of this theoretical adaptation is that, after all, both international and domestic systems are *political* systems and that we have overlooked striking similarities between international political processes and the domestic political processes of certain primitive societies. Consequently, so this argument holds, analytical concepts that apply to functionally diffuse and structurally decentralized societies (which seem to resemble the "state of nature" of international politics) can also be applied to the international system. But this kind of analytical framework simply posits parallelisms—some of which are dubious in

[7] Cf. Fred A. Sondermann, "The Linkage Between Foreign Policy and International Politics," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 8-17.

[8] Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 971-82.

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any case—between domestic and international political processes; it completely ignores voices of caution that warn against interchanging concepts from one level of analysis with those of another. Moreover, this way of reaching for a unified theory of international and comparative politics leads to an ironic consequence: the very premise of parallelism tends to sustain the traditional notion that international and domestic political systems are conceptually *distinct*, even though Alger may view them as not fundamentally *different*.

III

If we are are still far from a unified theory, K. J. Holsti's *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* is a welcome signpost on the way. It should be noted immediately that it is not Holsti's intention to provide such a theory. But one of the many merits of this international politics textbook is that the cast of its framework strongly directs the reader to materials and analytical questions that are equally relevant to the study of comparative politics. In this cogently organized book, Holsti is concerned with two central questions that he considers crucial to a general study in the field of international politics:

> *Why* do states conduct their relations in specified ways, and *how* do they conduct their relations? The first six chapters offer some explanation or hypotheses regarding the sources of state behavior. The main thesis is that no explanation is adequate unless it examines simultaneously the impact of systemic, national, and personality variables on foreign policy objectives and actions. One of the main shortcomings of general analyses of international politics . . . has been their implicit reliance on only one set of explanatory variables, such as the personalities, values, and aspirations of key policy-makers. The second question is seemingly easier to explore because "how" implies description rather than explanation. Yet . . . it soon became apparent that mere description of diplomatic processes would be inadequate. For instance, once the question of how governments bargain with each other has been explored descriptively, a series of problems remain, namely why do certain bargaining strategies fail or succeed (p. ix).

Holsti organizes his argument largely around the three levels of analysis (the individual, the state, and the international system) that were categorized and analyzed by Kenneth N. Waltz in his widely acclaimed *Man, the State and War*.[9] To the question, Which level of

[9] (New York 1959).

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analysis should we employ as the most useful perspective from which to explain or understand politics among nations? Holsti replies with the unexceptionable answer that we need all three since one alone cannot account for all aspects of reality, although any one may be able to illuminate some aspects of reality more adequately than the other two. The choice of level of analysis depends on the type of problem we want to analyze. On the systemic level, Holsti describes and analyzes six historical international systems with the use of five variables—system boundaries; the main characteristics of system members; systemic structure arising from power and influence configurations; the most common forms of interaction among component units; and the regulatory assumptions and value systems upon which relations are based. Holsti concludes that the most important variable in attempting to construct typologies of political orders at the international level is systemic structure: "The nature of the units which interact provides one basis of differentiation, but evidence is insufficient to suggest that the *forms* of political organization—whether feudal units, city states, agricultural states, or nation states—determine the unique characteristics of international politics in a given era. International systems could also be classified according to the types of issues which bring political units into conflict. But the most meaningful distinction may relate to the types of structures—the general patterns of power, dominance, and influence—that persist among units [of] the system" (p. 91).

Turning more specifically to the formulation of foreign policy objectives, Holsti stresses the other two levels of analysis (the state and individual decision-makers) and discusses the large number of variables that combine in a particular decision-making setting: images, value and belief systems, and psychological and political needs of decision-makers; national role in the international system; domestic needs; capabilities; general social values, public opinion, and specific group interests; organizational needs, values, and traditions; and—as the perennial situational backdrop—the structure and conditions of the international system. Holsti is very much aware of the problem of gauging the relative weight of these different variables and of assessing the nature of the relationships among them. He does, however, venture some plausible hypotheses about which components "are likely to constitute the most salient aspects of a definition of the situation, and under what conditions" (p. 186). Holsti then turns to the major techniques employed by political units to achieve or defend their objectives, interests, or orientations: diplomatic bargaining, propaganda, eco-

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nomic instruments, subversion, intervention, and massive military force. The book concludes with a discussion of external restraints (such as international law) and internal restraints (such as public opinion and the role of ethics and morality), followed by two somewhat inconsequential chapters on resolving international conflict and on conflict and collaboration in security communities.

Holsti's book is one of the finest texts to appear in a long time. Equally challenging to student and teacher, it is concerned with theoretical issues that many scholars in the social sciences regard as most pressing, and it conveys these concerns to the student in language that is clear and free of jargon. Even if Holsti does not provide the answers, his framework of analysis poses the most relevant questions logically and insistently.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Time Sequences and Rates of Change

By ERIC A. NORDLINGER*

Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, editors, *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, 487 pp. $8.50.

POLITICAL development is undoubtedly a rich and variegated field of study. We have begun to accumulate first-rate studies of widely divergent cultures and social structures, masses of quantitative data on the socioeconomic variables involved in the modernization process, analyses of political phenomena ranging from the destooling of chiefs to the functioning of complex legislative systems, well-documented surveys of particular political systems, and a smaller number of useful typologies and general hypotheses. It is this burgeoning and many-faceted literature that makes "theory-building" simultaneously most difficult and most desirable—just as the integration problems facing the new states are exceptionally difficult to resolve, while at the same time their resolution is first on the list of political imperatives. We are clearly in need of a set of questions and concepts that are broad enough to encompass the phenomena falling under the rubric of political development, but that are also specific enough to allow for the generation of testable hypotheses of an explanatory variety. A reading of the uniformly excellent volume edited by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner suggests a strong candidate to fill this need.

Although the editors and contributors are concerned with a large group of disparate problems and geographical areas, nine of the book's fourteen chapters make at least some mention of time sequences and, to a lesser extent, rates of change, while four of the chapters contribute an extended analysis of sequences. In their own concluding chapter, LaPalombara and Weiner go so far as to suggest "that the roles political parties play in handling the problems of national integration, political legitimacy, participation, and distribution depend upon (a) the sequences and (b) the clustering of issues. Closer examination may show that, among the independent variables that affect the kind of party system and party-system capabilities that

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develop, great attention must be paid to these two factors. It may be that there is an 'appropriate' or 'optimum' timing of issues or crises as distinct from a malsequential pattern" (p. 430). To ask questions involving time sequences (and, I would add, rates of change) is apparently a powerful approach for generating explanatory hypotheses. While these two concepts are not independent variables themselves, when applied to particular variables they are specific enough to facilitate the formulation of explanatory hypotheses within a well-structured framework. It is the main burden of this review article to underscore the uses and advantages of a focus upon time sequences and rates of change.

It should be quite apparent that both sequences and rates of change are sufficiently generalizable concepts to allow for the systematic integration of broad slices of the political development field. In dealing with the variables constituting the field, we can analyze all manner of political, attitudinal, social, and economic phenomena in terms of their sequences and rates. As to different geographical areas, one of the primary concerns of the LaPalombara-Weiner volume—to help remedy the neglect of European countries in the study of political development—may also be realized since the two time dimensions may be utilized in comparing patterns of development among the European countries, as well as between Western and non-Western systems. Thus, in introducing us to the special problems confronting the emergence of effective parties and party systems in Latin America, Robert E. Scott sees fit to compare the political systems of Europe and Latin America in terms of their wide differences in sequence, thereby presenting some important historical explanations for the stagnation and ineffectiveness of Latin American parties (pp. 334-35).

Moreover, this focus upon the two dimensions of time may help to fill an important gap in the political science literature. While it is by no means true that history explains everything, it does take us well along the road, especially in the implicitly historically oriented field of political development. Yet until quite recently, political science was practically denuded of any explicit conception of time, thereby eliminating the possibility of constructing generalizations based upon historical patterns of development. Generalizations involving history may be of either a descriptive or an explanatory type, or both simultaneously. The great evolutionary theorists—Condorcet, Comte, Marx, Spencer, Darwin, Spengler, Toynbee, and Sorokin—either restricted themselves to descriptive generalization alone or combined description and explanation. Descriptively, they argued that historical develop-

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ment unfolds according to particular stages; in their explanations, they argued that one stage is unable to emerge until the prior stage has evolved, for each stage is in some way a necessary condition for the emergence of its successor. We are now well aware that history is in no way unilinear—that there are not any "evolutionary universals in society," as Parsons has called them. Yet there is no reason why this major difficulty in the descriptive aspect of evolutionary theories forces political science to ignore various concepts of time.

The point to be made is then this: political scientists could profitably play down the importance of those descriptive generalizations involving time found throughout the development and modernization literature and concentrate upon explanatory ones. Instead of attempting to identify a general pattern according to which political systems develop, we can look at the various developmental patterns and ask questions about their different consequences. For instance, rather than suggesting that political systems necessarily become more differentiated and complex over time, we can attempt to construct general explanatory hypotheses of this kind: *if* a political system becomes more differentiated at a particular rate of change, or according to a certain sequence, one part of the system becoming differentiated before another, then certain consequences are likely to follow. Hans Daalder, another of the contributors to the LaPalombara-Weiner volume, does just this when he argues that an authentic democratic system is unlikely to develop in a country where the central bureaucracy is established prior to the onset of party competition (pp. 59-61).

Besides providing far more extended explanations of political development, this type of emphasis can also contribute to a greater refinement of explanatory generalizations. As one sociologist has put it, "Because few theorists face the relevance of time to their explanations, discussion of social change remains vague, and causal links far from clear."[1] Utilizing the notion of time sequences has allowed another contributor, Giovanni Sartori, to bring a large breath of fresh air into the perennial debate about the interrelation between electoral arrangements and the party system. Instead of reasserting or refuting the argument that proportional representation leads to the multiplication of parties, Sartori has effectively inserted himself into the debate by developing a number of propositions supporting his contention that PR produces a multiparty system only when it is introduced *prior* to

[1] Max Hierich, "The Use of Time in the Study of Social Change," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (June 1964), 386.

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the formation of parties with structured organizations and well-articulated party platforms (pp. 167-69).

There is also the possibility that a time-oriented approach can bridge the analytical distinction between "social statics" and "social dynamics" which has afflicted the social sciences ever since Comte originally drew a sharp line between the two. This bridging could be done in two ways. The obvious way is to utilize changes in the independent variables to account for "static" or structural phenomena; even the structural-functional school is beginning to move in this direction.[2] On the other hand, it is also possible to utilize "static" hypotheses in the construction and verification of "dynamic" hypotheses, given the paucity of the latter. Many of the propositions put forward in this review article take this form.

Lastly, a focus upon rates of change implicitly raises questions involving time lag. We may speak of a time lag between two related variables when one of them originates at an earlier time or evolves at a faster rate than the other, so that the two reach similar levels only after a certain time period has elapsed. After having determined such an approximate time lag, it should be possible to offer hypotheses that account for differences in time lag and to suggest the consequences that larger or smaller time lags have for other phenomena. In fact, such hypotheses and suggestions form the centerpiece of Stein Rokkan's chapter on polarization (or cleavage patterns) in Norway. By bringing together ecological and election data, Rokkan maps out the time lags between rural and urban political mobilization. The fact that it took some fifty-five years for rural voter turnout to match that of the urban population in Norway is accounted for by variations in the social structure and is then related to the country's cleavage patterns. And in his concluding section, Rokkan outlines his reasons for thinking that such time-lag studies in rural and urban political change are one of the most potentially rewarding research strategies in comparative politics generally (pp. 244-45, 248-49, 258-61).

I. Variables and Hypotheses

These then are some of the uses and advantages of an approach to political development that focuses upon sequences and rates of change.

[2] Francesca Cancian, "Functional Analysis of Change," *ibid.*, xxv (December 1960), 818-27; and Alvin Boskoff, "Functional Analysis as a Source of Theoretical Repertory and Research Tasks in the Study of Social Change," in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch, eds., *Explorations in Social Change* (Boston 1964).

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However, while many of the contributors to the volume reviewed here have utilized this broad approach in one way or another, none of them has done so in as extensive a fashion as is possible. By relying upon the hypotheses and data found in the LaPalombara-Weiner volume and in some of the other outstanding studies of political development, a preliminary attempt will be made here to formulate a number of explanatory hypotheses involving time sequences and rates of change as they help account for certain fundamental aspects of political development. It is hoped that this attempt will serve to illustrate the applications and the explanatory power of sequence and rate-of-change propositions and that it will concomitantly outline a convenient manner of systematically integrating many of the major conclusions in the political development literature. And it may even turn out that the hypotheses offered here enjoy a respectable measure of validity.

There are four political phenomena whose sequence and rates of change constitute the independent variables:[3] (1) a national identity may be said to exist when the great majority of the politically relevant actors accord the nation's central symbols and its political elite(s) greater loyalty than that which they maintain toward subnational units, such as tribes, castes, and classes, and toward political elite(s) residing outside the system's territory. (2) A central government that is institutionalized is characterized by a significant differentiation of structures and a specificity of functions, by regularized decision-making procedures, and by the existence of a hierarchical relationship in which the personnel responsible for the execution and enforcement of governmental decisions are subordinate to the executive and/or legislative decision-makers. (3) Protoparties, as contrasted with mass parties, are limited in their membership, which is composed of national, regional, and/or local notables, and in their organization, which is minimal. (4) The last independent variable, mass suffrage or near-universal suffrage, is self-explanatory except for the provision that voting is not pro forma, as in single-party states, or inconsequential because the legislators are practically powerless, as in Meiji Japan, or ineffective because votes are weighted, as in Wilhelmine Germany.

The sequence and rate of change of each of these variables will be analyzed separately in an attempt to account for the three dependent

[3] While the following variables are susceptible to more precise definitions than those offered here, to define them further would be both useless and pretentious. The kinds of hypotheses and illustrative evidence offered below are not refined enough to link up with a set of more closely defined variables, just as certain studies relying upon survey or aggregate data only artificially confirm the hypotheses when the statistical manipulations are unwarranted by the weak reliability of the data.

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variables defined here: (1) The presence or absence of widespread violence refers to attacks by one group against another (rather than against the government itself), commonly centering on tribal, class, ethnic, religious, or territorial hatreds and jealousies. (2) An authoritarian government is one that represses political dissent even when such expressions do not involve the goal of overthrowing the government. This policy involves the punishment of even those dissenters who do not publicly express their disapproval of the form of government and its incumbents or make known their dissatisfaction with governmental outputs. Authoritarianism as repression also refers to the outlawing and destruction of independent intermediary groups, such as farmers' organizations, labor unions, and communal associations, which do not challenge the government's authority, though they may peacefully attempt to persuade the government to alter its policies. It should be heavily underscored that the category of authoritarian rule does not include those dictatorships—colonial regimes, single-party states, military oligarchies, and monarchies—that are simply concerned with maintaining their position of control and that do not resort to the repression of the rights and liberties of individuals and groups who do not challenge their authority.[4] (3) The last dependent variable is a form of democratic government (i.e., open competition for governmental office, with the population selecting the "winners") which is genuinely representative, durable, and decisionally effective.[5]

Although these three dependent variables refer to certain *forms* of interaction among individuals and between individuals and the government, they also tell us a good deal about the presence or absence of those outcomes that determine the *quality* of life in a society—what Pennock has termed "political goods," constituting an important and

[4] This distinction is related to the typology of regimes put forward by LaPalombara and Weiner; authoritarian government as defined here includes their "one-party authoritarian" and "one-party totalitarian" systems, whereas nonauthoritarian dictatorship includes, among others, their "one-party pluralistic" regimes (pp. 37-41).

[5] Some students of political development would contend that democracy as defined here—in terms of the electoral form that it has taken in Western areas—is inapplicable to the non-Western areas and that governmental responsiveness to the population, if it is achieved, will be achieved through *indigenous* forms of representation. Perhaps—but at this point in history it is a highly dubious proposition since such indigenous forms of representation have not yet been institutionalized in any national political system. Moreover, a handful of modernizing systems—such as the Philippines, India, Chile, and Costa Rica—have successfully adopted the Western democratic model, and all but a few of the new states of Asia have set out to build a political order of the Western type. See Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia* (New York 1966), 61-62. Moreover, electoral democracy requires a heightened political consciousness, which in turn depends upon mass mobilization. And the latter is commonly incompatible with electoral competition. See Ernest Gellner, "Democracy and Industrialisation," *Archives européennes de sociologie*, VIII, No. 1 (1967), 63-64.

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much neglected aspect of political development.[6] Some of these "political goods"—such as individual dignity, security, justice, liberty, and material welfare—are intimately connected with the presence or absence of widespread violence, repressive rule, and democratic government. Thus in attempting to account for these three dependent variables, the general propositions offered here will presumably also be related to the distribution of "political goods."

Since the secondary arguments supporting the general propositions sometimes become rather involved, it might be helpful to summarize the major propositions at the outset. With respect to time sequences, it is argued that the probabilities of a political system's developing in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian, and eventually democratically stable manner are maximized when a national identity emerges first, followed by the institutionalization of the central government, and then by the emergence of mass parties and a mass electorate.[7] With respect to rates of change, it is argued that if an attempt is made to create a national identity, institutionalize central government, form mass parties, and usher in mass electoral participation in a rapid fashion, the outcome is likely to be widespread violence and repressive rule, which make it more difficult to establish a democratic system and, further, assure that if such a system is established, its stability, representativeness, and decisional effectiveness will suffer.

II. National Identity and Governmental Institutions: Sequence

In order to maximize the probabilities of a political system's developing in a nonviolent, nonauthoritarian form and ultimately achieving democratic stability, a sense of national identity should precede the institutionalization of the central government. What then are the secondary hypotheses that support this general argument?

The most fundamental objective of any central government is its own continuation, preferably at the same level of institutionalization and with the same amount of capability in dealing with the nonelite. Going beyond this, many governments are also firmly committed to the realization of change in any number of spheres and directions.

[6] J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics*, XVIII (April 1966), 415-34.

[7] Dankwart Rustow arrives at a broadly similar conclusion (that the most effective sequence for "political modernization" is the one of identity-authority-equality) by a different route than that taken here. See his *A World of Nations* (Washington 1967), 120-32. LaPalombara and Weiner would presumably also agree with this formulation, but their supporting arguments are limited to the single point that a different sequence would inflict too heavy a "load" upon the government (pp. 428-29).

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Admittedly, governments might achieve their primary goal without the presence of a sense of national identity. However, it would be more difficult for them to do so, as the nonviolent development of the government in any desired direction is highly unlikely to proceed without the prior resolution of the identity question. Sidney Verba makes the point succinctly when he writes that "other problems are likely to be pushed aside until the central problem is met: 'What is my nation?' must be answered before 'What kind of a nation?'"[8] Without a subjective identification with the regime on the part of the political actors, not only will the government have difficulty in applying its decisions, and thus maintaining its authority, but all types of change will remain in abeyance until a national identity is formed.[9]

When a central government is confronted with sharp procedural and substantive conflicts, it can best ensure its survival and the absence of violence if there is already present a set of inclusive attachments that serve as centripetal forces alleviating the divisions produced by the centrifugal ones. Not only might the procedural values be readily challenged if governmental institutions were formed before a sense of national identity had emerged, but the legitimacy of the central government's mere existence might be called into question when parochial groups tried to secede or refused to accept the authority of the governmental incumbents. This point may be taken one step further by noting that the institutionalization of the central government may actually provoke existing parochial groups to resist its authority. In societies where the continuing strength of communal loyalties and hatreds has not allowed a national identity to be formed prior to the institutionalization of the central government, "to permit oneself to be ruled by men of other tribes, other races, or other religions is to submit not merely to oppression but to degradation—to exclusion from the moral community as a lesser order of being whose opinions, attitudes, wishes, and so on, simply do not fully count."[10] And these feelings of oppression and degradation can only be compounded during the process of institutionalization, for the process highlights the presence and increases the power of the incumbents as perceived by the parochial groups.

[8] "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton 1965), 533.

[9] In a related vein, Carl J. Friedrich has written that "only a firmly established government is capable of being constitutionalized. . . . In the evolution of our Western world this meant that national unification had to precede constitutionalism" (*Constitutional Government and Democracy* [Boston 1941], 8).

[10] Clifford Geertz, "Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe 1963), 127-28.

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In Europe the states that have developed most successfully according to the criteria of our three dependent variables are the Scandinavian countries, and in these countries a sense of nationhood developed not only before it did in almost all other European countries (around the tenth century), but before the formation of central governmental institutions. Among these countries, Norway is a particularly illuminating illustration of the hypothesis. Its history is characterized by the absence of revolution and authoritarianism and by a paucity of violence, while its twentieth-century democratic governments have been exceptionally representative, decisionally effective, and stable—and this despite widespread and intensive cleavages (regional, cultural, and religious), together with the strains following in the wake of rapid industrialization. Part of the explanation undoubtedly lies with the prior existence and the continuing strength of exceptionally cohesive bonds (in the form of a sense of national communality) which successfully mitigated the effects of these conflicts upon the central government.[11]

Besides the definitionally universal aspect of a national identity, which decreases the centrifugal pressures confronting the government, its substantive content is also relevant. When a sense of national identity precedes the institutionalization of the central government, there is the possibility that the particular values constituting this identity will restrain the government from developing into an authoritarian one. Two examples of this point are found in the United States and Japan. The American national identity was formed prior to 1789 around the two interrelated foci of self-government as a British colony and the War of Independence with Britain. Both experiences helped form a national identity based upon a belief in the Americans' superiority in protecting individual and group liberties, a belief that then played an important part in curbing the opposite tendencies (though it did not succeed in eliminating them, as evidenced by the Alien and Sedition Acts) in the first thirty years of independence when the government was being centrally institutionalized. In Japan, a strong sense of national identity was exhibited by the political class in the last years of the Tokugawa regime and the first years of the Meiji Restoration, before the Meiji oligarchs turned to the job of centralizing and institutionalizing the government. And it was in part the elite's sense of national identity, expressed in service and responsibility to emperor

[11] Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton 1966), esp. 119-20, 181-82.

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and nation, that helped keep authoritarian abuses within easily manageable bounds during the period of governmental institutionalization.[12]

III. National Identity: Rate

Having considered two broad reasons for thinking that national identity ought to precede the establishment of central governmental institutions, we must now note that there are only a handful of political systems that have developed in this manner. The more common sequence is either the emergence of a national identity after central government has been institutionalized (the institutionalized government helping to mold the national identity) or the simultaneous development of the two, as in the postcolonial societies. The exceptional importance of national identity, both for the three dependent variables presented here and for practically all other variables commonly said to constitute "political development," would suggest that a national identity should be formed as rapidly as possible once central government has come into existence, so that it may alleviate the strains and conflicts that hinder the peaceful development of nonauthoritarian and democratic government.[13] However, turning to rates of change, not only is it extremely difficult to form a sense of national identity in a short period of time, but when the attempt is made, the likelihood of repressive rule and widespread violence following in its wake is concomitantly increased.

One reason why it is highly unlikely that a sense of national identity can be rapidly formed is that the process involves a fundamental alteration in the loyalties of those people whose primary attachment was previously given to subnational groups. If the attempt is made to create a national identity in a short space of time, there appear to be only two foci around which it could develop: a set of emotionally charged symbols or a charismatic leader.[14] But in either case the likelihood is that

[12] Moreover, these particular attachments to the nation allowed for the gradual inclusion of protoparties and limited popular participation into the decision-making process characterized by a bargaining style. See Robert E. Ward, "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization," in Pye and Verba, 55-56. The pre-1868 peasantry and urban lower classes did not manifest a sense of national identity, but their quiescence and acquiescence made them insignificant as political actors.

[13] Rustow, 125. Frederick W. Frey sets out "four crucial factors leading a group to an early sense of national identity," in his *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), 409. Also see Weber's essay on bureaucracy in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York 1958), 209-10.

[14] There is a third possibility—that the government simply legislate minority languages and educational patterns out of existence. This procedure is manifestly unsuited to the creation of a common identity. The failures of the post–World War I democ-

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the new, synthetically created national identity will be a fragile one, to be rejected at the onset of the first major crisis, unless of course the improbable happens and such a crisis is so slow in appearing that the new loyalties have time to strike roots into the culture. Emotional attachments are especially erratic phenomena, particularly when their symbolic centerpiece has faded, as in the case of the colonial nationalist movements ten years or so after independence.[15] And Weber has schooled us in the brittle qualities of charismatic authority.[16] A charismatic leader may help form a basis for unity among contending political factions, legitimate a constitutional form of government, allow protoparties to develop into mass parties, and set a precedent for the peaceful transfer of office. Washington and, to a lesser extent, Atatürk were certainly instrumental in these respects. But in the great majority of new states the charismatic leader has fulfilled only the single task of "acting as a symbol which represents and prolongs the feeling of unity developed prior to the achievement of independence."[17]

Leaving aside the probable likelihood of failure, if a charismatic figure or a manipulation of emotion-charged symbols is used in attempting to form a national identity at a rapid rate, there remains the distinct danger that authoritarian rule will emerge. In consciously attempting to weld together a positive attachment to the leader or the symbol in a short space of time, the leader or the wielders of the symbol (the party) must necessarily become the embodiment of the nation and thus stand above the nation. Such a claim is often closely bound up with the Rousseauistic notion of the general will, dictating that there not be any partial or independent associations in society. The close relationship between the rapid creation of a national identity, the assertion of the leader's or the party's position as standing above the nation, and the eradication of independent associations is found in post-independence Ghana and is discussed by Rupert Emerson in the

racies in Eastern Europe in just this kind of heavy-handed attempt certainly underscore the point.

[15] Emphasis upon "symbol-wielding" and what Shils has termed "demonstrative" and "remonstrative" politics may also lower a government's administrative and economic effectiveness. For an analysis of Indonesia along such lines, see Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," *World Politics*, XVI (October 1963), esp. 86, 92-96. For the general argument that charismatic leadership in the non-Western countries inhibits economic development, see Edward Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: Their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries," *World Politics*, XI (October 1958), 1-19.

[16] Moreover, Weber's arguments that charisma *may* become routinized contain a number of pitfalls. See W. G. Runciman, "Charismatic Legitimacy and One-Party Rule in Ghana," *Archives européennes de sociologie*, IV, No. 1 (1963), 149-51.

[17] Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York 1963), 22-23. See also Rustow's penetrating discussion of charismatic leaders in the new states, 148-69.

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volume under review (pp. 278-81). In Nkrumah's often reiterated declaration, "The Convention People's Party is Ghana, and Ghana is the Convention People's Party," and in the last five years of Nkrumah's increasingly repressive rule, youth, labor, ex-servicemen's, and farmers' associations were permitted to exist only if they were merged into the CPP, and religious associations could continue only if they were deeply penetrated by the party. All associations standing outside the party (and there were very few) were saddled with the subversive label.[18] The intimate relationship between the rapid creation of a national identity and the eradication of independent associations is found in even starker form in Guinea, where Sékou Touré has gone further than Nkrumah in directly attacking tribal loyalties in both the society and the ruling party (the Parti Démocratique de Guinée). The society is organized, penetrated, and led by the party so that, as Emerson writes, "all interests and groups . . . [are] closely interlocked with the structure of the ruling party. Touré himself has made it clear that he regards individual and group liberties as having validity only insofar as they promote the realization of the sovereign popular will, again as expressed by the PDG" (p. 278).[19] Thus one danger in attempting to integrate a political system through the rapid creation of a national identity is that individual liberties are repressed and the society is denuded even of its quiescent voluntary associations—associations that would play a singularly important role in the future development and maintenance of democratic government.[20]

Even if these arguments were accepted, it might still be possible to suggest that the use of the past—of a country's traditions—would permit the rapid creation of a national identity. Apter has attributed a good deal of importance to tradition as it helps maximize the chances of averting authoritarianism and establishing democracy. In comparing the new countries of Africa, he finds "that the degree of autocracy which emerges after independence is in virtual proportion to the degree of antagonism the government shows to tradition." He then goes on to state that "respect for the past and cultivation of tradition

[18] See also David E. Apter, "Ghana," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley 1964), 295-300.

[19] See also Charles F. Andrain, "Democracy and Socialism: Ideologies of African Leaders," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe 1964), 157-64.

[20] This argument finds additional support when it is noted that in other single-party African states whose governments and territorial integrity are also endangered by parochial demands—such as the Ivory Coast and Tanzania—the goal of creating a national identity is being implemented in a relatively gradual fashion, which is related to the maintenance of their intermediary groups.

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is a necessary condition of democracy."[21] However, it is necessary to distinguish between a respect for tradition on the part of the government (which is Apter's concern) and the government's deliberate resurrection of tradition in order to unify the nation around a set of common symbols and values. If the government's resurrection of tradition is to be successful, what is commonly thought of as a calming and unifying factor must necessarily become emotionally supercharged, with the attendant dangers of political excesses and the exacerbation of divisions following in its wake.[22]

In the case of Japan, the Meiji oligarchs were exceptionally successful in rapidly developing a national identity in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, utilizing the traditional and semimystical symbols of Imperial Shinto and the imperial institution. Their success in creating this identity among a people who previously had had little knowledge of, and even less interest in, what little central government existed was directly related to the institutionalization of the central government and rapid industrialization. But despite these singular achievements, the necessarily emotional attachments involved in the rapid formation of a popular national identity contributed to the emergence of a xenophobic militarism and authoritarianism in the 1930's. Turning to post-independence Ceylon, we find a telling example of the exacerbation of conflict and violence following the attempt to create a national identity in a short space of time. In its first years of independence the Ceylonese government maintained its legitimacy on the basis of a westernized secularism; the country's two largest ethnic groups (the Tamils and the Sinhalese) were able to accept the government because of its "official disregard for all indigenous cultures."[23] This course was then sharply reversed in the middle fifties. And as Geertz has noted, "the search for a common cultural tradition to serve as the content of the country's identity as a nation . . . led only to the revivification of ancient, and better forgotten, Tamil-Sinhalese treacheries, atrocities,

[21] David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (Princeton 1961), 476-77. Robert E. Ward also places a good deal of emphasis upon tradition as a stabilizing influence that may help to usher in democratic stability, in Pye and Verba, 77-82, and "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan," *World Politics*, xv (July 1963), 578-81. For a discussion of Atatürk's successful manipulation of the traditional Sultanate and Caliphate in altering Turkish identity, see Richard D. Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 34-92.

[22] Rustow, 119-20; and Myron Weiner, *Party Politics in India* (Princeton 1957), 170-71.

[23] McKim Marriott, "Cultural Policy in the New States," in Geertz, *Old Societies and New States*, 42.

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insults and wars."[24] The outcome of this attempt saw the emergence of widespread communal violence.

In short, despite the desirability of a national identity's preceding the central government's institutionalization with respect to our three dependent variables, this sequence is not a common one, and, at the same time, there does not seem to be a rapid solution for this developmental problem. Not only is it highly unlikely that a national identity can be created in a space of a few years, but the attempt to do so is likely to usher in the unhappy consequences of repressive rule and exacerbation of potentially violent divisions, with their obviously deleterious consequences for the growth of democratic government.

IV. Governmental Institutions and Political Competition: Sequence

The next general hypothesis suggests that the chances for attaining a nonviolent politics and democratic stability without passing through a phase of authoritarian government are maximized when the institutionalization of central government precedes mass suffrage and the formation of political parties.[25] However, the consequences for our three dependent variables will not be nearly as detrimental when limited structures of political competition are established before or along with central governmental institutions as when mass electoral participation precedes or emerges simultaneously with an institutionalized central government.

To begin with, LaPalombara and Weiner stress the point that at any one time a government is capable of handling only a limited "load" of problems, demands, and conflicts if it is to maintain itself at a particular level of institutionalization, stability, and effectiveness (chaps. 1 and 14, *passim*). This is to say that whatever loads a government has to deal with ought to be interspersed so that the critical point at which loads exceed capabilities is not reached. Yet a government confronted with the problems of incorporating structures of political competition and mass participation faces a simultaneous increase of

[24] Geertz, *ibid.*, 123. Also see W. Howard Wriggins, "Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon," *American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 316, 319.

[25] Cf. Daalder's argument (pp. 60-61) that it is less likely that authentic democratic government will emerge where the establishment of a strong bureaucracy precedes party competition. However, it would seem that the crucial point in his argument refers to overcentralization rather than bureaucratization.

With respect to rates of change, Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that political centralization is positively related to the rate at which democratic government emerges (*Democracy in America*, Vol. II [New York 1960], 298).

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loads on three counts: there are the institutional problems of integrating the new structures of competition around entirely new patterns of conflict resolution and decision-making; existing divisions among the voters will be exacerbated and demands heightened as parties attempt to mobilize support in order to win control of the government; and demands for greater participation (in both scope and intensity) will follow once the principle of an extended suffrage has been conceded. Thus if a government is to handle these loads (or crises) without endangering its stability and effectiveness, it would be well if the governmental structures were securely institutionalized beforehand.[26] Otherwise the government's capabilities and legitimacy will be easily impaired, necessitating its use of force in order to maintain itself. In Parsons' words, when loads exceed capabilities, "increasingly severe negative sanctions for noncompliance with collective decisions will be imposed."[27] LaPalombara and Weiner illustrate this generalization with the Italian political system of the early twentieth century. Faced with the simultaneous loads of creating a national identity, institutionalizing and legitimizing governmental structures, and inducting new strata into the electorate, the political elite responded with repression and violence (pp. 428-29). And once governments rely upon force, they tend to overreact to demands with the application of excessive force; the value of organizations with force at their disposal (the army and the police) is heightened; there is consequently a further loss of legitimacy; and finally the population itself turns to violence, thereby setting up an additional stage prop for authoritarian rule.[28]

On the other hand, when the crises of competition and electoral participation do not appear until the government has had sufficient time to become institutionalized, the governmental structures will actually be able to play a positive role in helping the system to adapt itself to the new situation. As Huntington has persuasively argued, with increasing longevity, institutions become more adaptable to new challenges and more flexible in accommodating change.[29] To this may

[26] For an analysis of European political parties that supports this proposition and demonstrates how the time factor "merges into and coincides with the load factor," see Otto Kirchheimer's chapter "The Transformation of the Western European Party System," in LaPalombara and Weiner (pp. 177-82). The same type of analysis on a somewhat broader theoretical plane is found in LaPalombara and Weiner's own concluding chapter (pp. 427-33).

[27] Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War* (New York 1964), 64. Also see Geertz, 131.

[28] Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa" (forthcoming).

[29] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Poli-*

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be added a separate point, which also provides some underpinning for Huntington's: the institutionalization of government before it is faced with the crises of competition and electoral participation might provide the political elite with a sufficient sense of security for it to accommodate itself to these changes in a peaceful manner. And in reverse fashion, where the governmental incumbents are insecure because of the brittleness of governmental structures, claims for wider participation may be seen as threatening demands, to be adamantly refused. In such an impasse, the groups seeking entry and access to the political system would adopt an alienated posture, questioning the government's root-and-branch legitimacy and possibly turning to violent means as their demands become increasingly radical. Under these circumstances governmental repression, with its unhappy consequences for the country's future development, could very well follow—especially when the elite is insecure because of the fragile governmental structures.[30]

Another argument relies upon the mitigating effects of institutional arrangements. When governmental structures are stabilized and differentiated before the onset of party competition and mass suffrage, the intensity of partisan conflicts and procedural issues will be dampened as they are channeled through and processed by the mediating governmental institutions. On the other hand, when the sequence is reversed, partisan conflicts will tend to escalate as substantive issues evolve into procedural ones in the absence of stable conflict-resolving structures. This point may provide a partial explanation for Pye's observation that "opposition parties and aspiring elites [in transitional systems] tend to appear as revolutionary movements,"[31] for when the government is not sufficiently institutionalized for the effective resolution of conflicts, it is only a small further step for the opposition to challenge the entire spectrum of the government's goals and legitimacy. Zolberg apparently supports this argument when he writes that in West Africa "the incumbent leaders [and] challengers tend to view

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tics, XVII (April 1965), 394-95. Also see S. N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (New York 1966), 58-61; and Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy* (Boston 1967), 18-20. It is noteworthy that the two oldest single-party systems, those of Russia and Mexico, are the only ones to have been successfully institutionalized to the extent of regularizing the succession problem.

[30] Referring to Europe in the decades following the French Revolution, Tocqueville could write that once the "spell of royalty is broken . . . [the monarch] is full of animosity and alarm; he finds that he is a stranger in his own country, and he treats his subjects like conquered enemies" (I, 327).

[31] Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven 1962), 19-20.

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conflict as an all-or-nothing proposition . . . [since] factors which might make for the limitation of issues are almost nonexistent. Whether it begins by asking for better wages or better prices, whether it is dissatisfied with the delimitation of constituencies or with lack of consideration for generational claims, the opposition almost always ends up challenging the entire order which the regime is dedicated to build."[32]

Especially with reference to highly politicized societies, there would be few political scientists indeed who would disagree with the statement that large-scale socioeconomic reform should be instituted as early as possible; such reform would generally have the effect of confronting the regime with far fewer loads.[33] This quite obvious point becomes even more significant when socioeconomic reform has not been effected before the creation of a mass electorate. The conjunction of the two—popular power together with popular dissatisfaction and alienation—has all manner of disabling effects: it raises the specter of a violent mass movement or communal politics; the strength of sharply divisive parochial groups is not lessened through the process of "modernization" and the creation of Durkheim's organic solidarity based on the division of labor to replace a disappearing mechanical solidarity based on value consensus; and the regime suffers from a loss of legitimacy. Taken together, these factors also lead toward repressive rule. This generalization becomes relevant in the present context because a precondition for socioeconomic reform is a central government that has achieved a high level of institutionalization and thus the capacity for adopting and executing such a policy.[34] This is by no means to assert that there is any inherent tendency for an institutionalized government to undertake large-scale reform; but such a government is commonly a necessary precondition *if* such reform is to be instituted.[35] Thus, with respect to sequence, it would be well to see an

[32] Aristide R. Zolberg, *Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa* (Chicago 1966), 75.

[33] This would be true unless socioeconomic change is overrapid, in which case the government would probably have to contend with the rise of mass movements. See William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe 1959), esp. 142-76; and Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 529-52.

[34] See the discussion of this point in Samuel P. Huntington, "The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies," *Daedalus,* XCV (Summer 1966), 766-68. Huntington's reasoning is largely based on James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," in James D. Thompson, ed., *Approaches to Organizational Design* (Pittsburgh 1966), 193-218.

[35] Two exceptions come readily to mind from the Latin American experience: in both Mexico and Bolivia, prior to governmental institutionalization, land was dis-

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institutionalized government develop before the expansion of the electorate, with the possibility (and that is all it is) that significant reforms can be achieved before the onset of mass suffrage.

Lastly, there is the problem of limited resources, which makes the simultaneous development of governmental structures and national political parties (under conditions of mass suffrage) a problematic undertaking. As a historical generalization, it may be said that when political systems are in the process of forming central governmental institutions there is usually a paucity of the necessary human resources —i.e., experienced political leaders and administrators. Given this coincidence, the resource scarcity places limitations upon the extent to which the government can be institutionalized while national structures of political competition are being formed, especially if these structures are to perform their functions effectively, a task necessitating both national and local organizational staffing. This problem is, of course, an especially critical one in the postcolonial societies in which scarce resources are simultaneously being devoted to economic modernization and to the development of social services. In the post-independence period, "talents that once were available for the crucial work of party organization may now be preoccupied with running a ministry. . . . This will be particularly true where the conditions under which independence was obtained led to the withdrawal of European advisors and technicians and threw the whole technical and administrative burden on the shoulders of the young indigenous politicians."[36]

There are consequently only two possibilities for the allocation of resources. Existing resources may be devoted entirely to the development of governmental institutions, which would, it is hoped, provide a relatively effective and stable rule while skirting the danger of authoritarianism.[37] It should be stressed that this concentration of human resources within the government may be the optimum strategy for legitimizing the government. According to Shils, it is the "belief in the effectiveness of authority . . . the fact that it seems 'to mean business' . . . coherence at the center . . . [that] will legitimize the elite

tributed to the peasants who worked it. However, it is significant that the landholding elites were practically destroyed in the revolutions that preceded the land reforms.

[36] William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems," in Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1963), 123-24.

[37] The recent tendency of African states to merge their governmental and party hierarchies is partly necessitated by just this shortage of trained personnel, and it also accounts for the weakening of the parties. See Immanuel Wallerstein's chapter "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States," in the volume under review (pp. 201-15).

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and the system in which it operates."[38] The alternative possibility is to dilute existing resources, dividing them between the government and the party (or parties), with the attendant probability that none of these structures will become institutionalized in the short run, especially when the parties attempt to organize a mass membership of a few million. Such a division of resources increases the likelihood of a series of coups d'état, widespread partisan-communal violence, and thus the government's resort to force in order to maintain itself.[39]

V. Governmental Institutions: Rate

If the argument that governmental structures should be institutionalized before the onset of political competition and participation has some validity, and if a high value is placed upon democracy, then the governmental structures should presumably be institutionalized in a rapid fashion in order to usher in democracy as quickly as possible. Perhaps. But in carrying out such an aim the political system would be exposing itself to a number of difficulties and dangers: authoritarianism, the intensification of potentially violent conflicts, and the weakening of existing democratic governmental structures.

If a government is to institutionalize rapidly, it obviously requires far greater power and human resources than if this development occurs gradually. But when governments begin the process of institutionalization their capability is necessarily minimal, and their conflict-resolving structures are too weak and untested to be able to cope with the conflicts attendant upon such rapid development. And it is unlikely that at the start of governmental institutionalization a sufficient number of experienced politicians and administrators capable of directing and controlling rapid institutional change will be available. Yet in those former colonies in which some indigenous leaders were given governmental responsibilities before independence—in the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, and, to a lesser extent, in Uganda and Kenya—the post-independence record of governmental

[38] Edward A. Shils, "Demagogues and Cadres in the Political Development of the New States," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 68.

[39] In analyzing the processes by which national units become integrated into political systems having a larger territorial scope and a greater number of functional responsibilities—an analysis that is also said to be in large part applicable to the processes of domestic political integration—Amitai Etzioni arrives at a proposition supporting the point made here: "Unions that have few elite-units will tend to be more successful [in integration] than unions that have a greater number" (*Political Unification* [New York 1965], 68-69). Also see Karl W. Deutsch and others, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton 1957), 38.

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stability and the absence of authoritarianism is *on the whole* significantly better than the record of those former colonies in which indigenous leaders were not given such experience prior to independence —such as Indonesia, the Congo, and French Indochina. It is also significant that it is among the five new states of Asia that retained Western civil servants after independence that we find the only four countries of the larger group whose political systems may be termed democratic—India, Ceylon, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Moreover, of the dozen or so states in Europe that became democratic overnight after World War I, only two maintained their democratic structures: Finland and Czechoslovakia. Finland enjoyed the advantage of having large numbers of well-trained civil servants with upper-class Swedish backgrounds; Bohemia, while it was part of the Hapsburg Empire, was governed by an able and experienced group of bureaucrats who stayed on to form the core of the new Czechoslovakian civil service.

Even assuming that minimal human resources are available, when a new government attempts rapid institutionalization it must necessarily add large numbers of new recruits, reducing the coherence and thus the autonomy of the governmental structures in relation to dissident elements within or outside the government.[40] Coherence and autonomy will be further weakened as the strenuousness of the competition for higher office among the incumbents increases, since expectations and desires for promotion tend to be exaggerated when governments are being rapidly formed and expanded. In the former African colonies, "rapid promotions only lead to higher aspirations among those who have been promoted and among those left behind, while the inflationary curve of governmental expansion tapers off after independence."[41] To which may be added two further exacerbating factors found in most African and Asian countries. The high governmental incumbents in these states are relatively young, thereby increasing the frustrations of the middle and lower echelons who are well aware that the first generation of nationalist leaders will be around for some time to come. And since there are practically no alternative sources of high prestige, power, or affluence outside the government, the incumbents

[40] Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 403. Downs has hypothesized that in rapidly expanding bureaucratic organizations "a higher proportion of [the incumbents'] efforts is devoted to internal politics and rivalry rather than performance of their [organization's] functions" (p. 263). For example, in England between 1689 and 1715, an exceptionally rapid expansion of government personnel detracted from the unity, coherence, and autonomy of the executive (J. H. Plumb, *The Origins of Political Stability: England 1675-1725* [Boston 1967], esp. 110-12, 126-28).

[41] Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict."

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will presumably fight to retain their positions with little regard for the rules of the game.

Lastly, it seems probable that governments pursuing rapid institutionalization will move in an authoritarian direction. The coercion-control activities of governments tend to be exaggerated when officials have neither the time nor the inclination to concern themselves with the establishment of self-correcting feedback structures that extend into the government's environment.[42] The level of information available to such governments is then minimal, so that Apter's double-barreled proposition that the two functional requisites of all governments—coercion and information—stand in an inverse relationship to each other becomes applicable: a small amount of information is found together with a high degree of coercion, and a large amount of information with a low degree of coercion.[43] To take this point one step further, a high level of coercion-control dictates a shift of opposition from outside the government to inside the government, which leads to a further intensification of coercion-control. It is when the opposition resides within the government that it "is even more frightening because it hides beneath a friendly guise; it is even more threatening because it dwells very close to the center of power; it is more bewildering because it is no longer possible to know with assurance who is reliable and loyal. . . . Hence, an ever-increasing display of [coercion-control] is necessary to obtain minimal assurance that things will not fall apart."[44]

VI. Political Competition: Rate

Having indicated some of the consequences that are likely to follow when a sense of national identity precedes the institutionalization of government and when the latter precedes the emergence of parties and

[42] See the related remarks of Karl W. Deutsch, in *The Nerves of Government* (Glencoe 1963), 224, 227. Edward A. Shils contends that in the new states there are some half-dozen factors that militate against an effective feedback flow, in "The Intellectuals, Public Opinion, and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VI (October 1957), 55-62.

[43] David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965), 238-40. What is in effect a corollary to Apter's hypothesis is put forward by LaPalombara and Weiner: "While a mobilist party (particularly in a one-party state) may be more compatible with the establishment of the minimum central authority necessary for economic development, the adaptive party is often more effective in providing government with information essential for carrying out economic development programs" (p. 426).

[44] Zolberg, *Creating Political Order*, 92. And for a repeated stress on the importance of a coherent and unified elite if political stability and democracy are to be attained and maintained, see Edward Shils, "Political Development in the New States," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, II (April and July 1960), 389-91, and Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 420-21.

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mass suffrage, and having analyzed the consequences of the rapid formation of a national identity and the rapid institutionalization of the central government, I should now like to examine the likely consequences of rapid change in the direction of greater competition and wider participation. Rapid change in this instance may occur either when a nonrepresentative system (e.g., a former colony, monarchy, or dictatorship) is directly transformed into a democratic one, without first taking the form of a semirepresentative oligarchy, or when mass participation through universal suffrage is introduced overnight in the case of a semirepresentative oligarchy. To put it differently, when structures of competition are gradually developed (i.e., when protoparties precede full-blown parties and a mass suffrage) and when the rate at which the suffrage is expanded is gradual—under these two closely interrelated conditions, but especially under the latter—our three dependent variables are most likely to be realized. The explanatory power of this hypothesis is presumably increased in those political systems that have not achieved a sense of national identity and a securely institutionalized government and is decreased in those systems that have achieved these ends.

When mass suffrage is instituted before or along with the development of national political parties—or, to put it another way, when protoparties have not preceded mass parties—these national parties will not have sufficient time to form coherent and autonomous organizations before having to meet the participation crisis. They will have neither the experienced leaders nor the firm linkages between the center and local areas required for the effective articulation and aggregation of popular demands, thereby leaving the electorate "available" for mobilization in either extremist mass movements or government-controlled organizations.[45] Further, the national parties' lack of organizational strength and the absence of effective ties with local power centers significantly reduce their role in governmental decision-making and make the parties themselves vulnerable to "incorporation" into the (noncompetitive) governmental structure. Thus in the postcolonial African states, the weaknesses of party structures have both decreased the amount of popular participation in the political system and left the parties without any influence in preventing, starting, or ending the numerous coups.[46] Political scientists are in general agreement that

[45] Cross-national aggregate data that support this generalization are found in Ted Gurr, with Charles Ruttenberg, *The Conditions of Civil Violence: First Tests of a Causal Model*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 28 (Princeton 1967), esp. 12, 86-87.

[46] Wallerstein discusses this point in the LaPalombara-Weiner book (p. 211).

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the chances of achieving viable democratic government are increased when parties perform an integrative function—that is, when they manage to form broad alliances with disparate territorial, communal, and economic groups. Yet if parties are to succeed in this respect, especially under the conditions of a recently extended mass franchise, it would seem desirable that they first be institutionalized to provide the necessary ideological and organizational adaptability. This is another reason for thinking that protoparties emerge prior to the mass suffrage.

Besides the organizational dimension of parties, the orientations of the party leaders are also relevant at this point. Leaders of parties that have been rapidly formed or have had to face the participation crisis immediately after their formation tend to respond to this situation with repressive policies toward the electorate and thereby decrease the chances for future democratic stability. Following LaPalombara and Weiner, I can suggest two factors underpinning this hypothesis. By comparing those colonies in which protoparties were repressed and those in which they were able to share some governmental power, it is found that in the former, the "nationalist groups subjected to such repressive measures . . . are not adequately socialized into the art of political compromise and responsible leadership. . . . After independence they are likely to manifest an overly strong identification with the state, view opposition as illegitimate, and be dogmatic, uncompromising, and monolithic in their orientation" (p. 31). The second point is a psychological one: the new wielders of power generally find it difficult to share the power that they themselves have just attained, especially when there is little enough to go around. "In a very rough way, we might say that the probability of resistance [to participatory demands] is associated with the proximity between the creation of a party system and increased demand for participation. Where the new elites are immediately challenged by others who wish to share in the exercise of power the probability of repression is much higher than in those places where the waves of demand are spread over a longer time span" (p. 402). In short, party leaders need time—for organizational consolidation, socialization into the roles of "responsible democratic" leadership, and attainment of psychological security—if they are to allow a democratic politics to emerge.

Turning to the rate at which mass suffrage is implemented, we know that when a government undertakes any major change of a procedural variety entailing a wider distribution of power, this change will usually be followed by a multiplication of political demands.

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When the major change is effected in a short space of time and when it appears that this change will settle the contours and determine the outputs of the regime for the foreseeable future—which is what happens when mass suffrage is introduced overnight—then the government will have to contend with a whole range of intensive demands. This type of situation tends to produce a politicization explosion, in which any group difference—social, linguistic, cultural, economic—may be transformed into political demands.[47] Furthermore, the rapid acquisition of the vote will probably not have afforded the electorate sufficient time to learn to distinguish between partisan opposition and the pressing of demands upon the government, on the one hand, and an attempt to overthrow the regime and secession, on the other.[48] Following the rapid introduction of mass suffrage, there is then likely to be a confluence of many intensely felt and conflicting demands placed upon the government, combined with a resort to direct action—a generalization that is borne out in numerous African and Asian countries whose original democratic systems have consequently "degenerated" into violence, authoritarianism, and, at best, nonrepressive dictatorship.

Nor is the problem only one of the number and intensity of demands facing the government; the rapid realization of electoral power is likely to lead to a greater awareness and exacerbation of just those communal differences that have the most deleterious consequences for stable and effective democratic government. The electorate's newly acquired power will magnify its awareness of ethnic, religious, and linguistic divisions since the people now believe themselves to have a good deal of control over such issues. This new awareness is then further heightened by the politicians who utilize communal loyalties and hatreds in accumulating votes. Geertz makes this point about traditionalizing elections in a forceful manner, contending that the exacerbation of "Indonesian regionalism, Malayan racialism, Indian linguism, [and] Nigerian tribalism . . . are part and parcel of the very process of the creation of a new polity and a new citizenship."[49]

[47] For an application of this hypothesis to West Africa, see Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict."

[48] The overnight introduction of universal male suffrage in Colombia in 1853, which was followed by two tumultuous civil wars, may serve as a telling Latin American case in which the suffrage was expanded "too far and too fast." For the Latin American situation since 1940, see John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964), 98-101.

[49] Pp. 120-23. Also see Deutsch and others, 61-63, for some European examples that support this generalization; and MacKenzie's conclusion based on close study of five African elections: "If tribalism is the enemy, elections are partly responsible for encouraging it" (W. J. M. MacKenzie and Kenneth E. Robinson, *Five Elections in Africa*

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Whenever mass suffrage has been rapidly introduced it has been legitimated by an exaggerated populistic rhetoric, engendering high expectations for socioeconomic change, the redress of grievances, and extensive popular influence upon governmental decisions. Yet given the realities of limited resources and the necessarily hierarchical structure of any democratic government, these high expectations are bound to remain unfulfilled. Popular disappointment and frustration are thus likely to follow in the wake of an overnight introduction of universal suffrage, producing a greater stress on communal values and interests and an increasing disregard for the claims of other groups and regions.[50] This has even happened where the majority's primary aims were realized. In Rwanda, the Hutu majority had been dominated by the Tutsi minority in a client-patron relationship for four centuries. But even though the Hutu won a decisive majority in the suddenly introduced elections of 1960 and 1961, achieving their intensely felt goals of dominating their former overlords and redistributing the Tutsi wealth, it was their electoral *victory* that triggered a massive bloodbath and the emigration of the Tutsi.

Having considered some of the ways in which rapid extension of the franchise exacerbates communal divisions in some non-Western countries, we can turn to the effects of the franchise expansion rate upon the class divisions in Europe. Although it is by no means one of the most important explanatory factors, there appears to be an inverse relationship between the rate at which the franchise was extended and the bourgeoisie's and the aristocracy's acceptance of democratic government. Where effective universal suffrage was most rapidly extended—in the Second French Republic, the First Italian Republic, and Weimar Germany—the bourgeoisie's and the aristocracy's already extensive hostility toward the specter of democracy was intensified and protracted.[51] These groups negated the democratic regimes' legitimacy and actively worked toward the establishment of more or less

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[Oxford 1960], 484). For a detailed account of the way in which the politicians sharpened communal tensions in Ceylon by playing upon communal issues in gaining electoral support, see C. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton 1960), 169-270. Pakistan may be viewed as a case in which the politicians played upon parochial interests and thereby provided the rationale for preserving national unity and governmental effectiveness by doing away with elections. See K. Callard, *Pakistan: A Political Study* (London 1957).

[50] Deutsch and others, 62; Tocqueville, I, 201.

[51] Italy illustrates this point most clearly. With the sudden expansion of the suffrage in 1918, shifting electoral power to an illiterate working class, Mussolini's antidemocratic appeals were embraced by a middle class whose main political objective now became protection from socialism and communism.

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repressive dictatorships. Even in the case of Weimar Germany, with the upper classes in firm control not only of the bureaucracy and the army, but also of the democratically elected governments in the last half of the Republic's short existence, they maintained their strident opposition to democratic institutions.

In other European countries, such as Britain, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, and Holland, mass participation was only gradually extended throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The effects that this gradual expansion had upon these countries' subsequent development is aptly set out by Daalder: At any one time the new political strata "tended to be given at most only part-power—enough to give them a sense of involvement and political efficacy but not enough to completely overthrow the evolving society. . . . Since at any one time the political stakes were relatively modest, the upper classes were less afraid and the lower classes less threatening. Older and new elites were thus held more easily within the bounds of one constitutional, if changing, political system that neither alienated the one into reactionary nor the other into revolutionary onslaughts on it" (pp. 48-49).[52]

VII. A Final Note

It should be emphasized that the general and secondary hypotheses put forward in this review article are at best of a tentative variety. There are numerous methodological difficulties afflicting hypotheses based upon sequence and rate of change—difficulties that would require a far more extensive treatment than can be carried out here. Moreover, it should be quite clear that a good deal of further work is needed if the hypotheses are to be fully explored rather than simply being illustrated, as has been done here. Nor should the conclusions be taken to mean that the sequences and rates of the four independent variables examined are the most important explanations in accounting for different patterns of political development. If sequence and rate are useful notions, they may just as readily be applied to variables other than the ones examined in this article. Certainly the spectrum of socio-economic factors—which have not even been mentioned here—could

[52] To which may be added two other arguments: a period of restricted suffrage may produce a "nationalized" politics, and to the extent that this influence extends into the next stage of universal suffrage, it mitigates cultural and regional cleavages—a point that is illustrated in Belgium. More important, gradual enfranchisement is apparently related to the nonelites' maintenance of respectful and partially acquiescent attitudes toward political authority—a cultural variable that figures prominently in a handful of theories of stable democracy.

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be analyzed in such a fashion. However, it is hoped that this review article's primary goal has been at least partially realized—the goal of illustrating the uses and advantages of a focus upon sequence and rate for systematically ordering the field of political development in the form of a series of generalizable explanatory hypotheses.

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THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY

By CHARLES F. HERMANN

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, New York, Viking Press, 1964, 461 pp. $7.50 (cloth), $1.95 (paper).
Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The British and American Experience*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1967, 331 pp. $7.50 (cloth), $3.95 (paper).

THE study of the processes by which foreign policy is formed has been in the embarrassing position of falling between two academic chairs. On the one hand, students of international affairs have displayed considerable reluctance to delve into the domestic factors that distinguish one nation's policies from another's. On the other hand, scholars of comparative politics, with their knowledge of political institutions and processes, have rarely considered the effect of various political arrangements on foreign policy. The inability to bridge these two traditional areas of study may account for the rather underdeveloped character of the comparative study of foreign policy. Instead of making actual comparisons between foreign policy processes, we tend to describe nations serially. First nation A's foreign policy procedure is characterized, then nation B's, and so on. Instead of offering theories about the conduct of foreign policy, we frequently enumerate categories such as democratic versus authoritarian states or industrialized versus developing nations. How the categories are to be related to one another or to other policy-relevant variables is a task that continually escapes analysis. Instead of hypotheses examined for a number of countries, we produce detailed studies describing the making of a particular policy. For understandable reasons these studies of a specific issue often report on the foreign policy machinery in the United States —a condition that does little to aid comparisons across nations.

Various evidence indicates that the study of foreign policy is on the verge of change. Objections similar to those specified above are becoming more frequent. Scholars of comparative and international politics are beginning to discuss the problem with one another.[1] Even more encouraging is the appearance of books like the two under review.

[1] Volumes produced from two such conferences are R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966); and James N. Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York 1967).

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In his book *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*, Kenneth Waltz is concerned exclusively with domestic influences on foreign policy, whereas the earlier volume of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR*, is not confined to external policy —a consideration that may explain why the relevance of their book for foreign policy studies has been recognized only gradually. Both books attempt to deal with some of the problems that have plagued the comparative study of foreign policy. For this reason they represent important landmarks in the development of this area of scholarship. Before their collective contribution is examined, each volume will be considered separately.

I

Political Power begins with the statement of a theory of convergence: "The basic theme is that the Soviet Union and the United States are becoming more alike" (p. 9). More specifically, the theory suggests that as the Soviet Union experiences industrialization it will produce a culture that will be pluralistic and affluent. Under these conditions ideological fervor will be dissipated and the Communist party will come to mediate between competing interest groups in much the same way as political parties in Western democracies. Without explicitly referring to the convergence concept between their introductory and concluding chapters, the authors assemble evidence against it. Fervor, they contend, is not required for ideology to influence society once it is embodied in a party bureaucracy. Moreover, pluralism is curbed by the party's siphoning off the leadership of various elite groups and giving them a vested interest in the party's monopoly of power. These and numerous other arguments pave the way for the conclusion: "The evolution of the two systems, but not their convergence, seems to be the undramatic pattern for the future" (p. 436).

The main part of the book is not exclusively—perhaps not even primarily—concerned with the rejection of the convergence theory. It is devoted to a series of comparisons between the Soviet Union and the United States ranging from the nature of political ideas to methods of political recruitment, from the relationship between political system and society to the relationship between the acquisition and the exercise of power. The authors first set forth the comparisons in general terms and then apply them to specific situations experienced in both nations. The comparative case studies include the selection of Kennedy and Khrushchev, their respective troubles with civil rights and consumer demands, the common problem of agricultural policy, the challenge to

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political control presented by Generals MacArthur and Zhukov, the interventions in Cuba (1961) and Hungary (1956), and the respective conflicts with French and Chinese allies.

In the initial chapters a number of concepts are introduced to assist in the comparison of the two nations. In the Soviet Union political ideas are incorporated in a *political ideology*, whereas *political beliefs* are "the looser, vague, less formal and unstructured American counterpart" (p. 23). The two political systems are characterized in terms of their relationship to society as either *instrumental* or *ideological*. The United States has an instrumental political system designed to protect and guide an existing society. The ideological political system of the Soviet Union, however, brings about a new society by conditioning and manipulation. Professional Soviet leadership is *bureaucratic*—made up of men committed to only one career and experienced in working through a bureaucratic hierarchy. By contrast, professional politicians in the United States are *electoral*. They are distinguished not only by the requirement that they must win popular elections to hold office, but also by their frequent pursuit of a private career for part of their lifetime. As a result of the increasingly organizational character of both societies, the authors find that "while the role of the Soviet apparatchik has increased in importance, that of the American electoral politician has tended to decline" (p. 156). In examining the policy-making processes, Brzezinski and Huntington identify four phases in both political systems—*initiation, persuasion, decision,* and *execution*. The operation of these phases is found to be different in the two states. For example, the persuasion phase is assumed to precede decision in America, but to follow decision in the USSR.

If concepts like these are incorporated as variables in hypotheses, then the importance of the study extends beyond a comparison of the United States and the Soviet Union at a given point in time. The hypotheses constructed with these concepts become the basis for comparing other political systems. Comparative theory generally and theory of comparative foreign policy in particular will be closer to realization when a body of such hypotheses is available for systematic investigation. As we shall indicate below the authors provide us with hypotheses of this kind. For several reasons, however, the concepts they introduce have restricted utility for the construction of hypotheses. First, some of the terms are not mutually exclusive, as the authors themselves recognize (e.g., see p. 73). A fundamental requisite for classification and simple measurement is violated when we cannot establish, for example, whether citizens are taught to participate in the political system

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through socialization (indirect indoctrination) or politization (direct indoctrination). In most cases, the problem seems to be less that the concepts cannot be more carefully defined than that sufficient time and space were not devoted to removing ambiguities. This observation leads to a second difficulty.

When we examine the case studies, the basic differences between Soviet and American action often are not described in terms of the general concepts introduced earlier. Thus, comparing the acquisition of the top leadership position by Kennedy and Khrushchev, the analysis concentrates on similarities such as the common effort to gain the support of professional party leaders and on differences such as the political future of opponents after each man was victorious. In their explanation of why the Soviet intervention in Hungary succeeded whereas the American intervention at the Bay of Pigs failed, the authors discuss both political ideas and political leadership. It is not the distinction between the concept of ideology and beliefs, however, that is important, but rather the specific content of Marxist ideology and American beliefs. (In the situations under examination, the Soviet ideology provided reassurances as to the legitimacy of force, whereas the American beliefs ran counter to the use of force.) Similarly, a case is made for differences in political leadership during the Hungarian and Cuban interventions, but again the distinction is not made in terms of bureaucratic and electoral politicians. In both cases the leaders were bureaucrats. In the United States, in contrast to the Soviet Union, the problem was not handled by the highest levels of government until late in the decision process, and when the problem reached the top policy-makers they were inexperienced. Elsewhere the authors explain why the conflict between France and the United States is more contained than that between China and the Soviet Union. The two Western countries are found to have advantages in managing alliance conflict because of the more open nature of their debate, the greater social affinity between the two societies, and the informal and indirect ties between the leaders.

The similarities and differences between the two nations identified in these and other case studies are provocative and insightful. The foundations for many of the distinctions illustrated in the cases are presented in the earlier chapters. And occasionally the distinction between the nations is made in terms of the general concepts. The point to be made here, however, is that many of the earlier concepts structured so as to be applicable to more than the Soviet Union and the United States take on a secondary importance in interpreting specific

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instances of Soviet and American behavior. In particular explanations the broad concepts appear less salient than characteristics more closely associated only with the two nations under consideration.

II

Like Brzezinski and Huntington, Waltz selects the United States as one of the two nations to be compared, but Britain rather than the Soviet Union provides the counterpart. The two books also share a similarity in format. After stating a broad theme, both volumes compare particular aspects of the two countries and then present a series of case studies. Furthermore, several topics are treated in both works—for example, the recruitment of political leaders and the problem of administrative turnover. The resemblance, however, should not be overdrawn. The Waltz book is in several respects narrower in scope, for unlike *Political Power*, its comparison is limited to the two governments with little attention to the impact of the total societies on policy. Waltz confines himself to a direct comparison of Britain and the United States and makes no specific effort to introduce broader concepts with possible application to other states. Brzezinski and Huntington divide their attention between domestic and foreign policy, whereas Waltz is primarily concerned with internal factors that influence foreign policy. In *Political Power* little explicit attention is given to the convergence thesis between its presentation in the introduction and its rejection in the conclusion, but in *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* the author consciously develops his thesis in every chapter.

The Waltz thesis simply put is that "in matters of foreign policy (and of domestic policy as well) the American Presidential system is superior to British Parliamentary government" (p. 307). The book consists of a series of careful arguments designed to refute many of the widely held judgments as to the relative merits of the British and American systems. For example, the strength of the prime minister in conducting foreign policy, Waltz contends, is an illusion created by the rigid party discipline that weakens Parliament. "British Prime Ministers have been thought to be strong leaders because they are in public so ineffectively opposed" (p. 62). Party discipline is found to weaken the prime minister as well as Parliament. Exclusive dependence upon his party for support makes the British executive extremely sensitive to any possible signs of party defection. To maintain party cohesion a prime minister moves cautiously, postpones controversial issues, and makes extensive concessions. In the United States the fluidity of parties is seen as allowing the President to assemble different coalitions for

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different issues; thus if he is politically skillful he can be a strong leader. Moreover, Congress can become involved in foreign policy-making before an issue is resolved.[2] In general Waltz finds the contribution of Congress to be a positive one by bringing executive proposals more into accord with the national mood and sectional habits. When an executive proposal (such as the Atlantic Defense Treaty) has to be approved by an independent legislature, the long-term American commitment is greater than it would be if the legislature did not have a separate source of power. Waltz insists that it is not that the separation of powers increases the possibility of controversy and deadlock, but rather that the inevitable divisions are made more public than in Britain where the controversy occurs within the party in power and where public debate in the House of Commons results only when an issue is assured of support.

The prime minister is unlikely to be a vigorous foreign policy leader not only because of the manner in which he must manage his party, but also because of the way in which he is selected. The long apprenticeship that a prospective prime minister must serve as a member of Commons provides both experience and socialization to the customs and traditions of Parliament. By the time he assumes leadership he has acquired age, but "what he may well lose is verve" (p. 46). It is not only the strength of the executive and his relationship to the legislature that lead Waltz to compare the American system for making foreign policy favorably with that of the British. The bureaucratic leaders in the American executive departments are found to have several advantages over their British counterparts. The tendency in the United States to recruit administrators from various sources rather than exclusively from the legislature, the experience gained by future leaders as subordinates in the administration of either party rather than as observers from a back bench in Commons, and the much larger number of executive appointments made by a new President as compared to those of a new prime minister all are seen as working to the advantage of the United States.

[2] Although he briefly alludes to congressional initiative (p. 62), in his fuller exposition Waltz appears to describe the primary function of Congress as evaluating foreign policy proposals that originate with the executive. Thus, his position is not in direct conflict with the research of James Robinson and others who find little evidence of congressional initiative in foreign policy-making. Waltz does conclude that "Congress, though it sometimes complains that it is kept in the dark, is clearly the best informed legislative body in the world" (p. 101). Be this as it may, we still wonder whether the serious limitations described by Robinson on congressional access to information, when compared to the information-gathering capabilities of the executive branch, place restrictions on the evaluative role of Congress. See James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy Making*, rev. ed. (Homewood 1967).

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The very novelty of Waltz's conclusions—at least among academic comparisons of Great Britain and the United States—invites rejoinders that in turn, we may hope, will produce further explanation and elaboration by the author. Observations in this review article will be confined to the management problems of the prime minister, the relative positions of the United States and Britain, and the selection of case studies. One of the identified restraints on the prime minister's leadership is his need to maintain consensus within his party. Inasmuch as Commons has not voted a majority government out of office since 1895, it is difficult to believe that leaders might not occasionally perceive that bold actions could be undertaken without serious defections. The ability to minimize demands of party members seems all the more likely given the considerable means available to the prime minister for disciplining those who are defiant or rebellious. As Waltz notes, the member of Parliament, unlike his congressional colleague, cannot make a career in the House of Commons without the support of the prime minister. "It is the Prime Minister who elevates to office, ordinarily by a series of finely graded steps; and those he has raised he can also cast down, rudely or more gently, by dismissal from office or demotion, by having the sovereign effect a translation to the Lords, or by bestowing the appropriate one of a hierarchy of honors" (p. 43). Moreover, the restrictions on executive initiative might be expected to vary substantially with the size of the party's majority and the issue under consideration.[3]

Although *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* is not explicitly confined to a comparison of the contemporary governments in Britain and America, most of the illustrative material used to document the author's conclusions is drawn from the postwar period. One wonders if the evaluation would be altered were Britain's policy processes at, say, the middle of the nineteenth century compared with those of the United States today. "Governments are praised," Waltz concludes, "when their nations are great" (p. 298). That national greatness encourages respect for a government and even interest in imitating it is one thing. It is another to suggest that relative superiority in capabilities allows a governmental structure to perform more effectively than a state with more limited resources. In discussing the problem

[3] At several points Waltz notes that "on questions of defense and foreign policy, divisions appear within parties more frequently than is the case with domestic problems" (p. 169). Therefore, the need for party unity might be expected to restrain the prime minister more in foreign than in domestic policy *if* party opinions in both areas are held with equal intensity. (This assumption should be investigated.) Within foreign policy some issue-areas may be more likely to lead to party divisions than others.

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of overproduction in American agriculture, Brzezinski and Huntington suggest that American wealth makes possible the luxury of slow problem-solving that might prove less tolerable under other conditions: "The general affluence of the American economy supports the burden of agricultural overabundance and buys time for the political system to work through its tortuous, slow processes toward a more fundamental solution" (p. 328). In his own book Waltz provides a detailed study of the slowness with which British defense policy has adjusted to the changing international realities of the postwar period. Given the present economic status of England, the failure of government leadership is costly and fairly evident. Another Waltz chapter presents the surprising stability in the level of American foreign aid during approximately the same time period. The ability of the United States to sustain this program at a relatively constant level may partially cloud the American government's limited response to changing international conditions that bear on the aid program. Thus, the difference in economic capability may make one government's lack of responsiveness more immediately costly than the other's in terms of political performance. Consideration of the role of relative national resources in comparing the performance of the United States and England introduces the broader question relevant to all studies of comparative foreign policy: Do unidentified variables provide a rival explanation for the observed similarity or difference between political systems?

Reference already has been made to the case studies that constitute four chapters in *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*. These cases differ in function from those presented in *Political Power*. Brzezinski and Huntington select seemingly parallel situations for the United States and the Soviet Union and attempt to explain the elements that account for the similarities and differences in the way the two nations have handled comparable problems. Rather than compare parallel policy questions in both Britain and America, Waltz uses each detailed study to illustrate a characteristic of one or the other government. A study of postwar British military policy and another of England's attempt to enter the European Economic Community are used to display the qualities inherent in the British political system which prevent leaders from confronting and resolving critical issues. A third case offers evidence that, contrary to popular belief, the role of Congress in appropriating foreign aid has not disrupted the continuity of this program over two decades. In the final study, which emphasizes reactions during the Korean War, American public opinion is found to have displayed considerable maturity in meeting the problems of the cold

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war. These studies expand the book's general thesis, but each is constructed so as to be a complete analysis by itself.

In his selection of case studies Waltz has chosen issues that critics might have mentioned to challenge his evaluation of British and American foreign policy machinery. Despite his skillful handling of these potential challenges, the studies generate questions. For example, would the level of American foreign aid expenditure appear as steady if the annual amount were treated as a percentage of the gross national product or as a portion of the total annual government expenditure? Another kind of question asks if the conclusions would be different had other cases been selected. Would the conclusions about the absence of forceful leadership and the inability to confront issues directly have differed if Eden's Suez policy in the fall of 1956 had been examined, rather than Macmillan's policy to negotiate entry into the EEC? If one draws conclusions about the British governmental structure from the fact that "public opinion was not forced or formed; the people were not led" during the negotiations with the Common Market (p. 264), why is it inappropriate to draw similar conclusions about the American system from the Truman administration's handling of Korea in which "the mixture of firmness and vacillation in the government's policy was mirrored in the people's opinion" (p. 281)? Although the American people may have correctly sensed the government's indecision over Korea and effectively sought alternative leadership in the 1952 elections, is this a regular pattern?[4] It is not the faults of any one of the case studies that are emphasized here, but rather the limitations of the technique. In that respect the comment applies with equal force to the detailed studies in *Political Power*. Case studies of the formulation of individual policy may help in the construction of a hypothesis, but they fall far short as a means of confirmation. No matter which policy issue is selected, its unique qualities prohibit generalization.

III

The difficulties that can be raised with respect to these two works should by no means curb the careful inspection of them both by all

[4] An interpretation of a detailed national survey conducted in early 1966 suggests that American opinions on Vietnam are unlikely to affect election results. "The public opinion we have been discussing does not seem to possess much potential for controlling or limiting the alternatives of the administration. . . . The lack of structure of preferences along party or class lines means that attitudes toward the war are not likely to affect electoral outcome and are less likely to be taken into account in making policy calculations" (Sidney Verba and others, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *American Political Science Review*, LXI [June 1967], 333).

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who are interested in comparative and international politics. Each volume presents a major challenge to beliefs that have been widely held: the convergence of Soviet and American political systems is rejected in *Political Power*, and the superiority of British over American procedures for making foreign policy is rejected in *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*. In addition to their imaginative treatment of what might be called their basic themes or macro-hypotheses, the authors' contribution to the comparative study of foreign policy should be recognized. Here are two studies that accept the difficult task of drawing conclusions about the performance of two nations by directly comparing the same structures and processes in both countries. Both books attempt to relate domestic political procedures to actual policies pursued by the states. James N. Rosenau has observed, "Rare is the article or book which goes beyond description of an internal factor and locates it in the ever changing interplay of variables—both external and internal—which combine to produce foreign policies. Even rarer is the work that contains explicit 'if-then' hypotheses in which the 'if' is a particular form of the internal factor and the 'then' is a particular type of foreign policy."[5] With respect to the development of hypotheses these books may be a rarity in the present literature, but they may also represent a new trend in research on foreign policy. In neither study are hypotheses numbered or italicized; however, propositions can be abstracted from both works in quantities sufficient for a score of dissertations and other hypothesis-testing endeavors. The diversity and inventiveness of the hypotheses generated by these authors can be demonstrated by drawing illustrations for each of the categories advanced by Rosenau. He has proposed that all the variables that influence the nature of a state's foreign behavior can be grouped into one of five variable clusters—idiosyncratic, role, governmental, societal, and systemic.[6]

Idiosyncratic variables pertain to the individual characteristics of policy-makers. Although neither volume under review emphasizes variables of this kind, they are not excluded. The following hypothesis is drawn from material in both sources: if the rate of turnover among previously inexperienced bureaucratic executives is greater than that among personnel immediately below the top level of the bureaucracy, then personal characteristics of the bureaucratic leaders are less likely to influence the content of policy.[7] On this relationship Waltz observes

[5] "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in Farrell, 31.
[6] *Ibid.*, 43.
[7] Waltz affirms another hypothesis in which the type of political system is directly

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that "the executive arrangements that prevail in Great Britain . . . make it more difficult than it is in the United States for the Minister who would effect changes to impress his will upon the bureaucracy. . . . The stability of personnel just below the top heightens the effect of the rapid turnover that prevails among the Ministers who guide the policies of departments" (p. 136). In the Soviet Union "the new Party rules also make explicit the previous patterns of less turnover on the higher levels and thereby formally consolidate the power of those at the top and minimize it at the bottom. In the American system, on the other hand, differences in tenure enhance the power of bureaucratic and congressional leaders and reduce that of the Administration" (Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 182). If this hypothesis is confirmed we can conclude that, as a result of turnover rates, personal leadership differences are most likely to affect foreign policy in the Soviet Union, somewhat less likely to do so in the United States, and least likely to do so in Britain.

A second cluster of variables are those associated with a particular position or office, that is, role variables. A relationship between a variable in this category and foreign policy is illustrated in the following hypothesis: the more established the system of apprenticeship for top leadership roles, the greater the tendency for continuity in foreign policy. In the Soviet Union the apprentice system is the *apparat* of the Central Committee of the CPSU, in Great Britain it is the House of Commons, but in the United States no single institution provides the training for those who assume top leadership in foreign policy. "A group of skilled practitioners of power, sharing a common outlook about the use of power and a common experience in the use of force, are more likely to be the more adept at . . . embarking with consistency on a selected course" (Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 386). A similar position is advanced by Waltz: "The English apprentice their rulers; the Americans do not. . . . What in America is lost in terms of safety may be made up for by boldness. What is gained in vigor may be lost through an incompetence untested by relevant experience and thus previously undiscovered" (p. 47). Of course the tendency toward consistent policy may be offset by other variables such as the one in the next proposition.

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associated with a particular kind of leadership personality: "In totalitarian states rather than in democracies are found the paranoid men of power surrounded by their bizarre coteries" (p. 309). Neither book under examination develops this hypothesis; however, Tucker has argued for closer attention to the role of personality in authoritarian systems. See Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics*, XVII (July 1965), 555-83.

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One example of a relationship between government or political-system variables and foreign policy is contained in this hypothesis: the less separated is the process of making foreign policy from the acquisition of political leadership, the more likely are sudden reversals in policy. The hypothesis is based on the observation that when positions on foreign policy are involved in the struggle for political leadership, then sudden changes in political fortunes often result in abrupt changes in the direction of policy. Foreign policy is more likely to become a part of a domestic struggle for power when the processes of acquiring leadership are closely associated with those for making policy. "In general, it would seem that correspondence between these processes is less in the United States than in Great Britain and considerably less in both than in the Soviet Union" (Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 191). Based upon this argument, the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this paragraph appears in various forms in *Political Power*. For example: "Whereas the slow process of piecemeal amendment typically alters major policies in the United States, in the Soviet Union policy reversals are often far-reaching, dramatic, and highly visible. They are caused by power struggles or critical shortages in resources" (p. 230). Waltz would appear to agree that in the United States "the electoral game is less closely joined to the process of justifying policy" than in England (p. 171), and that English governments, "attuned to the mood of the nation, have used their international policies to serve domestic political purposes" (p. 174). But his analysis does not support the conclusion suggested by the hypothesis that British foreign policy is more often marked by reversals or changes than that of the United States. On the contrary, the characteristics of British foreign policy emphasized by Waltz are "massive continuity, painfully slow adjustment, response to crises only when they have almost hopelessly deepened" (p. 304). In the English system, apprenticeship in the House of Commons tends to minimize differences, whereas "competition for power in the Soviet Union tends to magnify policy differences between contestants" (Brzezinski and Huntington, p. 193). An examination of both volumes indicates that the initial hypothesis must be modified by the addition of a conditional clause. If the competition for political leadership encourages the development of differences between the contenders, then the less separated the acquisition and the exercise of leadership, the more likely are sudden policy reversals.

Considerable attention is devoted to societal variables in *Political Power*. Among the hypotheses advanced is the following: "The more stable the society and the more established the claims (or 'rights') of

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its citizens both as individuals and as groups, the more restricted the power of the political system in the society" (p. 71). The implications of this relationship for external policy are made explicit in a related proposition presented by Waltz: "The government that is strong in its foreign policy because it is widely supported at home will have difficulty in changing its course. . . . Only when policy is divorced from the people's support are abrupt reversals easily possible" (p. 310). The hypothesis suggests that, of the three nations discussed, the Soviet society gives its government the greatest flexibility in foreign policy. From Waltz's analysis we might expect that American society serves as less of a constraint than English society on its respective government. This lack of flexibility on the part of the British government does not necessarily result from a more stable British society or more firmly established rights of citizens than exist in the United States, but rather from the greater ease the English have in affixing responsibility in the centralized British political system. The separation of powers in the United States is interpreted as dividing the responsibility for policy between the Congress and the President, but "in England the public concentrates its gaze with single-minded intensity upon the Prime Minister. . . . The leader who is responsible then has to husband his power; the onus for the risky policy that fails to come off falls entirely upon him" (p. 302).

The final cluster of variables that Rosenau identifies as pertaining to foreign policy are systemic, that is, "any nonhuman aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials."[8] Both books under review recognize the importance of some systemic variables. For example, the authors of *Political Power* refer to the external assistance to the United States and the USSR which in both nations lessens the pressure on the political leadership for radical changes in agricultural policy (p. 326). They also describe the impact on governments of an international system in which the technology of communication is highly developed (p. 428). The illustration of the linkage between systemic variables and foreign policy, however, is a hypothesis drawn from *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics*: "The United States has pursued a foreign policy of confrontation and settlement in response to the bipolar condition of the world, which has rendered largely inappropriate the older British habits, attuned to a world of many great powers, of manipulation and adjustment" (p. 8). Cast another

[8] P. 43.

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way, the hypothesis suggests that the number of major powers existing in the system influences the kind of policy each is likely to pursue.

We have indicated that these two studies provide a rich vein of hypotheses ready to be mined by those interested in the analysis of foreign policy. Relationships are found not only between the nature of external behavior and Rosenau's five categories of variables, but also between the categories. (For example, consider the connection between political system and role proposed by Waltz: "Where government operates through a series of *ad hoc* majorities, the hand of the chief executive is strengthened" [p. 118].) These comments take us back to the problems identified at the outset of this review article. Research on the processes by which foreign policy is formed in various nations has been hampered by the absence of theories, hypotheses, and between-country comparisons. Neither Waltz nor Brzezinski and Huntington offer a theory of foreign policy-making, but they do make insightful comparisons, and they do offer numerous hypotheses. With the appearance of books of this quality we may be about to turn an important corner in the comparative study of foreign policy.

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THE DIFFICULT POLITICAL CHOICES OF SCIENCE

By EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF

H. L. Nieburg, *In the Name of Science*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966, 431 pp. $7.95.
Sanford A. Lakoff, editor, *Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government*, New York, The Free Press, 1966, 502 pp. $10.95.

BY now it can be said that science and technology have entered, if just barely, the normal American political process. For much of our history, except the first years of the Republic, interest in the pursuit and application of physical knowledge was a subject of minor political interest, even at times when fundamental and far-reaching measures, such as the Morrill Act endowing colleges for the benefit of agriculture and technology, were enacted. This lack of political interest was succeeded after World War II by a period in which science was elevated to near-theological status. During this time, science and technology (and particularly the former) tended to be seen by the public at large as panaceas, and scientists were accorded a large measure of respect and deference, no matter on what issues they chose to speak.

Though the path had some detours, it was during this latter period that the public funds allocated to science and technology increased so dramatically. Of greater significance, it was during this period that the decision-making process in the executive branch with regard to science and technology was established largely along the lines desired by the scientific and engineering communities.

Even though the scientists lost a few well-publicized battles, such as the controversy over the form of the National Science Foundation, in effect they won the war. The mechanisms and procedures in the government for selection and support of scientific research, for accountability of funds, and for rights of publication were established with essentially complete acceptance of the principles and criteria normally used in the scientific community itself. Even in areas affected by concern for secrecy, the scientific community was able to force relaxation of restrictions on publication to conform more nearly to the norms of scientific research as defined and described by scientists. Finally, in what could almost be described as a coup d'état, the mechanisms for allocating resources were staffed largely by scientists, in some cases by individuals serving the government part-time without having to modify

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their status as independent research scientists in the community at large. The National Institutes of Health, for example, are required by statute to rely on committees of outside scientists to evaluate and select research proposals for funding. The National Science Foundation has somewhat more flexibility, but still uses representatives of the scientific community as the primary choice mechanism. And other agencies that rely more extensively on in-house staff for funding decisions, such as the Office of Naval Research, normally hire staff with credentials accepted by the scientific community. The attitudes and judgments of such staff members are likely to be those shared by their scientific peers outside the government.

In technological areas, the "takeover" was less complete, but even here a powerful logic existed in the government for pursuing technology according to the criteria of the technologists alone. The logic had two elements, sometimes explicit, more often implicit. The first was a belief that decisions affecting technology should be taken on an objective, technical basis without reference to "corrupting" political factors, since technology itself was considered to be objective and politically neutral. The other was a tendency current through the 1950's in the national security area to proceed with the development of whatever hardware seemed to make some contribution to defense and was technically feasible.

Throughout this entire period, the "action" was in the executive branch. Congress, with only occasional protests or questions, went along docilely, not understanding the implications of the investments in science and technology and frustrated by its inability to challenge the bureaucracy on issues with significant scientific or technological elements. Yet, on occasion, it actively abetted the notion that future national strength and vitality would be served by—in fact, were dependent on—large-scale investment in science and technology *allocated* and *managed* by scientists and engineers insulated from traditional political concerns.

This period in which science and technology—or, more accurately, scientists and engineers—had enormous influence and independence in government with respect to their own fields is already beginning to seem, at least to scientists, to have been the golden age in relations between science and government. It could not last, for it raised many serious problems, including the fundamental problem of political control. But at the same time it did make possible the forging of a relationship between government and the research and development communities in the U.S. which has given this country unquestionably the

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strongest and most innovative scientific and technological capabilities of any nation.

The period, however, has ended. There was, of course, no sharp termination of the days of laissez-faire for scientists and engineers. Rather, there has been a gradual change of attitudes that recognizes more clearly that funds for science and technology cannot escape economic constraints; that it *is* possible for laymen to understand the issues involved in making allocation decisions for science and technology and even to develop new methodologies for analyzing those choices; that science and technology mean big money and thus big politics; that a set of relationships has grown up between the public and private sectors which raises new problems of government; and that the societal implications of advancing science and technology are so significant that policies and programs must be developed to deal with those implications and to assure political control of the new technologies.

The result of these changes in attitudes can be seen or measured in a variety of ways. One is the gradual leveling-off and even the decrease of funds for R & D in the federal budget, with a concomitant rise in concern for designing means for wise allocation of funds among many worthy competitors. Another is the concern in the Congress and in state governments over the apparently uneven geographical distribution of federal funds for science. A third is the growing sophistication in some parts of the Congress on issues related to science policy, and the competence developed in the executive branch—particularly in the Defense Department—to analyze and understand resource allocation decisions in technical areas.

These developments in the government are reflected in turn in a great increase in the extragovernmental efforts devoted to the study and analysis of the relationship of science, technology, and public affairs. The first efforts of this sort included the kind of basic general analysis represented by Don Price's first superb study, *Government and Science* (1954), and the superficial, though provocative and useful, morality tales of C. P. Snow. More recently, there has appeared a succession of major analyses devoted to almost all aspects of the scientific and technological enterprise in the U.S., including, among many others, studies of the hard problems of choice in the support of science, of the more philosophical problems of the effects of technological developments on the political process, and of the implications that rapidly developing science and technology have for international affairs and the making of foreign policy. New journals, such as

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Minerva, have appeared, focusing exclusively on problems of science and society. Others, such as *Science* and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* have devoted increasing space to, or have broadened their purview to include, a wide range of issues surrounding science and technology. The federal government itself, in both the executive and legislative branches, has been steadily more concerned with the study of the problems and results of decision-making in an environment in which science and technology increasingly affect many of the central concerns and objectives of policy, but in which the technical information is often complex, uncertain, and monopolized by interested parties. In the academic world, in addition to research projects on specific questions of interest, more than thirty major universities have established broad teaching and research programs under a variety of labels in the area of science and public policy or, more generally, science, technology, and human affairs.

Thus, science and technology have become more visible subjects of political decision and controversy. The methodologies for dealing with them in the political process are often primitive at best, which is one of the reasons this development is viewed with alarm by many scientists, engineers, and others. But the need for this politicization cannot be denied; the resources devoted to science and technology and the implications of the subjects are simply too significant to be left to scientists and engineers alone.

Quite clearly, one important need is an improvement in the understanding of science and technology in their public roles and the development of the tools and the insights necessary for informed and, it is hoped, wise decision-making in the political arena. The growing body of analyses and literature is, in general, directed at that end, though as is to be expected, the quality is uneven. So, too, is the focus of attention uneven. That is, there is little consensus as yet as to what the most important problems are, much less as to how to deal with them. The development of a systems analysis approach to aid decision-making in technological areas is one encouraging exception, but it, too, raises many problems.

The two books being considered here represent well the strengths and weaknesses of the current "state of the art." H. L. Nieburg's *In the Name of Science* is some four hundred tightly packed pages on the highly significant theme of the political control of government support for science and technology, with particular reference to the uses of science today and the abuses of present practices surrounding the "contract state." It is a gripping book, an angry book, but sadly un-

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successful in doing more than alerting the public to the existence of a problem. An opportunity for a fine scholar and writer, as evidenced by his earlier work, to make a major contribution to the understanding of a central issue growing out of science and technology has been missed.

The Sanford A. Lakoff work is entirely different in concept. Under the title *Knowledge and Power*, Professor Lakoff has put together a collection of essays, including three of his own, which attempts to concentrate in one place representative cases and analyses dealing with science and government. The majority of the essays are well written and of high quality: several are important; but in sum they are too much of a miscellany to be considered a major work in the field. They are, however, an accurate reflection of the field as it is today and, as such, form a useful and selective collection for courses in science and government or for introductory reading by interested laymen.

Of the two, the Nieburg work is probably the more interesting for the general public because of its focus on a closely related set of problems that clearly touch everyone in the society. Nieburg's preoccupation is with the way in which science and technology are being used by the society and, more particularly, with the means by which the public, through the government, is able to maintain control of the objectives set for R & D and the conditions under which R & D funds are provided. Nieburg's principal bête noire is the excessive domination of the policy process by industry, but he also has unkind words for almost every relevant element of the society (with the exception of a few heroes: David Bell, Robert McNamara, and some scientists).

If there is a single text that represents at least the starting point for Nieburg's thesis, it is President Eisenhower's astonishing farewell address, in which the President warned of the dangers of the military-industrial complex and the scientific-technological elite. That speech was astonishing for a number of reasons, not the least of which was its call for attention to an important problem, a call that contrasted so startlingly with the President's own previous inaction on the problems he identified. The speech took many of his own advisers by surprise, so that the scope of his concern was not absolutely certain. Quite clearly, however, he at least had reference to the alliance of the military, industry, the Congress, and some elements of the scientific community, an alliance that has made it so difficult for a President to allocate resources sensibly for large-scale R & D, especially in the security area. This alliance has at times been the result of a

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calculated commitment at whatever cost to enhance the prestige and role of a military service, to increase the profits of an industrial firm, to win votes in a congressional district, or to justify large-scale investment in particular scientific or technological areas. But at other times and, I believe, more often, it has resulted from a mixture of narrow but laudable motives and perspectives that have led to the conviction that measures to promote national security are identical with measures to serve other more limited objectives. Defense Secretary Wilson put it more succinctly when he indicated he believed that what was good for General Motors was good for the country.

But such issues can almost be labeled traditional, for they arise in any decision-making process in which each of the participants necessarily views the world from a somewhat parochial point of view. Unfortunately, they are only the obvious parts of the iceberg. Below are numerous others that are less easily defined, but may be of more far-reaching and fundamental importance. Many of these issues prove ultimately to be questions of political control. For example, many observers have noted the disappearance, or blurring, of the distinction between the public and private sectors, growing largely out of the now-standard practice of contracting to industry, nonprofit organizations, and universities for government R & D. When several of the country's largest firms are entirely dependent on government business for their existence, when government must look to outside firms or individuals to define the choices before it, or when individuals divide their time between government and private positions, the distinctions between public and private become difficult to make. And then where does public responsibility lie? Who is accountable? Who, in fact, makes policy decisions, and with what political authority?

Extensive government contracting to the private sector itself raises important political questions. How can government effectively monitor and evaluate highly advanced projects in industry, if the technical competence resides only in industry? Is the delegation of responsibility for studies to define policy objectives in effect a delegation of governmental responsibility to private groups that have no political legitimacy? Does the movement of individuals in and out of government service, normally prized as one of the great strengths of American government today, in fact result in skewing government policies toward objectives defined by a tiny fraction of the electorate? How can large-scale technological programs such as Apollo or post-Apollo be effectively debated or evaluated in the political arena when virtually everyone with any political power is an interested party?

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These are real questions, questions that are peculiarly difficult to study as well as to deal with in government. They are difficult in large part because moral judgments on the facts, even if there is consensus on the facts, are fuzzy and unclear at best. Undoubtedly, the part-time participation of private scientists in recommending research fund allocations has resulted in biasing scientific support in certain directions favored by those scientists. Is that unfortunate? If the scientists have been faithful to criteria of quality, has the nation suffered, or has it prospered? Undoubtedly, the practice of calling on private industry and nonprofit organizations to evaluate government-supported programs or define public objectives has in some sense been a delegation of responsibilities normally reserved to government. But, if that practice has enlisted the most knowledgeable individuals in very complex technical subjects to work conscientiously under government auspices and direction, is there another method that could have produced a better result?

These procedures have their dangers, and they certainly have been abused at times. But no one really knows very much about how the procedures work in practice, much less what constitutes abuses and how extensive they have been. What is required is the kind of careful analysis that will provide the necessary information, showing what the long-range effects of the practices have been and are likely to be and suggesting safeguards or alternatives to meet the uncovered problems.

These issues are the kind that Nieburg analyzes in his book, but the desperately needed high quality is absent. The strength of the book is in its coverage, in its bringing to light many aspects of the science/government interface which are not often realized or discussed in one place, and in its ability to place forcefully before the reader potential relationships and ideas. Stylistically, the book is a great success.

But it is basically a political diatribe, a polemic without enough supporting evidence. If the evidence could have been produced, it would have been an exceedingly important book. As it is, it resembles most a tract from the thirties in which business and the business mentality are attacked as inherently evil, in which issues are seen as black and white, motives are assumed without evidence, and incidents are described from a highly biased point of view.

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to the necessity of making hard choices in the allocation process or in the procedures by which funds are made available by the government to the private sector. Even more, he argues that there has been a consistent pattern of delegation of political responsibility to the private sector which must now be reversed and that this will be hard to accomplish because those who benefit most from this delegation of power are deeply entrenched and will fight any reversal. In Nieburg's own words: "The nation cannot much longer evade the necessity for choice and for positive democratic planning. . . . Those who are most vociferous in attacking planning per se are the beneficiaries of the Contract State, the present system of inchoate and disguised planning. Our society must shake itself out of this scratchy groove in order to dispute the real issues: toward what objectives should the national energies and resources be directed? and how can democratic values be preserved?" (p. 383).

Nieburg's examination covers a broad panorama, and little escapes criticism. (At times, the knight on a white horse in one chapter turns into a villain in the next, as he himself comes under the author's magnifying glass.) Nieburg looks in turn at allocations of resources for space and military systems, the relation of scientific and technological activities to economic growth and the business community, the Oppenheimer case, R & D contracting practices, the nonprofit organizations, and, finally, the Bell report on improved contracting procedures (prepared under the chairmanship of David Bell when he was Director of the Bureau of the Budget) and Secretary McNamara's attempts to introduce better R & D contract control and incentives. In each substantive area he finds abuses of the public trust or of public funds which, if true, are scandalous. In the final chapters, he holds out the Bell report and McNamara's efforts as examples of the direction in which we must move.

These are important subjects, and the issues within them are subtle and far-reaching. The government is increasingly wrestling with development of means to ensure adequate political control and wise resource allocations in an environment in which the facts themselves are far from adequately known or documented and in which therefore the formulation of corrective policies or the formation of political coalitions capable of bringing about reform where needed is impeded. The government is clearly going to have to devise more sophisticated criteria for allocating resources in science and technology, for extending and strengthening the control over contracting introduced in the Kennedy administration, and for upgrading in-house technical competence in

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order to provide greater ability to monitor, evaluate, and control outside contractors. But what the exact needs are and how they can be achieved remain the significant questions. More's the pity, therefore, that Nieburg has presented a poorly documented, one-sided attack on the present situation and has offered little more than oversimplified calls for planning and increased in-house government competence as palliatives.

After all, there are differences of view about priority objectives in science and technology, not just because there are good guys and bad guys, but because we are dealing with a political process in which there is legitimate divergence of views. What criteria should be used, and how can they be applied? Those are the real questions, which are not answered simply by saying, as Nieburg does, that the private sector has too much power, too frequently abused, and that the government should take back the responsibility unwisely delegated.

Similarly, government must have greater internal competence to maintain control of contract funds for science and technology. Decrying past contracting practices and issuing a resounding call for "resurrection" of in-house laboratories simply is not a contribution to the debate. The private sector has been tapped so extensively by the government not as a means of lining industry's pockets ("The shibboleths of free enterprise perpetuate a system by which . . . the fruits of the civilian economy fall into the outstretched hands of the aerospace group" [p. 197]), but primarily because the competence and conditions have not existed within the government to do the job. How can the right balance between in-house laboratories and contracting-out be achieved? Large government laboratories with high-salaried scientists are not a panacea. For example, even if high quality can be achieved, large formal governmental structures are quite likely in time to become inflexible instruments of policy, so that they eventually become bottlenecks to wise allocation of resources rather than aids. This is not inevitable, but the assumption cannot be made that it will not happen. The problem of building in-house competence is real, but it is not simple.

Unfortunately, other problems with the Nieburg book must also be noted. One is the author's repeated tendency, normally the practice of the polemicist and not the scholar, to impute motives or describe perfectly normal relationships in terms that imply (or state) evil intentions and results, without supporting evidence. For example, he states with minimal discussion and no evidence that "industry seeks to exploit U.S. foreign aid programs to inject sophisticated American

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FROM THE CONTENTS

Articles by:

Claude LEVI-STRAUSS	
COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES	Communication systems and resources.
James R. MILLER	On line analysis for social scientists.
Oscar CORNBLIT—Torcuato DI TELLA—Ezequiel GALLO	A model for political change in Latin America.
Marisa ZAVALLONI	Comparability of indicators in cross-cultural attitudes surveys.

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VOL. VII **NÚM. 4**

INDICE

Artículos

Helio Jaguaribe: "Modelos políticos y desarrollo nacional en América Latina"
Elisabeth M. Esser: "La posición de México respecto al regionalismo"
L. S. Sing: "Des-Sukarnización en Indonesia"
Norma Sharara: "Egipto y la Unidad Arabe"

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products into backward nations" (p. 71). Or, in another context, Nieburg charges, without any adduced evidence, that corporations follow "a deliberate tendency to avoid the formality of reporting to the government patentable processes or devices that emerge from [government-supported R & D], because of the greater advantages in asserting a proprietary claim" (p. 83). There is no way of proving that Nieburg is wrong. All I can say is that the burden of proof ought to be on the author. There is a general paucity of documentation to support many of the statements made throughout the book, statements that cry out for proof or evidence.

In a related vein, Nieburg charges that NIH has "had difficulty recruiting professionals to supervise these [R & D] programs, relying upon part-time panels made up largely of those who are recipients of grants and have a vested interest in the advice proffered" (p. 228). This is a perfect example of the problem repeatedly encountered in the text. What he is describing is the so-called peer-group selection process for research projects, consciously designed by the government expressly as the *best* means of judging scientific quality, and not adopted because of inadequate ability to recruit. In this case, Congress wrote the system into law. There are important problems with the system, but the only way to deal with them is by much better understanding than we now have of how the system works, of its strengths and weaknesses, and of possible alternatives.

The book also has an excessive number of factual errors; in many cases in which I have personal knowledge of a situation, I find the facts wrong or questionable. The author's statement that the Hardtack data confirmed the "big-hole" theory concerning the muffling of underground nuclear tests is misleading (its primary relevance was to the propagation characteristics of seismic disturbances); his statement that President Kennedy proposed a joint lunar program with the Soviet Union as "a way out" of the dangerous Apollo program is essentially wrong (Kennedy's motives were based primarily on international political objectives); the selection of Vanguard as the IGY satellite program was not a compromise between Air Force and Army proposals, as he claims, but instead was made to avoid any interference with top-priority military missile development; numerous dates are cited incorrectly; and so forth.

Where evidence is cited to support particular conclusions, it proves, all too often, to be derived from congressional hearings in which unevaluated testimony is quoted as factual support. In one case, Nieburg describes scientists as follows: "The scientist, *according to one study,*

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is a unique species differing in certain aspects from the common run of mankind: he is 'highly intelligent, individualistic, radical, retiring and unsociable, generally unhappy in his home life, and married to an unattractive woman' " (p. 118, italics added). The source cited, when the footnote is inconveniently tracked down at the end of the book, turns out to be a study of the impressions of scientists held by college students.

In addition, on a substantial number of occasions the text is contradictory, first attacking scientists, then praising them, or first criticizing universities for their attitudes toward government support and then looking to universities as one of the ways out of excessive reliance on industry. And the use of statistics and funding information leaves something to be desired. At one point, Nieburg refers to the total hardware and R & D budget of DOD and NASA, and then blurs the distinction between R & D and procurement. In another case, he cites a Government Accounting Office study of abuses of the contract system in which overcharges are detailed. Nieburg extrapolates the figure over a decade and reports, with horror, "A projection . . . would indicate contract waste for the decade of the 1950's well over $1 billion" (p. 269). If Nieburg's figures are correct, that would average out at some $100 million per year—a very respectable sum, but still less than one percent waste in the defense budget over that period. That's not to be condoned, but the figures scarcely warrant the degree of concern (in fact, that estimate is probably too low).

Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that I came away from Professor Nieburg's book profoundly disappointed. It is a tour de force of a kind in its sweep, in its single-minded purpose, and in its language. But it is essentially a journalistic account of important issues, primarily based on superficial sources, sometimes exhibiting only a casual concern for accuracy and precision, and thereby contributing little to the badly needed examination of those issues. Undoubtedly, many of Nieburg's criticisms and accusations are correct, but on what basis can one separate the valid from the hypothetical?

Professor Lakoff's collection of essays is a much more straightforward work, aimed at illuminating the field of science and government without having a particular point of view to support at every turn. It is a collection of solid essays (many of which were originally prepared for the Harvard Science and Public Policy Seminar and were not previously available), but by being less controversial is also less stimulating. Of the four parts of the book, the first is devoted entirely to a brilliant essay by Lakoff himself on the history of science

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in social thought from Francis Bacon to the present. As a summary of the history of philosophical thought as it pertains to science, it is an excellent piece of work. It should probably stand on its own, for its conjunction with fourteen other essays all concerned with practical politics is somewhat anomalous. Lakoff apparently perceives this and labels the piece "Preface," but that is not a real solution.

The other sections deal with more practical matters. The first of these consists of six case studies of issues that have arisen between science and government. These are followed by three essays on the organizational structure for the making of science policy in the U.S. government. The five essays at the end are devoted to more generalized questions of the role of scientists in policy-making and the allocation of resources for science.

Aside from Lakoff's opening essay, probably the two contributions of greatest interest and significance for issues of science policy are the essays in the last section by Alvin Weinberg, Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, on "Criteria for Scientific Choice," and by Harvey Brooks, Dean of Engineering Sciences at Harvard, on "Future Needs for the Support of Basic Research." Both of these directly address the extremely difficult but central question of how to determine the amount and the distribution of support for basic research.

Dr. Weinberg's article in particular by now counts as a classic in the field. Originally appearing in *Minerva* in 1963, it was the first serious attempt to establish criteria for judging scientific projects which went beyond those judgments of the quality of the investigator and of the validity of his research focus and design which are the staples of the present system. Dr. Weinberg proposed that three additional external criteria be recognized: he termed these criteria measures of technological, scientific, and social merit. The first relates to technological needs, the second to how much a field of research contributes to neighboring scientific disciplines, and the third to how much a field of research contributes to a defined social goal such as national prestige or international cooperation. The importance of the article lies not in that it solves the question of criteria for scientific choice, but rather that it opens debate in a new and profitable direction. Weinberg's criteria do not, by themselves, make more precise or operational the process of choice. But they do suggest new measures and new ways to study allocations for science.

Dean Brooks's article, which first appeared in the volume of essays *Basic Research and National Goals,* prepared by the National Academy of Sciences at the request of Congress, is in effect a *tour d'horizon* of

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the issues that enter into the general question of how much support should in the future be allocated for basic research. Until now, the annual increase in support by the federal government for basic research has been a variable amount, dependent on political factors, luck, budget pressures, and the like. About the only calculation not entering in the decision has been how much money basic research *should* receive, and that calculation has been absent because no one knows how to perform it. Dean Brooks in this essay attempts to provide at least a partial base for a quantitative determination, by deriving a relationship between the nation's announced goals for graduate education and the support for basic research. His conclusion is that to meet those goals alone, university research support will have to rise by at least thirteen to fifteen percent per year.

At least as important in the essay are Dean Brooks's review of the management of science statistics; his categorization of science support into aggregates that are more useful for analysis than misleading divisions into basic research, applied research, and development; and his exposition of the justifications for investment of public funds in basic research.

The Weinberg and Brooks essays stand out in significance. Several others may not be quite as important, but still are excellent pieces of work and particularly useful for students of science and public policy. Notable in this category is McGeorge Bundy's little piece "The Scientist and National Policy," in which he details simply and briefly why the scientist "should be there" in the making of policy. Among the points he makes are three that are often misunderstood when considering the role of scientists in government: first, that the scientific elements of policy issues *cannot* be isolated from other aspects of those issues; second, that it is nonsense to talk about the political neutrality of scientists; and third, that often the scientific information a policymaker wants is *not* known. These three points are absolutely salient to the scientists' participation in the policy process, and often the opposite of each is assumed to be true.

Other essays of high quality and value are Lakoff's essay on the Oppenheimer case, Daniel Greenberg's case study of Project Mohole, Stanley Reiser's analysis of how Congress reacted to the smoking/cancer link, and Enid Bok Schoettle's case study of the establishment of NASA. All of these add considerably to the factual literature and analysis available in the field.

The remaining pieces are of variable quality; in particular, the section concerned with the existing science policy machinery in the

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government is weak. Carl Fischer's essay offering a profile of the President's Science Advisory Committee provides useful information but little evaluation of the information brought to light either in social or political terms. In the same section, Eilene Galloway analyzes three proposals for providing scientific advice for Congress—clearly an important subject, but the proposals analyzed are not the right ones. None of them has a serious chance of enactment, but more promising possibilities are not dealt with. And Lakoff's third essay, dealing largely with the development of the role of scientists in Washington, is not of the caliber of his others. Its fault is a lack of a realistic sense of operations in Washington, a sense that perhaps can only be had with at least some time spent working for the government. As a result, Lakoff's approach has an air of unreality, and the essay proves to be somewhat superficial and at times rather misleading. However, the weakness of this and a few of the other essays in the third section of the book do not seriously detract from the overall judgment that the book is a valuable and thoughtful addition to the literature.

Thus, we have two contrasting entries in the newly accepted political "field" of science and technology. Nieburg's *In the Name of Science* is bold, brash, outspoken, but finally of little net value. Lakoff's *Knowledge and Power* is less original, more scholarly, more diffuse in scope, less easy reading, but ultimately of greater use in moving research ahead in the field. The two together represent the present state of the art; there is much work to be done.

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